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Daisy Louise Dixon  
 
Abstract 
Art viewers and critics talk as if visual artworks say things, express messages, or have 
meanings. For instance, Picasso’s Guernica has been described as a “generic plea against 
the barbarity and terror of war”, forming a “powerful anti-war statement”. 
One way of understanding meaning in art is to draw analogies with language. My 
thesis explores how the notion of a speech act – an utterance with a performative aspect – 
can illuminate art’s power to ‘speak’. In recent years, philosophers of art have explored 
speech act theory in relation to literary art, though barely at all in relation to visual art. Given 
the way we talk about painting, sculpture, installation, film, and photography, and given that 
artists have investigated performativity through their art, this neglect is surprising.  
My thesis develops two main arguments. First, artwork meaning is active. I argue that 
visual artworks, under certain conditions, are speech acts. They have propositional content, 
and they have a certain force: they can do things such as assert, protest, and criticise – things 
we would normally do with words. I defend these contested claims against several dissenters, 
and explore some consequences: in particular, I explore how art can lie, a hitherto neglected 
question. 
Second, artwork meaning is flexible. I argue that what an artwork says and does is 
affected by the context in which it’s displayed, and in particular, by its curation. As a result, 
an artwork’s content and force can vary from context to context. This goes against a 
dominant view in the philosophy of art – what I call ‘Originalism’ – that the meaning of an 
artwork is fixed by factors which held at the time of the work’s creation, and so cannot 
change across time. I argue that this is mistaken: artworks can change in meaning. Curatorial 
factors can affect an artwork’s content and force, and consequently its social effects. 
It is known that our verbal speech has the power to oppress and liberate people in a 
society. My thesis aims to show that art also has this power to shape society; through what 
it says, and through what it does.  
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Introduction 
 
 
1. Art as speech 
 
A tapestry reproduction of Picasso’s Guernica (1937) was covered up by United Nations 
officials during the US Secretary of State’s presentation of the American case for war against 
Iraq, in 2003. Guernica is a large, looming painting, with shades of black and grey exploding 
into chaotic shapes and distorted, contorted, screaming figures. The painting depicts the 
German Luftwaffe air raid that destroyed the ancient town of Guernica in the tenth month of 
the Spanish Civil war, which killed or wounded a third of the village of 5,000. The desolate 
mural has been described by art historians as a “protest-painting” (Foster et al, 2004: 285), 
and more generally by viewers as a “generic plea against the barbarity and terror of war”,1 
and “a bold visual protest” which challenges our notions of warfare, thus forming a 
“powerful anti-war statement”. 2 The literal cover-up at the UN headquarters in New York 
demonstrated the acute power of the mural as speech: the artwork’s vehement anti-war 
message, “threatened to speak to historical parallels that the Bush administration and UN 
officials were clearly determined that the media or the public should not make” (David 
Walsh, 2003). 
Visual art has the power to speak to us in this way, without using words. For centuries, 
we have ascribed ‘meaning’ to artworks, understanding art to communicate ideas, emotions, 
and other kinds of content. For instance, a dictum coined by Pope Gregory the Great in 
600AD held that religious paintings were “books” for the illiterate (Duggan, 2005: 66). 
According to Pope Gregory, 
 
Pictures are used in churches so that those who are ignorant of letters may at least read 
by seeing on the walls what they cannot read in books (codicibus)…What writing 
(scriptura) does for the literate, a picture does for the illiterate looking at it.3 
   
                                                 
1 Leal, P. E., (1992) 
2 PBS: Treasures of the World (n.d.) 
3 Quote from Duggan (2005: 63). 
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Paintings depicting stories from the Old Testament and New Testament evoked not only 
religious emotion, but also expressed “the important messages of the scriptures to those who 
could not read them” (Williamson, 2004: 66).  
Many have said that visual art has ‘meaning’, and many have acted as if this was the 
case. The cover-up of the Guernica reproduction at the UN is an instance of censoring a 
work because of its potent meaning, as speech. Throughout history, artists have been 
commissioned to make art that communicates ideals and principles to particular audiences. 
Matthias Grünewald’s Isenheim Altarpiece (1516) – a startling depiction of the Crucifixion 
which originally stood in the Monastery of St Anthony – was commissioned to convey a 
particular message which would aid the healing program for diseased patients at the 
monastery. An art historian writes: 
 
That Grünewald chose to transcribe a presumably predetermined program into visual 
language that touches the experiences of these patients only brings out more 
dramatically…his extraordinary capacity to be affected by this context and his evident 
need to communicate with this special group of viewers (Hayum, 1977: 516). 
 
And because art is so readily regarded as speech, it is often protected by principles of free 
speech, alongside some visual pornography and political cartoons. Censorship of artworks 
causes uproar, for it is seen as an infringement of the right to free speech.4   
 
2. The Puzzle 
 
This communicative function of art has been understood through two main areas within the 
philosophy of art. On the one hand is the idea that art’s meaning is to be identified with just 
the emotion it expresses (Langer 1953; 1957, Ducasse 1944). For example, the meaning of 
Guernica is identified with an expression of negative emotion towards war. The problem 
with this approach though is that art does so much more than express emotion. 5 It also 
expresses ideas and concepts. It says things.  
                                                 
4 For instance, consider the Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine attacks in 2015, the destruction of Banksy’s anti-
immigration pigeon mural in 2014, and the philosophical debate about pornography being protected as free 
speech (see MacKinnon 1987; 1993, and Langton 1993).   
5 For consideration of various theories of how art expresses emotion, see Matravers (2009), and for a defence 
of ‘the arousal theory’ in particular see Matravers (1991; 1998). 
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On the other hand is the idea that art just is a kind of language. Under this idea, 
Guernica communicates as a language, with its own kind of syntax and semantics.6 The 
problem with this approach though is that while art and language share some features, it is 
very dubious that art is strictly a language. There are important disanalogies between visual 
art and sentential language: visual art doesn’t possess its own grammar and syntax for one 
thing. Language is conventional; its marks have meaning due to the rule-governed 
conventions, and it contains a fixed vocabulary and rule-governed grammar, resulting in 
compositionality (the ability to generate infinite sentences) (Margolis, 1974: 176-177). 
While artworks often use conventional symbols (such as using a dove to represent peace), 
this doesn't go far enough to show that all artworks can be construed in terms of a vocabulary 
and grammar. Nothing like the finite grammar that helps generate well-formed sentences 
can be formulated for the arts (Margolis, 179); in fact, this would probably hinder artistic 
creation. So the claim that art possesses a fixed vocabulary and syntax is far-fetched: 
“pictures cannot be ‘read’ in the same way as, or as fully as, a book” (Duggan, 2005: 95). 
So while people speak and act as if art communicates messages, there is a puzzle to be 
solved. The puzzle is: how can visual art have ‘meaning’, and ‘speak’ in this way, without 
containing words, or without being a language in the ordinary sense?  
While art shouldn’t be regarded strictly as a language, it is illuminating to treat art as 
sharing some important features with language. Under this picture, the notion that art can 
‘speak’ isn’t interpreted literally in the sense that art uses a strict vocabulary and grammar, 
but rather, as indicating a close and important link between art and sentential language.7 
A recent dominant avenue to solve the puzzle this way is to primarily look to the role 
of the artist’s intentions about their artwork, and the relationship between these intentions 
and the work itself. The Intentionalist Debate in the philosophy of art does this, and explores 
the nature of artwork meaning by drawing analogies between art and language. The idea is 
that artworks are like utterances, in that they have a ‘speaker’ (artist), and a meaning, which 
is communicated to the viewer.8 The competing positions in the debate consider whether and 
how the artist’s intentions partly determine the meaning of their art, and how facts about a 
work’s original context partly determine the work’s meaning. 
                                                 
6 Carter (1974; 1976) and Goodman (1976) can be said to hold something like this view, or at least variations 
of it. 
7 See Hagberg (1995) for a Wittgensteinian treatment of this link between art and language.  
8 For example, see Carroll (1992; 2001), Levinson (1992; 1996), and Stecker (2003; 2006). 
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I wish to explore a new avenue to solve the puzzle. Like the Intentionalist Debate does, 
I want to use philosophy of language to shed light on meaning in art, but my interest is in 
three features of language which have hitherto been somewhat neglected in the philosophy 
of visual art: illocutionary force, propositional content, and norms of communication. When 
we consider how these might apply to artworks, we will be in a position to make two novel 
contributions. First, we can make visible the power of artworks as speech acts: the meaning 
of artworks is to be understood in terms of their force, as speech acts. Second, we will see 
the role of curation in determining an artwork’s meaning: a factor neglected by all parties, 
but crucial to an understanding of ‘how to do things with artworks’. Both contributions have 
implications for the Intentionalist Debate which I outline later on.  
 
2.1. Active meaning  
 
Let us explore how the notion of a speech act – an utterance with a performative aspect – 
can illuminate art’s power to ‘speak’. To do so, we need not treat art literally as a form of 
language. J. L. Austin (1962) noted that philosophers had hitherto overlooked the capacity 
of speakers to do things with words. Philosophers were too focused on sense and reference, 
and he wished to bring out the performative aspect of language use. When we speak, we’re 
not merely uttering sentences with propositional contents, but we’re also doing something 
with those words. The utterance, in that context, has a particular force. Suppose I say “You’ll 
close that door”. I say something that has a certain propositional content, what Austin called 
a ‘locutionary act’. But I am also doing something: perhaps issuing a command, making 
threat, or making a prediction, what Austin calls an ‘illocutionary act’. The force of my 
uttered sentence affects what kind of message I communicate, or the meaning I express.  
I shall be arguing that the ‘meaning’ of artworks likewise has these two components: 
illocutionary force and propositional content. While Austin was able to take for granted that 
sentences have propositional content, that artworks have propositional content cannot be 
taken for granted: it has been highly contested that artworks express propositions. So, my 
argument that artworks have an ‘active meaning’ is two-fold: artworks can have 
illocutionary force and propositional content. When an artwork’s content is put forth with a 
certain force, such as assertion, this comprises a message. It is these messages that comprise 
an artwork’s overall meaning.  
This adaption of speech act theory to art, or at least the sentiment, is not new. Indeed, 
Jerrold Levinson claims that “art-making…is closely analogous to a speech act: an act of 
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attempted communication…” (1996: 180). However, this investigation has hitherto almost 
exclusively been concerned with literary art such as poems9, and barely at all in relation to 
visual art, which most of the time has merely been gestured to.10 A few philosophers have 
more systematically adapted speech act theory to visual works, most notably Novitz (1977) 
and Kjørup (1974; 1977). But these have tended to limit their arguments to more simple 
pictures, such as visual signs used in ordinary conversation. My thesis ventures into 
relatively unchartered territory: I focus on visual art, and adapt aspects of speech act theory 
to what I call the ‘artworld’, doing justice to the artworld’s complexities, such as exhibition-
making and the role of the curator.  
 
 
2.2. Flexible meaning and the overlooked curator  
 
 
Meaning, which includes both content and force, is normally informed by the context of 
utterance, in linguistic situations. For example, we need to consult the context of utterance 
in which a speaker says, “I’ll take that one”, to fully parse the sentence’s content and force: 
what does the demonstrative ‘that’ refer to, who is the speaker, and is this an order or 
request? 
Similarly for artwork meaning, a work’s content and its force are informed by context. 
Grounding an artwork’s meaning in its perceptual properties alone, or the artist’s intentions 
alone, is too limited to make sense of how we engage with art. Indeed, it’s been argued that 
the formal qualities of a work are connected to historical facts (Walton, 1970; Davies, 2006b: 
60), and concentrating on artist intentions alone has absurd consequences for meaning more 
generally. So, when determining artwork meaning, the context needs to be consulted in some 
way.  
The aesthetics literature acknowledges the importance of context to a work’s meaning, 
in particular, the context in which the artwork was created.11 But it is yet to give sufficient 
attention to the question of whether the context of a curated exhibition in the artworld, and 
the role of the curator in a certain socio-political context, bear on artwork meaning.12  
                                                 
9 For example, see Eaton (1983), de Gaynesford (2009; 2011), Mikkonen (2010), and Mole (2013). 
10 For example, see Levinson (1996: 180) and Stecker (2003: 20). 
11 See for example Davies (1996; 2006b), Levinson (1990), and Stecker (2003). 
12 A notable exception is Ventzislavov (2014). However, Ventzislavov doesn’t explore in detail as to how 
exactly the curator can contribute to artwork meaning, and moreover, he focuses more on the relation between 
the curator and artistic value.  
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Originating from the word cura (care) from the Medieval period, a curator is someone 
who cares for, develops, and organises collections of objects, in this case, artworks (Balzer, 
2014: 24-27). Broadly speaking, curators are exhibition-makers, ranging from museum 
employees who research and care for delicate, historical objects such as Chinese fans or 
European Renaissance illuminated manuscripts, to autonomous freelancers who work in the 
contemporary artworld, exercising authority and power over large art displays, such as Hans 
Ulrich Obrist, Beatrix Ruf, and Harald Szeemann. 
In recent years, the curator appears to have gathered more power over the generation 
of meaning in the artworks curated. With Europe’s “institutional acceptance” of conceptual 
art in 1972, and with this the concepts of the exhibition and of curation becoming self-critical 
(Foster et al, 2004: 554), curators were required to digest and communicate these growing 
complexities of the artworld in the 1960s and 1970s: 
 
In this crucial moment, the curator’s custodial or caretaking position becomes 
supplanted by that of the connoisseur; or rather, custodianship becomes 
connoisseurship. Curators no longer tended ground, but secured, organised and 
landscaped it (Balzer, 2014: 40). 
 
When developing a show, curators implement an exhibition concept, and liaise with 
publishers, artists, the media, and galleries, “in effect, shaping creatively in their own right” 
(Wells, 2007: 29). Hans Ulrich Obrist writes: 
 
[The curator] is no longer understood as simply the person who fills a space with 
objects, but as the person who brings different cultural spheres into contact, invents 
new display features, and makes junctions that allow unexpected encounters and 
results (2014: 24). 
Curators are thus beginning to take on more creative and artistic roles, constructing and 
shaping dialogues between works – works that are not always intended by their artists to be 
exhibited together. Consequently, the curator and the artist “now closely imitate each other’s 
position” (O’Neill, 2010: 252)13, but where the artwork and artist are often “subsumed by 
the identity of the whole curatorial endeavour” (O’Neill, 255). Indeed, the curator Liz Wells 
(2007: 31-32) talks of “curatorial strategy” and “curatorial voice” forming “critical 
                                                 
13 Ventzislavov even argues that “curating should be understood as a fine art” (2014: 83). 
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interventions” in the exhibition space, where artists’ works are used to fit into a broader 
project defined by the curator. 
The curator, their place in the artworld, and the wider socio-political contexts in which 
they operate, have been overlooked in the literature on artwork meaning. My thesis gives 
them some much-needed attention. In particular, I focus on the effects of curation in 
exhibitions. I consider how curation creates norms of communication within the artworld, 
how it helps generate metaphorical content in artworks, and how it can help create new 
situations in which artworks are interpreted, resulting, I argue, in their meaning 
accumulating. Broadly, I argue that curatorial decisions can affect the meaning of artworks 
by influencing what is done and said by the work as a speech act. In other words, curation 
and context are the mechanisms by which artworks can shift in their content and force.14  
 
2.3. Shallow and deep meaning  
 
When we inspect what Guernica means or says, we notice that it depicts what happened 
during a specific war – the Spanish Civil War – but it also expresses deeper messages about 
the nature of war itself. The reason its reproduction was covered up at the UN wasn’t 
because Guernica depicts a specific air raid, but because of what it says about that air raid 
and its more general deeper anti-war message. To make sense of this feature exhibited by 
most artworks, we need to distinguish between different levels of content in an artwork. 
Throughout the thesis I make use of this independently motivated distinction; what I call 
shallow content and deep content. When shallow or deep content is expressed with a certain 
illocutionary force, such as assertion, it generates shallow and deep messages. Such 
messages can be broadly understood as the “the product[s] of coming to understand the 
work”, by grasping a work’s representational and expressive properties (Nathan, 2006: 282).  
A shallow message is generated by what might be called the work’s ‘depictive 
content’: whatever the work immediately depicts, or what it says at a descriptive level. For 
example, Guernica depicts a light bulb in the sky above the unfolding attack. The painting 
therefore shallowly says, roughly, there was a light bulb in the sky when Guernica was 
bombed. A deep message of a work can be construed as that content which goes beyond this 
descriptive content, and forms the ‘point’ of the piece. Deep messages can be expressed 
                                                 
14  This thought is gestured at by Ivan Gaskell’s suggestion that “meaning might be generated by the 
juxtaposition of works of art” (2000: 86). 
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through shallow content, perhaps via the use of metaphor or presupposition. For example, 
the way that the attack is depicted in Guernica, and the painting’s use of certain symbols, 
serve to express the deep message that war is barbaric.  
Exactly how a work depicts objects at the shallow level has prompted several answers 
which can be classed into three diverging approaches to depiction: resemblance-based, 
convention-based, and psychology-based.  
The resemblance-based approach to depiction has it that for something to depict an 
object, it must somehow resemble that object. This resemblance has been understood in a 
variety of ways. First, in terms of sense as opposed to reference, whereby the mode of 
presentation (sense) of a picture is “an aspect or view of an object or arrangement of objects, 
relative to an implicit point (or a variety of points) of view” (Hyman & Bantinaki, 2017). 
According to Hyman, the sense of a picture is determined by the surface marks constituting 
colours and shapes, which are governed by optical principles (Hyman, 2006). A picture’s 
sense is considered independent from any artistic style or tradition in which the picture 
belongs, and independent from any artist intention or experience in the viewer.  
Second, resemblance has been understood “in respect of perceptible features that 
jointly capture the object’s overall appearance” (Abell & Bantinaki, 2010: 6). The main 
proponent of this view, Abell (2009), has it that “different respects of resemblance govern 
different instances of depiction” (2009: 196), such as optical or response-dependent 
properties, and these should at least be visible (199). In contrast to Hyman, Abell argues 
that the various respects of resemblance in a picture do depend on the artist’s intentions and 
offers a Gricean treatment of this artist communication (2009).  
Shallow content under a broadly resemblance-based approach would therefore be 
generated by the picture’s surface marks and the colours and shapes they form, or by various 
aspects of resemblance to the object represented in the artwork, capturing the object’s 
overall appearance as a result of the intention of the artist or picture-maker. 
The convention-based approach holds that depiction constitutes the necessary and 
sufficient structural features of a picture, which are possessed “in virtue of their relationship 
to other members of the system of representation to which they belong” (Abell & Bantinaki, 
2010: 3). Rejecting the idea that there is simple imitation or resemblance to the world, 
conventionalists hold that depiction is governed instead by sets of conventions and symbols 
which are part of a representational system, and crucially, which denote their objects in the 
same way that referential terms in language denote objects (Goodman, 1968 and Kulvicki, 
2006): 
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A picture that represents—like a passage that describes—an object refers to and, more 
particularly, denotes it. Denotation is the core of representation and is independent of 
resemblance (Goodman, 1968: 5). 
 
While depictions and linguistic descriptions are equally “arbitrary” and “conventional”, 
according to Goodman, they differ in that depiction belongs to a broad symbol system which 
is analog (syntactically and semantically dense) and replete, meaning that any slight change 
in the picture’s shapes, lines, composition, size, or colour will be relevant to what the picture 
represents (Goodman 1968: 229-231). Shallow content under this approach would therefore 
be generated by the artwork’s denotative symbols which will belong to certain depictive 
systems. For example, Guernica depicts an injured horse because a part of the painting 
constitutes a symbol which somehow denotes that object, rather than the depiction being 
governed by a resemblance relation, for instance.15 
Lastly, the psychological approach to depiction can be divided into experiential 
theories and recognitional theories (Hyman & Bantinaki, 2017). Roughly, an experiential 
theory holds that for something to depict an object it is necessary that it elicits “a perceptual 
experience with a certain phenomenology” (Abell & Bantinaki, 2010: 5). This ‘certain 
phenomenology’ might involve: an illusion that one is seeing the actual thing that is depicted 
(Gombrich 1977); a ‘two-folded’ experience of both the object depicted and the picture’s 
surface medium (Wollheim, 1987); an “experienced resemblance” (Hyman & Bantinaki, 
2017), whereby our experience of the depiction must resemble in some respect the 
experience we’d have if we saw the object in the flesh (Budd, 1993; Hopkins, 1995; 
Peacocke, 1987); or it must cause a game of visual make-believe with the depicted object 
(Walton, 1990).  
In contrast, a recognitional theory holds that for an object to depict something it is 
necessary that it “engage those mechanisms that are responsible for our ability to recognise 
that object in the flesh” (Abell & Bantinaki, 2010: 6). This needn’t involve a felt experience 
as per the experiential approaches, but involves ‘sub-personal processes’ of the spectator. 
According to this theory of depiction, pictures activate recognitional skills in the viewer 
which are normally used in ordinary visual perception: “a picture of O is precisely something 
                                                 
15 Denotation here is understood as a relation between a symbol and an object, such as between a name and its 
bearer. For a critical review of Goodman’s notion of denotation in depiction see Hyman & Bantinaki (2017).  
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which can trigger the interpreter’s O-recognising abilities” (Schier 1986: 195); “The ability 
to work out what pictures depict covaries with the ability to recognize their depicta in the 
flesh” (Lopes, 2005: 170). 16  The competence with which a viewer engages their 
recognitional abilities will be relativised to certain pictorial systems or styles:  
 
A suitable perceiver for Picasso’s Vollard must be able to recognize cubist design–
content correlations. Somebody who can recognize Vollard but cannot interpret cubist 
pictures is not a suitable perceiver of such a picture. We must say that a suitable 
perceiver of a picture must have a competence in its system (Lopes, 1996: 153).  
 
Shallow content under a broadly psychological approach would therefore be generated by 
the artwork eliciting felt or ‘sub-personal’ experiences similar to those that are caused by 
seeing objects in ordinary visual perception. For instance, Guernica depicts a screaming 
horse because it invokes in the spectator an experience somehow similar to the one we’d 
have if we saw such a horse outside of the picture.  
All these theories of depiction invoke a particular “standard of correctness” (Abell & 
Bantinaki, 2010), which will also be relevant to our notion of shallow content. This standard 
constitutes a necessary condition for depiction: it is needed in order to explain how 
something forms a depiction of something else, rather than something accidentally 
resembling an object, or something accidentally eliciting a particular phenomenology in the 
spectator. For instance, stains on a wall might form the appearance of a face via resemblance 
relations or by eliciting an experience with the same phenomenology as an experience 
evoked by a picture of a face (2010: 6). But the stains on the wall do not depict a face. So, 
depiction theorists stipulate a condition or relation that something must bear to an object if 
it is to depict it.  
There are two schools of thought about this standard. The first relates to intention: 
“something must have been intended by its maker to bear the relevant phenomenological, 
recognitional, or resemblance relation to an object if it is to depict it” (2010: 7). The second 
relates to causality, where the content of the depiction must have been caused by the object 
in some way. While photographs are directly causally related to their objects, some theorists 
                                                 
16 According to Lopes, denotation plays a role in depiction, but not in Goodman’s sense of the relation being 
arbitrary. Rather, “What pictures symbolise may depend in crucial respects on the perceptual skills of their 
interpreters” (Lopes, 1996: 93, 111). 
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hold that non-photographic pictures are indirectly causally related to their objects “via a 
series of preceding information states that have those objects as their sources” (2010: 7, 
Lopes 1996). So, an artwork’s shallow content will either be partially generated by the 
intentions of the artist, or by causal relations between the object depicted and the depiction 
itself. 
I do not intend, in this thesis, to place shallow content in a particular depiction theory; 
I believe that shallow content in general can be understood rather well under any of the three 
approaches to depiction. However, as I will explain in Chapter 3, my proposition theory of 
art potentially invokes a broadly psychological theory of depiction, with an intentional 
standard of correctness. Despite this, I don’t set out to argue for such an approach. Rather, I 
merely note that given that my proposition theory of art makes use of agents performing 
cognitive actions, this suggests that it enjoys some obvious links with a broadly 
psychological and intentional theory of how exactly a picture depicts an object. 
Given that my arguments in this thesis are designed to incorporate both picture-based 
artworks, and artworks which are not strictly speaking pictures such as sculpture and 
installation, I intend ‘depiction’ to be taken rather broadly, to encompass pictures as well as 
other art-forms. Unfortunately, not a huge amount has been done to fully extend the notion 
of depiction to non-pictorial art-forms. But what can be said is that, depending on which 
depiction theory is adhered to, it will need to be tweaked to allow for certain resemblance, 
conventional, or psychological ‘respects’ of depiction, which are unique to the art-form at 
hand (for instance, sculptures but not pictures have a distinctive relation with 3D space). 
The extended analysis would presumably be done whilst holding on to core features of that 
depiction theory, such as resemblance relations, syntax and symbol systems, or 
psychological qualities (Hopkins, 2003).  It is not my goal in this thesis to fully establish 
such an extension of the concept of depiction, but it’s important to bear in mind that I’m not 
using the term ‘depiction’ to refer purely to picture-based artworks.17 
The shallow/deep distinction has similar counterparts in the aesthetics literature. For 
instance, DeWitt Parker anticipated the distinction, labelling it ‘surface meaning’ and ‘depth 
meaning’ respectively: 
 
                                                 
17 See Hopkins (2003) for a more comprehensive application of depiction to sculpture. 
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Many poems and some works of plastic art possess what I like to call “depth 
meanings” – meanings of universal scope underneath relatively concrete meanings 
or ideas. Thus in the following line of one of Frost's little poems  
Nothing gold can stay 
the word “gold” has its usual surface meaning, but underneath that is its depth 
meaning, precious; so in addition to saying that nothing golden can endure, the poet 
is saying that nothing valuable can abide — a more universal statement (Parker, 1920: 
32). 
 
More recent theorists allude to this distinction as well. A shallow message can be unpacked 
as being generated by what a work represents or depicts at its “subject level” (Lamarque, 
2009: 150) or “descriptive level” (Korsmeyer, 1985: 203). For example, the subject level of 
Guernica consists of an airstrike destroying a town; the painting represents, at a shallow 
level, the bombing of Guernica. This will in turn express a shallow message related to this 
content, such as Guernica was destroyed in the Spanish Civil War. Deep messages, on the 
other hand, can be unpacked as belonging to the ‘theme’ of the work, which form “a 
perspective or…general reflection that informs the subject matter and moves beyond the 
immediate events portrayed” (Lamarque, 150). Or, deep messages can be considered 
comprising the ‘thesis’ or ‘point’ of a work (Carroll, 2001: 166), the work’s ‘moral 
messages’ (Korsmeyer, 203), or they might comprise what Gabriel Greenberg calls “artistic 
representation” as opposed to pictorial representation: “…artworks are characteristically 
tuned to expressive and metaphorical significance beyond literal content…” (2013: 220). 
For example, a thesis of Guernica might be that war is barbaric. Moreover, shallow 
messages are commonly considered to be often expressed explicitly, and deep messages 
often expressed implicitly (Carroll, ibid & Weitz, 1950: 142). 
I don’t intend these other conceptions to entirely capture the shallow/deep distinction 
in artworks. For instance, shallow/deep content will not always correspond with being 
explicit/implicit, for deep messages could be expressed explicitly and shallow messages 
expressed implicitly. Moreover, shallow/deep content will not always correspond with 
being non-moral/moral, for shallow messages can be moral messages, and deep messages 
needn’t be morally loaded. But I hope that these other conceptions help further clarify the 
distinction.  
It’s important to note that the above is not meant to suffice as a definition of these 
meaning levels in art. And this thesis is not an attempt to argue for their existence. Rather, 
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I make use of this distinction which is frequently used in the aesthetics literature, and which 
is hopefully familiar and intuitive to art-viewers. 
 
3. Thesis plan 
 
While each chapter in this thesis is designed to be self-contained, each one complements and 
provides further support for the other, either by one chapter defending assumptions made in 
another, or by one chapter filling in explanatory gaps and consequences left open by another. 
The dialectic is as follows. 
Chapter 1 – The Illocutionary Force of Artworks – argues that artworks can perform 
illocutionary acts. We talk about art ‘challenging’, ‘protesting’, and ‘questioning’ certain 
states of affairs. Within natural language, these are familiar speech acts: things we normally 
do with words. But can art – and, more pressingly, non-verbal art – perform such actions? 
How artworks do things without words is far from obvious. Chapter 1 defends the claim that 
art can perform such actions, and identifies these with J.L Austin’s ‘illocutionary acts’. By 
drawing on Austin’s speech act theory (1962), I argue that art has the capacity to perform 
acts like criticism, protest, assertion, etc., enabling it to contribute to our understanding of 
reality.  
Chapter 2 – Can Art Lie? – explores in detail an offshoot from Chapter 1: the act of 
lying. We learn from art and we believe that it can reveal truths about reality. But can 
artworks lie? If they can, this may explain what we find objectionable in certain artworks, 
affect how we interpret them, and have consequences for the culpability of the artist. The 
aim of Chapter 2 is to establish whether representational visual art can lie, where lying is 
treated as an insincere assertion. I argue that art can lie, but only in contexts where 
communication should be truthful: contexts in which H. P. Grice’s first Maxim of Quality, 
“Do not say what you believe to be false”, is in effect. I argue that this is a genre/curation 
sensitive issue, and so whether art can lie is a context-sensitive matter. 
Chapter 2 assumes that art can express propositions, and a lot rests on this assumption. 
Propositions are the bearers of truth-value. And if art cannot express propositions, then it’s 
unclear how art can lie, given that lying involves expressing or saying something believed 
to be false. Chapter 3 – Artworks Express Propositions: a Soamesian Picture – argues that 
artworks do have propositional content, thereby providing support to the assumption made 
in Chapter 2: artworks can say true and false things. Call this ‘the proposition theory of art’. 
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I deal with three main difficulties for this view, and I show how Scott Soames’ (2014b, 
2014d) recent theory of propositions might help us understand how artworks have 
propositional content. 
Visual artworks tend to say a lot more than what they merely depict. For instance, van 
Gogh’s oil painting A Pair of Shoes (1886) has been taken to say things about the nature of 
labour and the life of the peasant. But a problem arises: how are such messages expressed, 
when all is depicted is a pair of boots? It might be argued that it’s unclear how artworks can 
express such deep meanings without words, and how familiar pragmatic mechanisms used 
to express deep meanings in verbal conversation might translate to the artworld. Chapter 4 
– Metaphor in Art – argues that metaphor can help explain how an artwork expresses these 
deeper messages. I first explore how we should understand metaphor in art more generally. 
I consider a seemingly obvious contender, that of visual metaphor (Carroll 1994), but I argue 
that this should be rejected. I then develop an alternative proposal, which aims to do justice 
to a neglected phenomenon in the generation of metaphors in art: an artwork’s historical 
context and its curation can help generate metaphors in the artwork. This power to draw on 
metaphor is one way that artworks can convey their deeper meanings. 
Chapters 1-4 make use of the mechanism of curation. For instance, I argue that the 
way a work is curated can affect whether or not the work lies, and what metaphors it might 
express. In other words, I claim that curation can affect the meaning of an artwork. If true, 
then artwork meaning can shift over time: for different curators will have different beliefs 
and different agendas about the curated works, thereby affecting what the work expresses 
(for instance, what metaphors are expressed). However, this flies in the face of a dominant 
view in the philosophy of art: what I call Originalism. Originalism in art is the view that the 
meaning of an artwork is fixed by factors that held at the time of the work’s creation. This 
means that artworks cannot change in meaning: as time goes by, and throughout their 
different curation, their meaning remains fixed. If Originalism is true, and artwork meaning 
cannot change, then curation cannot affect artwork meaning. 
The final chapter, 5 – Alterpieces: Against Originalism in Art – argues against 
Originalism, and shows that artworks can change in meaning, given certain conditions. I call 
this view ‘Constructivism’. The role of the curator is therefore not ruled out as playing an 
important role in determining artwork meaning. 
A typical motivation behind Originalism is the plausible ontological claim that an 
artwork is a historically indexed object; its meaning is informed by its original context, and 
typically, Constructivist views don’t do justice to this. Using the Isenheim Altarpiece (1516) 
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as a case study, I argue for a Constructivist position that does do justice to this nature of 
artworks: an artwork receives its meaning in its original context, but the work can 
accumulate (alter) in meaning in subsequent contexts: artwork content and force can shift 
across time and place. 
Chapters 1-5 together develop the two main arguments of the thesis. First, artwork 
meaning is active. I argue that visual artworks, under certain conditions, are speech acts, and 
so possess active meanings: they have illocutionary force, and have propositional content. I 
defend these contested claims against several dissenters, and explore some consequences: in 
particular, I explore how art can lie, a hitherto neglected question.  
Second, artwork meaning is flexible. I argue that what an artwork says and does is 
affected by the context in which it’s displayed, and in particular, by its curation. This goes 
against the dominant Originalist approach in the philosophy of art; that the meaning of an 
artwork is fixed by factors which held at the time of the work’s creation, and so cannot 
change across time. I argue that this is mistaken: artworks can change in meaning. Curatorial 
factors can affect an artwork’s content and force, and consequently its social effects.18  
These two arguments thus comprise the title of the thesis: Alterpieces: artworks as 
shifting speech acts.  
Some notes about methodology and technical terms. Where I talk about the ‘artworld’ 
I mean to refer broadly to the social institution composed of people involved in the creation, 
criticism, preservation, production, and sale of fine art (Becker, 1982: x). This broad 
institution can be more accurately seen as consisting of multiple and interacting institutions 
and networks including galleries, museums, professions in the arts, art education, and the art 
market. The origin of the term ‘artworld’ can be traced back to Arthur Danto, who 
understands the artworld to be “an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history 
of art” (1964: 580): it is the existence of artistic theories that makes the artworld and works 
of art possible (581). While Danto uses this more theory-laden conception of an artworld, 
my thesis will invoke a more general concept, pertaining to the various institutions and 
networks involved in the making and presenting of art to a public, as well as to the general 
art theory and art history which binds these domains. 
Moreover, the works of art I attend to in the thesis and which I include in this ‘artworld’ 
cover a wide spectrum, ranging from works that were originally created for churches and 
serving a religious function – and which today sit in our galleries and museums – to works 
                                                 
18 For the artistic value of works that primarily socially engage with society, see Simoniti (2018).  
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that were created intentionally for the more familiar artworld we know today. 19  More 
specifically, the kind of art-forms that fall within the scope of the thesis are exclusively 
visual representational art. ‘Visual art’ is here understood as including painting, sculpture, 
installation, photography, and performance, spanning across art history. For ease of 
investigation, I focus on a select few paintings, but my arguments are intended to generalise 
to other plastic mediums in the artworld that are representational in some way, but which do 
not contain linguistic symbols (such as words) in their composition. ‘Representational art’ 
is here understood rather loosely, where the artwork depicts, represents, or stands for, an 
aspect of reality in some way. This will include works that depict or represent via more 
traditional methods such as imitation, but also via less straightforward and more abstract 
methods.  
My arguments do not generalise, though, to purely abstract artworks: works which do 
not clearly represent anything at all, whether an object or concept. However, I don’t see this 
limit to my arguments as a problem, but rather a merit. For it’s unclear how purely abstract 
art has any meaning at all, and we wouldn’t want a theory of artwork meaning to 
overgenerate to such specimens. Such art forms, if they are even ‘art’, will require separate 
investigation.  
Lastly, it should be noted that sometimes artworks are discussed in the thesis by 
reference to magazines and gallery websites rather than academic sources. The reason for 
this is to capture examples of how a layperson and average viewer actually understands the 
artwork in question, rather than only drawing on academic writers. Where appropriate, I 
refer to academic writings when outlining a work’s particular history, but I sometimes use 
more informal sources when discussing examples of interpretations given for a work of art 
by a range of people.  
 
 
4. Implications for the Intentionalist Debate 
 
The Intentionalist Debate today can be divided into two main camps: what I call Originalist 
and Anti-Originalist. According to the Originalist camp, the facts that determine the meaning 
of an artwork are exhausted by the (relevant) facts about the work’s original context, i.e. the 
                                                 
19 For more definitions of ‘artworld’ see Danto (1981), Dickie (1984), and Davies (2015). 
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context in which it was created. Consequently, artwork meaning cannot change over time in 
new contexts: it is fixed to its original setting.  
Traditionally, three broad positions fall under the Originalist banner. First, Actual 
Intentionalist views hold that an artwork’s meaning is determined somehow by the actual 
artist’s intentions. Historically, this type of view is divided into either extreme or more 
moderate versions. According to extreme actual intentionalism, the meaning of an artwork 
is simply what the artist intended, even when that intention is not supported or detected in 
the work itself. This ‘identity thesis’ is widely rejected in the philosophy of art, so I won’t 
deal with it further.20 In contrast, moderate actual intentionalism holds that an artwork’s 
meaning is determined by the artist’s successfully realised intentions, i.e. those intentions 
that are supported by the work itself.21 This emphasises the artist’s actual original intention, 
but it also blocks ‘Humpty Dumpy’ communication, where the artwork is supposed to mean 
whatever the artist intends it to mean. On this account, the intention is recognised through 
conventions and other facts that held in the work’s context of creation (Carroll 2000: 79, 82; 
Davies 1996: 21). So, the meaning of Guernica is whatever Picasso successfully intended 
the painting to mean. 
Second, Hypothetical Intentionalism holds that an artwork’s meaning is determined 
by a suitable audience’s hypotheses about the artist’s intentions; hypotheses which are based 
on the linguistic and artistic conventions that held in the work’s context of creation 
(Levinson 1996; 2010, Davies 1996: 21).22 This emphasises the actual artist’s perceived, or 
imputed, original intention. So, the meaning of Guernica is determined by the intentions a 
suitable audience is best justified in attributing to Picasso, regardless of the intentions 
Picasso actually had. 
And third, Conventionalism holds that, regardless of the artist’s intention, the 
conventions of language and art that were in effect when the work was produced are 
sufficient to secure the meaning of the artwork (Davies, 1996: 21). 23  Conventionalism 
emphasises the artwork’s original context, but not the artist’s original intention, actual or 
                                                 
20 Originally held by Hirsch (1967) and Knapp & Michaels (1982), the view is now unpopular in the literature. 
However, see Stock (2017) for a recent defence of the theory.  
21 Moderate actual intentionalists include Carroll (1992; 2000; 2001) and Stecker (2006).  
22 The main proponent of Hypothetical Intentionalism is Jerrold Levinson (1992; 1995; 2010). There are other 
versions of Hypothetical Intentionalism which postulate a hypothesised or fictional author (see Nathan 1982; 
2006 and Currie 1990: 78), but such views would fall into the Anti-Originalist camp because they detach the 
work from its artist’s context of creation. 
23 David Davies can be said to hold a kind of Conventionalist view about literary artwork meaning at least  
(Davies, 2007: 82).  
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perceived. It is a form of ‘Anti-intentionalism’, in that it rejects as necessary the artist’s 
intentions – actual or merely hypothesised – in determining work meaning. 24  When 
deciphering a work’s meaning, artist’s intentions need have no relevance, giving the work 
autonomy from the beliefs of its creator. Here, the meaning of Guernica is determined by 
facts about the work’s original setting, and what Picasso intended or may have intended for 
the work, has no role in determining the meaning of the painting. One particular theory of 
artwork meaning – a version of ‘value-maximising theory’ (Davies, 1996; 2006a) – can be 
characterised as Conventionalist. According to this specific theory, the meaning of an 
artwork is determined first by the conventional meanings of the parts of the artwork, whether 
visual or linguistic, and second, by whatever interpretation of the artwork’s content would 
maximise the aesthetic value of the work (Davies, 2006a). Crucially, this kind of value-
maximising theory emphasises the work’s original context when deciphering the 
conventional parts of the work (Davies, 1996 fn. 3; 2006a). For the purposes of this thesis, 
I’ll refer more generally to Conventionalism rather than to specific value-maximising 
theories.  
Anti-Originalists deny the central Originalist claim: it is not the case that the facts that 
determine the meaning of an artwork are exhausted by the (relevant) facts about the work’s 
original context. 
A traditional way to be an Anti-Originalist is to adhere to ‘The New Criticism’: a 
movement in aesthetic theory which released the artwork from its maker, minimising facts 
about the work’s origin, and in its extreme, spelled the ‘death of the author’25. The New 
Critic not only denies the Originalist claim, but much more besides. The New Critic makes 
the additional move of entirely rejecting a work’s original context as informing its meaning. 
Historic facts about the artwork’s origin, such as facts about the society in which the work 
was created, are irrelevant to the work’s meaning. A breed of Anti-intentionalism, it holds 
that artist’s intentions – actual or hypothesised – have no relevance at all to artwork meaning, 
and interpreters should give the work complete autonomy from the beliefs of its creator. 
Divorcing an artwork’s meaning from its original context and the intentions of its creator 
                                                 
24 Hypothetical Intentionalism can also be construed as Anti-intentionalist, in that it rejects the artist’s actual 
intentions as determinants of work meaning. However, my thesis remains neutral about this taxonomy; whether 
Hypothetical Intentionalism is an Intentionalist position, like Actual Intentionalism is, or whether it’s Anti-
intentionalist. My arguments don’t hinge on this terminological difference. 
25 See for example Beardsley (1970), Nathan (1982; 2006), and Wimsatt & Beardsley (1946). While Roland 
Barthes was not a member of the New Criticism school, his theory of the ‘death of the author’ (1967) shares 
similarities with it; specifically, in being against the notion that the author’s intention and their biographical 
context has any effect or power over the meaning of their work. 
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has the advantage of explaining how artworks seem to supposedly gain new meanings after 
their author or artist has died (Beardsley, 1992: 26). For example, Guernica could mean 
something quite new, in the context of a 2003 UN debate about the Iraq war.  
Another stripe of value-maximising theory can be characterised as Anti-Originalist in 
this way, namely, that artwork meaning is determined by the interpretation that maximises 
the artwork’s aesthetic value, but is constrained only by the conventional parts of the work, 
and not by the work’s original context.26 This is in contrast to Stephen Davies’s version of 
the theory, which constrains interpretations to those that are faithful to the work’s original 
context. Again, I won’t deal with value-maximising theory in either of its stripes, but more 
generally with the fundamental commitments they hold: being Originalist or Anti-
Originalist. 
My argument has implications for this Intentionalist Debate. Where relevant 
throughout the thesis, I outline the specific ways my arguments enter into the debate, but I’ll 
sum them up here. 
My argument that artwork meaning is active, resting on a speech act analysis of art, is 
as it stands neutral on the Intentionalist Debate. But I sketch out how a speech act theory of 
art might fit within Moderate Actual Intentionalist, Hypothetical Intentionalist, and broadly 
Anti-intentionalist pictures of artwork meaning (both Originalist and Anti-Originalist), 
noting some consequences along the way. 
However, my related argument that artwork meaning is flexible – via the theoretical 
importance that the thesis as a whole gives to the curator – casts doubt on all of the positions 
in the Intentionalist Debate that I outlined above. This is because I argue for an Anti-
Originalist picture of artwork meaning, by assigning the curator in non-original contexts a 
role in determining artwork meaning. If what I’ve argued is true, then Moderate Actual 
Intentionalism, Hypothetical Intentionalism, and Conventionalism, are all ruled out, for 
these are all Originalist positions. My position also rules out the existing Anti-Originalist 
Anti-intentionalist approach – that of the New Critic – in that my approach still gives a 
work’s original context theoretic importance in determining artwork meaning. This leaves 
us with a need to carve out new space in the debate.  
The current main players in the Intentionalist Debate are Originalist: Moderate Actual 
Intentionalism, Hypothetical Intentionalism, and Conventionalism, where each of these 
assign factors in the original context different importance. They have in common a core 
                                                 
26 Alan Goldman’s value-maximising theory (1990) can be said to be along these Anti-Originalist lines.  
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claim: “the meaning of a work is determined by circumstances obtaining at its creation” 
(Davies, 1996: 22). But, the underexplored question of the artworld context and the role of 
the curator in artwork meaning, which my thesis addresses, opens up some other possible 
positions that have been hitherto unnoticed. Traditionally, it looks like the only way to be 
Anti-Originalist is by being a New Critic. But this menu as it stands is too restrictive, and 
my thesis exposes some partitions in the logical space of the debate that haven’t yet been 
noticed. 
A consequence of my thesis is that while intentions might have some kind of role to 
play in determining artwork meaning, this needn’t just be the artist’s intentions. For instance, 
works can perform illocutionary acts, or lie, based on the beliefs and intentions of both the 
artist and the curator. This suggests that we should acknowledge an augmented or expanded 
Intentionalism that assigns a role to the curator as well as the artist in determining artwork 
meaning. This could either be an expanded Moderate Actual Intentionalism or an expanded 
Hypothetical Intentionalism. These Anti-Originalist variants of Moderate Actual 
Intentionalism and Hypothetical Intentionalism would each capture the importance of the 
original context to artwork meaning, but also capture the flexibility of artwork meaning in 
new, non-original contexts. 
I should stress that my thesis is by no means an argument for such expanded 
intentionalist positions, nor does it comprise a solid knockdown objection to the existing 
positions in the Intentionalist Debate. The central two arguments of the thesis are that 
artworks are active in meaning, and flexible in meaning. However, the results from at least 
the second argument about meaning flexibility cast doubt on the existing positions in the 
Intentionalist Debate, and they suggest schemas for possible augmented intentionalist 
positions. In the Conclusion of the thesis I’ll outline in more detail these Anti-Originalist 
variants of Moderate Actual Intentionalism and Hypothetical Intentionalism. 
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Chapter One 
1. The Illocutionary Force of Artworks 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter argues that artworks can perform illocutionary acts. We talk about artworks 
‘challenging’, ‘protesting’, and ‘questioning’ certain states of affairs. Within natural 
language, these are familiar ‘speech acts’: things we normally do with words. But can art – 
and more pressing still, non-verbal art – perform such actions? How artworks do things 
without words is far from obvious. Chapter 1 defends the claim that artworks can perform 
such actions, and identifies these with J.L Austin’s illocutionary acts. By drawing on Austin’s 
speech act theory (1962), I argue that art has the capacity to perform actions like criticism, 
protest, assertion, etc., enabling it to contribute to our understanding of states of affairs in 
reality.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Many visual artworks – such as paintings, sculptures, films, installations, performance, and 
photographs – represent things, and so have content: that is, there is something they 
represent. But for centuries, we’ve talked as if, through this representation, visual artworks 
do things. When artists, art critics, and philosophers talk and write about artworks, they 
frequently make the assumption that such works are capable of performing certain actions 
such as stating, denouncing, protesting, criticising, etc. For instance, recall Pablo Picasso’s 
Guernica (1937), which is said to protest against, criticise, and denounce the disastrous 
effects of war, as well as asserting certain anti-war views and pleading for peace. 
Such actions – protesting, criticising, denouncing, asserting, and pleading – are 
familiar things that we normally do with words. For instance, when a frantic father shouts 
‘Look out, it’s slippery!’ when his daughter walks on a frozen lake, he is warning her about 
the ice. Or, when the officer shouts to her troops ‘Open fire!’ she is ordering them to shoot. 
When we speak, we don’t merely utter sentences with certain contents, but we also do 
something with those words: the uttered words have a force. When I utter a sentence and 
express a proposition – what J. L. Austin (1962) calls a ‘locutionary act’ – like, “You’ll 
close that door”, I might be issuing a command, threat, or making a prediction – what Austin 
calls an ‘illocutionary act’ (I call this act an ‘illocution’ for short).  It is the locution and 
illocution that comprises what Austin calls the overall ‘speech act’.1 Likewise, artworks are 
about things and express certain contents, but also seem to put forth this content with an 
illocutionary force.2 These two components – content and force – combine to create speech 
acts, which express messages or meanings. It is the supposed illocutionary force of art, as 
opposed to its content, that forms the focus of this chapter. 
But can visual art perform illocutions without using words? Or are our beliefs about, 
and descriptions of, artworks doing such things, actually mistaken? The capacity to perform 
illocutions through non-verbal means is far from obvious, for in such cases there is no speech 
                                                 
1 The term ‘speech act’ is frequently used in the literature to refer to the illocution alone, and not to the 
locutionary act. I however follow Austin’s usage of the term (1962: 146), where ‘speech act’ refers to both the 
locutionary act and illocutionary act, i.e. an utterance with a performative element. 
2 See Novitz (1977) and Kjørup (1974; 1978) for support of the idea that pictures, at least, can perform 
illocutions, and Young (2001) and Crane (2009) for resistance of this claim. 
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ordinarily understood used to perform the act.3 You might think that visual art and other 
representations cannot perform such acts without at least being accompanied by a verbal 
language: “It seems to me that someone could assert something by using a picture – but only 
by saying something too” (Crane, 2009: 458). Some have thought it ludicrous to claim that 
artworks can perform illocutions, for instance the act of arguing: “the suggestion that 
paintings, sculptures, works of architecture and musical compositions provide arguments 
is…frankly incredible” (Young, 2001: 70).  
This chapter argues for the claim that visual art can perform illocutions by drawing 
on J.L Austin’s speech act theory (1962), and David Novitz’s (1977) and Søren Kjørup’s 
(1974; 1978) adaption of Austin’s theory to pictures. I do not comprehensively defend 
Austin’s theory. Rather, I present a workable explanation of it and I explore how it can be 
used to argue that artworks can perform illocutions. It’s also important to note that I neither 
claim that art can perform all illocutions, nor that all artworks can perform illocutions. Art 
may be unable to promise for example, as Kjørup points out (1974: 219). Equally, it’s 
unclear what acts might be performed by more abstract works such as Rothko’s colour-field 
paintings or Mondrian’s geometric paintings. I don’t want to rule out such examples, but I 
make the weaker claim that some artworks can perform some illocutions.  
This adaption of speech act theory to art, or at least the notion, is not new. Jerrold 
Levinson claimed that “art-making…is closely analogous to a speech act: an act of attempted 
communication…” (1996: 180). However, this investigation has almost exclusively been 
concerned with literary art such as poems4, and barely at all in relation to visual art; which 
is most of the time merely gestured to. 5 This chapter makes a start at filling this gap. 
Moreover, my account both expands on, and diverges from, Novitz’s (1977) and Kjørup’s 
(1974; 1977) adaption of speech act theory to visual works. I expand on these two theories 
by dealing with visual artworks, as shown in artworld spaces such as galleries, rather than 
                                                 
3 This problem also arises in the debate about whether pornography is harmful speech: there are reservations 
about whether pornography constitutes any kind of speech act at all, for most pornography consists of images 
rather than words. See Langton (1993), Jennifer Hornsby (2011), and Louise Antony (2011). What I say in this 
chapter should apply mutatis mutandis to pornography, and so form a response to the objection that 
pornography cannot perform speech acts, though I do not directly address this issue. 
4 For example, see Eaton (1983), de Gaynesford (2009; 2011), Mikkonen (2010), and Mole (2013). 
5 For example, see Levinson (1996: 180) and Stecker (2003: 20). Moreover, the literature on ‘performativity’ 
in the visual arts focuses on art’s performing of perlocutionary acts, for instance by changing artworld 
conventions (see von Hantelmann, 2010). The focus of this chapter though is on a different kind of act: the act 
performed “in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something” (Austin, 1962: 99), 
i.e. illocution. 
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focusing merely on how simple pictures can be used as visual signs in everyday 
conversation. And, as will become clear, I diverge from both Novitz and Kjørup in how I 
treat the relations between artist, artwork, and speech act. 
My arguments will show that many artworks are not mere representations or mere 
vehicles for emotion, contrary to theories that pervade in aesthetics. Such theories overlook 
art’s vital capacity to perform actions; a capacity that has implications for debates on what 
is communicated by art, and the moral status of art. In particular – and as I’ll show later in 
the chapter – once we analyse more carefully what’s involved in performing speech acts, 
this has implications for the Intentionalist Debate in aesthetics; a debate that considers the 
role of the artist’s intentions about their artwork, and the relationship between these 
intentions and the work itself. Aesthetic theories about artist meaning, then, ought to take 
into account the active nature of artistic communication. Section 2 gives some data which 
suggests that artworks perform illocutions. Section 3 outlines Austin’s account of speech 
acts. Section 4 considers how this account can be extended to visual artworks and considers 
the implications of this for the Intentionalist Debate. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The force of art      
 
Picasso’s Guernica is a large, looming painting, consisting of many different shades of black 
and grey exploding into chaotic shapes and distorted, screaming figures. The painting depicts 
the air raid that destroyed the ancient town of Guernica in the tenth month of the Spanish 
Civil war. Picasso began making sketches five days after the devastating attack by Luftwaffe 
Figure 1 
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and Mussolini planes, and he then took just five weeks to complete the painting (Clark, 2013: 
242). The piece was first exhibited to the public in the entrance hall of the Spanish Republic’s 
pavilion at the Paris World’s Fair. The show was curated such that Guernica sat opposite a 
large commemorative photograph of Garcia Lorca, the socialist poet who was executed 
during the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. In-between these two pieces sat Alexander 
Calder's Mercury Fountain with mercury falling into its pool (a main export for Spain). 
Outside the pavilion was a cinema showing films of the civil war (Clark, 240).  
When viewing this piece, the viewer feels that the work not merely depicts the effects 
of war, but that it is also doing something. Armed with the specific context in which 
Guernica was created and displayed, it seems natural to say that Guernica is not only 
depicting or representing the air raid and the violence, or expressing an emotion such as 
anger towards it, but is also deploring and denouncing it. The work appears to protest 
against, criticise, and challenge the disastrous effects of war, as well as asserting certain 
anti-war views. In other words, there is more to the painting than its mere content. An art 
critic writes:  
 
Guernica…is a picture that makes its giant size…work to confirm a wholly 
earthbound, and essentially modest, view of life. Life, says the painting, is an 
ordinary, carnal, entirely unnegotiable value…it finds a way to propose this visually 
(Clark, 2013: 246-248). 
 
The artworld is abundant with artworks that seem to make statements and perform other 
actions towards their subject matter or content. This is evident in the broad range of art 
criticism. I’ve taken a fraction of such examples (which I’ve italicised): 
 
[About Brueghel's ‘Conversion of Saul’ (1567)] It has been suggested that the picture 
commemorates in some fashion the passage of Alba and his troops through the Alps 
in spring of 1567 (Gibson, 1977: 182). 
 
[About Lubaina Himid’s ‘Revenge’ (1991-92)] ‘Revenge’ is at once a monument to 
the victims of the transatlantic slave trade, a critique of the patriarchy, and a space 
for dialogue. This series is a lamentation, an act of mourning transfigured in to a new 
phase (Modern Art Oxford, 2016). 
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What makes an artwork powerful and provocative is not just what it depicts or the emotion 
it supposedly expresses, but how it puts forth that content; the illocutions it performs. Indeed, 
the contemporary artist Lubaina Himid has said “I am a political strategist who uses a visual 
language to encourage conversation, argument, change”.6 
The assumption that artworks are capable of performing illocutions also underlies 
discussions about the ethical evaluation of art. The view that the moral value of an artwork 
affects its aesthetic value involves analysing the moral stances or “attitudes” possessed by an 
artwork and how these affect its overall value (Gaut, 1998: 182). Berys Gaut understands this 
as the work displaying pro or con attitudes towards a state of affairs, and this can be done in 
many ways. It looks like though for something to take or display a pro or con attitude there 
involves a doing of something, such as commending or deploring a state of affairs.  
Moreover, philosophers engaged in the debate assessing the relevance of the artist’s 
intentions to artwork meaning also assume that artworks can perform actions. Robert Stecker 
writes, 
 
We can talk about what a painting does and what it is intended to do: what it 
represents, expresses, how its formal features interact among themselves and with 
representational features, and what the painting is intended to do along these lines. 
Since these are the things we need to identify to understand and appreciate a painting, 
it is not an unreasonable extension of the word “meaning” to call these things aspects 
of the meaning of a painting…It is analogous to utterance meaning, since it identifies 
things the artist “does” in the work…just as utterance meaning identifies what a 
speaker does in using certain words (2003: 20, my emphasis).  
 
And Stephen Davies argues that recognising what an artwork is doing is vital to 
understanding what it’s about:  
 
Picasso’s impassioned painting Guernica is yet more powerful when seen as a protest 
against the bombing of the town by fascist forces in the Spanish Civil War (2006b: 
68, my emphasis). 
 
While this chapter focuses on visual art, it’s worth noting that non-art visual representations 
frequently seem to perform illocutions as well. Pictorial road signs, adverts, and visual 
                                                 
6 From Modern Art Oxford (2016). 
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propaganda are paradigmatic examples. Moreover, it’s been argued that some visual 
pornography constitutes harm to women because it performs the illocution of subordination. 
In particular, because the pornographic material may have a kind of authority over 
consumers, it’s argued that it subordinates women through what it depicts, and through the 
manner of this depiction.7  
This is a brief overlook, but it reveals the extent to which artists, philosophers, and 
art critics take for granted the assumption that artworks and other images can perform 
illocutions; actions we normally do with words. To better understand this, we need a grasp 
on what speech acts ordinarily are, within language.  
 
3. How to do things with words  
 
Consider a student protest to the government against the rise in tuition fees. The students 
shout “No ifs, no buts, no education cuts!” and use these words to argue that the increase in 
fees is wrong. The intended effect of their arguing is to persuade the government to 
reconsider their decision. According to Austin, three elements are at work in this speech act 
(1962: 94-101). The uttering of the words “No ifs…!” is what Austin would call the 
locutionary act. In addition to expressing a certain proposition, the utterance of these words 
(and sentences) in this particular context constitutes the action of arguing, and it is this action 
that Austin labels the illocutionary act (illocution). The protestors’ intended effect of 
convincing the government is the perlocutionary effect or perlocutionary act, which is 
separate to the illocution. Note that the protestors can still perform the illocution of arguing 
without achieving their desired perlocutionary effect of persuading the government.  
Illocutions, i.e. the acts performed “in saying something as opposed to performance of 
an act of saying something” (Austin, 1962: 99), require certain conditions to be in place for 
their smooth performance, i.e. ‘felicity’ conditions: “some at least of the things which are 
necessary for the smooth or ‘happy’ functioning of a performative” (Austin, 14).  
First, the correct ‘locution’ needs to be performed. Most of Austin’s examples focus 
on the illocutions that are performed by a verbal locutionary act; by the utterance of a 
                                                 
7 For more on this see MacKinnon (1993) and Langton (1993). My account provides some much-needed detail 
and close analysis of how exactly a visual representation can possess illocutionary force; something which is 
somewhat overlooked in the pornography literature, largely because there, focus is placed on the political 
consequences of such a view about pornographic content.   
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sentence expressing a proposition. Indeed, that’s why we tend to call actions like questioning 
or asserting speech acts. Austin states: 
 
…to perform an illocutionary act is necessarily to perform a locutionary act: that, 
for example, to congratulate is necessarily to say certain words (1962: 113). 
 
While Austin allows a locutionary act to take a written form as well as a spoken form (1962: 
60), he holds here that to perform an illocution must involve a verbal language. Given this, 
it looks like claiming that art can perform illocutions without a verbal language is doomed 
from the start, at least insofar as fitting with an Austinian framework.   
However, while it is perhaps characteristic for an illocution to be performed by verbal 
means, it’s not essential. In a contradictory vein towards his above remark, Austin claims 
that illocutions can sometimes be performed in a non-verbal way: 
 
…we can for example warn or order or appoint or give or protest or apologize by 
non-verbal means and these are illocutionary acts. Thus we may cock a snook or hurl 
a tomato by way of protest (1962: 118). 
 
A way out of this seeming inconsistency is offered by Novitz: 
 
 
Austin realises full well that although illocutionary acts are usually performed by 
speaking, one does not have to speak in order to perform them. Of course, if one 
performs an illocutionary act by speaking, it is also necessary to have performed a 
locutionary act. But this is all that Austin admits (1977: 77). 
 
So while Austin was mainly providing an account of verbal speech acts, this does not mean 
that illocutions are essentially verbally performed. And this seems right. Consider silent 
protests, greeting another person by smiling, or a pedestrian who objects to, or condemns, a 
nearby speeding driver, by flinging their arms up in the air.  
While we can perform illocutions by using non-verbal locutions, Austin places a 
restriction on this: these non-verbal means must still be ‘conventional’.  
 
Strictly speaking, there cannot be an illocutionary act unless the means employed are 
conventional, and so the means for achieving its ends non-verbally must be 
conventional. But it is difficult to say where conventions begin and end (118, my 
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emphasis). 
 
 
Such non-verbal gestures or locutions will need to be recognized and established in a certain 
community of interlocutors in order for the resulting illocution to be successful.8  
There are two readings of this convention restriction, drawn out by Peter Strawson 
(1964). I call these the strong reading and the weak reading. Under the strong reading, 
illocutions must be performed using conventional means that are a result of the relevant 
institution with its constitutive rules. For example, to christen a ship I must possess a certain 
type of authority and must perform a certain gesture whilst uttering a particular sentence. 
Indeed, pictorial objects such as road-signs may fall under this strong reading: they act as 
signals that contain the information they do qua conventional sign and not qua picture – a 
blue square may have served just as well to warn drivers of oncoming pedestrians, and 
succeeds in performing the illocution of a warning purely because there is a convention 
stipulating that it does.9  
This strong reading does capture the more ceremonial types of illocutions, such as 
marrying, calling out in a tennis game, or christening a ship. However, many (if not most) 
illocutions are not ceremonial in this way, and are merely communicative such as warning 
someone, greeting someone, or promising something to someone. Such illocutions employ 
different kinds of conventions: those that are not part of a historical institution or possess 
constitutive rules. For example, to warn someone I do not need to possess any authority, nor 
must I perform every time the same type of physical gesture. As Strawson writes, the 
utterance of ‘The ice over there is very thin’ can be used to issue a warning “without its 
being the case that there is any statable convention at all” (1964: 444).  
For the performance of most ordinary and communicative illocutions, then, we merely 
need certain linguistic conventions to fix the meaning of the locution: my hearer needs to 
understand my uttered sentence in the first place in order to grasp the illocution being 
performed. There needn’t be a conforming to extra-linguistic conventions over and above 
this in order for the illocution to be performed successfully. This weak reading of the 
convention restriction is indicated by Austin's claim that:  
                                                 
8 This complaint captures Antony’s (2011) objection within the pornography debate: pornography is mainly 
visual and does not contain words. As a result, it lacks conventions and so cannot perform illocutions: “it is 
not connected with or governed by conventions in the way that is essential to the operation of performative 
speech acts” (2011: 387). 
9 This example is taken from Young (2001: 43). 
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[the performance of an illocution] may be said to be conventional in the sense that 
at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula (1962: 103, my 
emphasis).  
 
This can be understood as the claim that the means employed in the performing of an 
illocution – the locution – must merely be recognised by my interlocutor(s): there must be 
“general suitability” as Strawson writes (1964: 449). These recognisable and suitable means, 
such as frantically pointing to the thin ice and gesturing a slit throat with my finger, will then 
grant or justify the use of the first person performative formula: ‘I’m warning you!’. 
 Under this weak reading, convention is understood not as consisting of specific 
constitutive rules as a result of an institution, like with marriage, but instead as consisting of 
certain means employed that are somewhat established and accepted in the nearby linguistic 
community, whether this is the uttering of the appropriate sentence or an already 
recognisable and appropriate gesture, like sending flowers to apologise. Austin seems, then, 
to intend a more general or weak idea of ‘convention’ when he says that the means employed 
when performing an illocution must be conventional; he does not intend the strong reading 
for all illocutions. 
So, the means employed to perform an illocution – the locution – need to be 
conventional: they must be established and recognised in a language community, otherwise 
communication will not get off the ground. For instance, saying, ‘the frozen lake is beautiful’ 
will in most cases fail to warn someone about the thin ice, for this uttered sentence is 
inappropriate, in that context, to perform the act of warning. In other words, the means 
employed to perform an illocution must be internally conventional, in that the means must 
be recognisable and conventional in themselves. Call this condition Internal Convention.  
However, for those ceremonial illocutions such as marriage, further conventions in the 
context of utterance over and above and external to using the correct locution also need to 
hold for the illocution to be successful (Strawson’s strong reading of Austin is accurate for 
some cases). Such conventions might be (i) authoritative; I can only get married by an 
authorised celebrant, (ii) structural; certain marriage rituals and orders of service must be 
followed, and closely related (iii) institutional; I can have a Christian wedding only within 
a Christian institution. Call this further condition that applies to some illocutions, External 
Convention.  
As well as uttering the correct locution in the correct circumstances, for the “smooth 
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or happy functioning” (Austin, 14) of some speech acts, argues Austin, the speaker must 
have the appropriate feelings, thoughts, and intentions (though these needn’t be necessarily 
distinguished (1962: 41)): 
 
Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts 
or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of 
any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in 
fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct 
themselves, and further, must actually so conduct themselves subsequently (15). 
 
For instance, in order to congratulate someone smoothly, I must feel pleased for that person, 
and not annoyed. To find someone guilty smoothly, I must believe that they are guilty. And 
to smoothly perform the act of promising, I must intend to do what I promise (40). Call this 
condition Intention; some types of illocution, to be performed smoothly, require the speaker 
to possess the appropriate intentions or beliefs. For instance, Intention might be true of the 
act of promising, but perhaps not true of the act of an order.10 
And last, even if the correct locution is used, for most illocutions to be successful the 
hearer must also actually understand the force of the speaker’s locution, that is, there needs 
to be uptake in the audience: 
 
I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what 
I say in a certain sense. An effect must be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary 
act is to be carried out . . . Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the 
understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution. So the performance of 
an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake (Austin, 116-17). 
 
Call this condition Uptake.11 
 So, to successfully and smoothly perform an illocution within an Austinian 
framework: (i) the speaker must use the appropriate locution (Internal Convention); (ii) if 
needed, the correct conventions must be in place in the context in which the locution is made 
(External Convention); (iii) the speaker must possess, if needed, the requisite intentions and 
thoughts for the smooth performance of the act (Intention); and (iv) there must be uptake in 
                                                 
10 Someone with perceived authority could unintentionally yet smoothly order someone to do something: 
“coming from him, I took it as an order, not as a request” (Austin, 1962: 76).   
11 For critical discussion of this condition see de Gaynesford (2011). 
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the audience (Uptake). More precisely, Internal Convention and Uptake are necessary, and 
in some cases sufficient, for something to count as an illocution. Intention is only necessary 
for certain types of act to be ‘smoothly’ performed. And External Convention is only 
necessary for those more ceremonial speech acts, such as marriage, where Internal 
Convention, Uptake and Intention together are not sufficient for the act to come off. 
 
4. How to do things with art  
 
We can begin to see how an artwork might perform illocutions. The artwork’s formal 
elements might roughly correspond to a kind of locution: its shapes, colours, and general 
forms which serve to depict a certain subject matter will inform what the work represents or 
the content it expresses.12 Moreover, if a viewer can understand what the work is about, this 
might form a kind of uptake. Furthermore, the practice with which we tend to display art has 
its own conventions, such as curatorial techniques and the nature of the gallery space. This 
section argues that artworks in the artworld can meet the Internal Convention, External 
Convention, Intention, and Uptake success conditions. 
 
 
4.1. Internal Convention  
 
We’ve established that for illocutions to be performed successfully via non-verbal means, 
such means need to be internally conventional: they must be recognised, established, and 
accepted in a community of people.  
The problem is whether artworks meet this condition. If they don’t, then this will either 
rule out their purported illocutionary force, or we’d need to reject the condition altogether. 
This latter option should be avoided, for to dispense with Internal Convention would mean 
that someone could apologise or assert something, for instance, completely outside any 
                                                 
12 Novitz draws an analogy between artworks and sentences when he writes that just as a sentence cannot by 
itself perform an illocution – it must be uttered in a certain context – so too must a visual work be used in a 
certain context to do something (1977: 7). Here, the artwork is seen as a vehicle to perform illocutions like an 
uttered sentence is. But since there can be illocutions performed without verbal locutions – that is, things unlike 
sentences such as non-verbal gestures – it needn't be the case that artworks must be conceptually or structurally 
similar to sentences in order for them to perform illocutions. Since my argument that artworks can perform 
illocutions doesn't hinge on the claim that artworks are actually like sentences, I do not uphold this contentious 
analogy. 
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conventions, but this wouldn’t be possible. I cannot apologise to you by handing you a pen 
if there is no established convention between us both that such an action would count as an 
apology; the illocution of apologising would be unsuccessful.  I will therefore attempt to 
show instead that at least most visual art does meet Internal Convention. 
In verbal performances of illocutions there needs to be an understood language, and in 
non-verbal cases the gestures need to be understood and recognised within the wider context. 
Similarly in art, there are conventional ‘gestures’ within art-making, and in particular within 
the formal features of a work, which will facilitate illocutions. Here I understand 
‘conventional art-making’ in a rather loose sense, involving a merely recognisable and 
established means of depicting or representing something.  
As John Hyman writes, “Certainly, rules and conventions of various kinds are involved 
in making and interpreting pictures” (2006: 171).13 What a painting or sculpture represents, 
and the way it represents it, can be recognisable, understood, and interpreted by many 
viewers. This can be achieved by depiction at the surface level of the work, and through 
more complex means such as metaphor and symbol; all of which make use of convention in 
some way.14  
First, there are recognisable ‘gestures’ within the artworld used to depict reality, which 
come in several forms such as style and genre. Hyman gives an example of such a ‘rule’ 
which is “involved in making and perceiving pictures”: 
 
…there are technical rules, such as Alberti’s rules for drawing a pavement in 
perspective… or the techniques set out in the classic Chinese manual, The Mustard Seed 
Garden Manual of Painting, [which includes] specific techniques for painting orchids, 
bamboo, plum trees, and so on… These are techniques for the application of slip or ink, 
which are designed to control the appearance of a foot, a stem, a branch, or a leaf and 
which therefore mediate between the marks on the surface of a picture and its content 
(2006: 171-172). 
 
                                                 
13 I interpret this claim to also be applicable to other visual art forms. 
14 It should be noted that while I make use of the uncontroversial fact that there are conventional means of art-
making, this doesn’t entail that the relation between a depiction and what is depicted is itself necessarily 
conventional, as per a conventionalist theory of depiction such as Goodman’s. I remain neutral as to the success 
of such a theory, while making use of systems of representation that are merely recognised, established, and 
accepted by people. 
 34 
 
 
Other examples include ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics which would depict objects from 
multiple views at once, and rules for perspective and naturalism which developed 
throughout Renaissance and Impressionist styles. 15  These techniques enable parts of 
artworks to ‘naturally’ symbolise or represent things, primarily by imitating something else 
with some degree of resemblance (Hospers, 1946: 49-50). The average viewer will be able 
to recognise or understand that these ‘natural symbols’ of a work depict things in reality. 
Depending on what theory of depiction you adhere to, this understanding might be due to: 
an intended resemblance between the depiction and the object depicted; the depiction 
eliciting “a perceptual experience with a certain phenomenology” in the viewer (Abell & 
Bantinaki, 2010: 5); or the depiction engaging sub-personal perceptual mechanisms in the 
viewer, such as their recognitional skills normally exercised in ordinary visual perception 
(Lopes, 1996; 2005). But either way, the phenomenon involves us grasping a depiction via 
familiar and established means.  
For instance, one of the things depicted in Guernica is a screaming horse. Its mouth 
is open and distended, revealing a sharp tongue. Its eyes are bulging and its limbs are in 
disarray. This manages to convey to the viewer that this horse is injured and in agony: the 
average viewer familiar with cubist styles and conventions, and a basic ability to detect a 
resemblance, or experience some kind of recognition between the depiction and what is 
depicted, will grasp that this is what is being depicted. In general, if the viewer understands 
the depiction method used, and is familiar with certain artistic styles and conventions of art-
making, these will form suitable means to make explicit the work’s purported illocutions. 
Indeed, according to Novitz (1977), what speech acts a picture can be used to perform will 
depend in part on what the picture resembles.   
Second, a painting’s use of complex symbols and metaphors expresses certain 
contents beyond what the work immediately depicts. Hyman gives an example of such a 
convention or rule: 
 
…there are iconographic conventions, such as the ones concerning the symbolic 
attributes of saints: Saint Peter’s keys, Saint Catherine’s wheel, the palm frond held by 
a martyred saint, and so on…iconographic conventions allow us to make inferences 
about the subject of a picture. For example, if we know the relevant convention, we can 
infer that a bearded scholar with a lion at his feet is Saint Jerome, that a pelican fighting 
                                                 
15 Novitz calls such conventions “umbrella conventions” (1977: 46). 
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a snake represents the crucifixion vanquishing original sin, or that a winged figure is an 
angel (Hyman, 2006: 171-172). 
 
For instance, in Christian paintings, the halo is a conventional (as opposed to ‘natural’) 
symbol for divinity, and the colour white is a semi-conventional symbol for purity (Hospers, 
38). ‘Conventional’ here means that the symbol stands for its denotation or referent only 
because of a common convention; the relation between the symbol and what is symbolised 
is an arbitrary one (words also fall into this category). ‘Semi-conventional’ here means the 
fact that one convention was selected rather than another “is not an accident” but the result 
of some natural relation or resemblance between the symbol and its denotation or referent 
(such as white and purity) (Hospers, 33). Such symbols require prior understanding of 
certain conventions, without which the viewer cannot go far in interpreting the work.16 
For example, the horse in Guernica is normally interpreted as a complex symbol for 
the massacred civilian population of the Basque town (Gottlieb, 1965: 111). Moreover, the 
woman to the right of the painting who stretches out a light above the scene unfolding 
beneath her has been interpreted as a symbol for ‘Civilisation’ or ‘History’ or 
‘Enlightenment’ (ibid). Notice too the elliptical form of the artificial light bulb, and the 
nearby elliptical bomb-like form inserted into the horse’s screaming mouth. This visual 
parallel has been interpreted as a “visual metaphor” for power: associations of technological 
sources of power (the light bulb) are linked with associations of war and weapons. This 
fusion creates the metaphor that beneficent power can “contain the seeds of violent 
destruction” (Green, 1985: 67). 
Historical facts surrounding an artwork, such as knowledge about the setting in which 
it was created, are normally required to help us further interpret a work’s formal content. 
Background knowledge about Guernica’s history, such as knowing that the work was 
created in the immediate aftermath of the Spanish Civil War, and knowledge about the 
catastrophe Picasso was responding to, help us interpret the work’s depictions, symbols, and 
metaphors. Moreover, depending on your favourite theory of art interpretation, knowledge 
about the artist’s intentions might help guide ascertaining the meaning of the piece. 
                                                 
16 The relation between a symbol and depiction should be noted here. A visual symbol may denote an idea, 
theme, or object because of pre-established conventions: for instance, the halo symbol will denote divinity. But 
this needn’t entail that the halo symbol depicts divinity. Rather, the halo symbol depicts the object of a halo. 
This means that we needn’t be committed to a conventionalist theory of depiction in order to help ourselves to 
denotative symbols in works of art; such symbols can indeed denote things while depiction might function in 
a non-conventionalist way, governed by different principles. I return to this point in Chapter 5. 
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Alternatively, we might merely hypothesise the artist’s intentions to illuminate the meaning 
of the artwork, much like we do when we communicate with words: we hypothesise what 
the person intends to say. I return to this issue of artist intention in section 4.3. 
The conventions that artworks frequently employ in their formal qualities and methods 
of depiction, as well as the available background knowledge to help us understand these art-
making methods, enables, I think, most art to therefore satisfy Internal Convention. 
4.2. External Convention 
 
Recall that for the successful performance of some illocutions, certain conventions, over and 
above the locution used, need to be in place in the context of utterance in which the 
appropriate locution is made. In verbal cases, such conventions tend to be authoritative, 
structural, or institutional. For example, for ‘I do’ to count as accepting Christian marriage, 
this will at least need to be uttered during the appropriate ceremony in a church, and to 
christen a ship, one must have the correct authority and perform specific physical actions, 
like smashing a champagne bottle.  
Analogously, there are external conventions – over and above the artworks themselves 
– in place in the artworld, which can accommodate the performance of certain illocutions. 
First, there are structural and institutional conventions. Galleries generally tend to have 
consistent layouts and designs: they are frequently white cubes, with familiar restrictions 
such as ropes or markers to stop viewers getting too close to the artworks. Moreover, 
artworks are curated in certain ways: their display is chosen carefully to play out the curator’s 
narrative they want to tell. This narrative is normally evident in the statements on the gallery 
walls, as well as catalogues and reviews of the show.  
For instance, THIS PLACE (2015) at Prague’s DOX gallery, consisted of twelve 
photographers’ works attempting to understand and challenge the complexities of Israel: its 
history, geography, inhabitants, and its resonance for people around the world. Information 
on the gallery walls stated that the images combined to create “a heterogeneous narrative of 
a conflicted, paradoxical and deeply resonant place…”.17 These features of the artworld 
normally make clear that the gallery is a place of communication: a place for the exchange 
of ideas whilst also offering aesthetic experiences. With certain curative elements in place, 
we tend to have certain expectations about what the works might be saying or doing. For 
instance, if a show is curatorially geared towards political dissent, this will affect how we 
                                                 
17 Cotton, C., (2015) 
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engage with the artworks on display, and also help make explicit the illocutions the works 
might be performing.  
For instance, recall that Guernica was first displayed in the entrance hall of the Spanish 
Republic’s pavilion at the Paris World’s Fair. The painting was curated such that it sat 
opposite a large commemorative photograph of Garcia Lorca, the socialist poet who was 
executed during the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Outside the pavilion was a cinema 
showing films of the civil war’s destruction. With this curation, it was clear that the artworks 
were denouncing and deploring the events they depicted, as well as warfare more generally, 
rather than celebrating and glorifying war. Just like saying ‘I do’ to accept marriage requires 
the presence of certain conventions beyond and external to the locution itself, gallery 
conventions facilitate the illocutions performed by Guernica.   
Moreover, such structural and institutional elements of the artworld can exude a certain 
authority, whether this be from the artists, the curators, or collective bodies like the gallery 
itself. The authority of the artist for instance may derive from implicit historical treatments 
of the artist as having “sanction” over their work (Irvin, 2005: 315), and also from the law: 
“Under most international and national laws, artists have the statutory ‘moral right’ to object 
to what UK law calls ‘derogatory treatment’ of their works” (Lydiate, 2007). Moreover, the 
authority of the curator may derive from the growing need over the last century for curators 
to translate and communicate artworks in a modern artworld: the artwork and artist are often 
“subsumed by the identity of the whole curatorial endeavour” (O’Neill, 2010: 255). Often, 
autonomous curators exercise authority and power over large art displays, such as Hans 
Ulrich Obrist and Harald Szeemann (Balzer, 2014). Consequently, artworks, when displayed 
in artworld exhibitions, are able to perform certain illocutions that may require a background 
of authority, such as the illocution of ordering, or even of subordination.18 
The conventions that almost always surround artworks, such as the wider art 
institution, structural elements such as gallery displays and curation, as well the authority 
we ascribe to the artist and the wider gallery community, enable most art to therefore satisfy 
External Convention. 
It might be objected that placing such convention restrictions on artworks in order for 
them to perform illocutions unreasonably restricts artists who attempt to break such 
conventions: whether they be internal or external. Indeed, Novitz does not consider this and 
                                                 
18  See MacKinnon (1993) and Langton (2017) for the relation between pornography, authority, and the 
illocution of subordination.  
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instead outlines how artworks neatly fit within certain conventions (1977: 28-39). However, 
many artists do not comfortably sit in established styles or exhibiting conventions.  
For example, consider Robert Barry’s Inert Gas Series (1969). Testing the limits of 
materiality within the artworld, Barry produced a poster for an exhibition that had neither a 
location nor a date. The poster contained a telephone number for the gallery, which had an 
answering service with a recorded message describing the ‘work.’ The work was the release 
of five measured volumes of odourless, colourless, noble gasses into the atmosphere in 
various locations.19 Barry’s work focuses on escaping the previously known and assumed 
physical limits of the art object, and is one of the many examples of artists who attempt to 
escape the limits of artworld conventions.  
Such works pose a problem for an attempt to contain art within both internal and 
external conventions because art is constantly breaking conventions and creating new ones. 
Verbal language is bound by convention, and you might think that art is not bound in the 
same way, so art cannot and should not satisfy any convention restrictions. And since we 
need internal conventions (at the very least), for the successful performance of illocutions, 
art therefore cannot perform such acts.  
To respond to this problem we can concede that artists do constantly break conventions 
and create new ones, but point out that this is always or mostly done against a backdrop of 
wider, recognised conventions. For the art-object to even be recognised and treated as art, 
and so be interpreted as performing certain actions in the first place, there needs to be 
sufficient conventions in place to render the object ‘art’, whether these be internal in the 
form of the medium used, or external, in the way that the work is displayed to the public. 
Once the object is construed as art, it will always or mostly evoke and reference past and 
current works, artists, and styles, and is thus contained within various artistic conventions, 
even if this is against the will of the artist.  
This might mean that to perform illocutions an artist’s work can never truly escape 
artworld conventions, internal or external, but this bullet isn’t too big to bite. If an artist 
created an artwork that was completely unbound by convention and perhaps, as a result, 
didn’t clearly communicate anything at all, then it wouldn’t perform any illocutions. But this 
is a good result: in such a case we should want to refrain from interpreting such a work as 
performing any illocutions for it isn’t communicating anything recognisable at all.20 
                                                 
19 ‘Robert Barry’ MoMA (n.d.) 
20 This reflects von Hantelmann’s (2010) adaption of Judith Butler’s ideas about ‘performativity’ to art, namely, 
that “the artwork does not gain a societal impact by rupturing these conventions; it is via these conventions 
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4.3. Intention in art 
 
Austin claims that some illocutionary acts, to be smoothly performed, require the speaker to 
possess the appropriate intentions and thoughts. I called this condition Intention. If the 
correct thoughts, ideas, or intentions are not held by the speaker when she performs a 
particular illocution, then the act is considered non-ideal, or stilted in some way. Here, in 
what Austin calls an ‘abuse’ of an illocution, the act is achieved, but is done so defectively, 
because the appropriate intentions do not lie behind the act. Where Intention isn’t satisfied 
with an act that requires it, the act is still performed, though not smoothly. For example, 
when I assert something I believe to be false, I still assert, though insincerely. Austin 
considers this to be the act of lying: an abuse of the act of assertion, or an insincere assertion. 
This is because in lying you assert something you believe to be false, where ordinarily you 
should only assert something you believe to be true (1962: 40).  
There is disagreement over whether a condition like Intention is true. Some have 
thought that speaker intention as a whole is irrelevant when determining illocutionary force, 
and a relic of an outdated conception of speech acts (Butler, 1997: 92-93).  
However, for the most part, theorists agree that something like Intention is required 
for the smooth performance of many types of illocution. The disagreement lies more in how 
this condition should be interpreted: for instance, is it the actual intention of the speaker, or 
merely an attributed intention to the speaker, that is required?  
Peter Strawson holds the former. He argues that most types of illocution such as 
asserting, warning, promising, and requesting, are communicative, as opposed to those more 
institutional speech acts such as marriage or check-mating in a game of chess. Consequently, 
the speaker’s actual intention to perform these communicative speech acts is necessary for 
the act’s smooth performance. Strawson uses Paul Grice’s notion of non-natural meaning to 
provide an analysis of the type of intention required behind these illocutions, which amounts 
to “broadly an audience-directed intention” (Strawson, 1964: 459). For the act to be 
smoothly performed, the speaker must intend “his audience to recognise his intention to 
produce a certain response by saying what he does” (de Gaynesford, 2011: 126, explaining 
Strawson’s position). 
                                                 
that there already is a societal impact” (2010: 14) and “…for Butler any form of acting is only thinkable within 
the constitutive and regulative structure of conventions…a radical break with conventions must fail…With this 
notion of performativity we can, for example, concretise how every artwork, not in spite of but by virtue of its 
integration in certain conventions, ‘acts’:  how for example, via the museum it sustains or co-produces a certain 
notion of history, progress and development” (2010: 19). 
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On the other hand, others have rejected the claim that certain illocutions, to be 
performed smoothly, require the speaker’s actual intention. Rather, merely an attributed 
intention to the speaker is necessary for the smooth performance of certain types of act.21 
I won’t come down on either side of this debate: an investigation into how artworks 
perform illocutions is hardly the place to argue for a particular view of intention in speech 
acts more generally. However, what I will do, is explore how the role of intention in 
performing illocutions can be understood in the artworld. I offer a derivative picture of 
intention in art, and one that uses the notion of a distant speaker. In doing this, I draw on an 
existing debate about determining artwork meaning.  
Performing illocutions like asserting, deploring, or protesting, is something we 
normally take people to do, rather than inanimate objects. This is because performing speech 
acts normally involves possessing psychological states, and objects, such as artworks, cannot 
have psychological states. Whether or not we agree with Intention, it does seem that many 
speech acts involve expression of, or at least the appearance of, certain psychological states. 
For instance, assertion tends to involve at least the appearance of belief, and promising to do 
something normally involves an intention to do that thing. In ordinary conversation people 
normally have intentions to perform certain illocutions, which they attempt to make manifest 
or signal to by using appropriate locutions. Moreover, understanding what illocution is 
supposedly being performed by someone normally involves the audience at least ascribing 
an intention to the speaker to perform the act in question. Given that artworks as inanimate 
objects cannot possess psychological states, they therefore cannot perform speech acts 
entirely on their own. 
But an object can at least perform illocutions in a derivative sense, in a way that derives 
somehow from an agent. Consider verbal objects, like notes or signs, which can be used by 
an agent to do things. For instance, at a building site Mark puts up a sign saying ‘Demolition 
work in progress’. Mark is asserting that demolition work is in progress. But we also speak 
of the sign as asserting that demolition work is in progress, because an agent uses it: it forms 
an utterance. More generally, while we tend to speak about utterers saying things, we also 
speak of utterances saying things. Indeed, Austin speaks of both people and utterances 
performing actions like asserting or lying (1962: pp. 6-8, 57). 
This distinction between people performing illocutions and objects performing 
illocutions is useful because we can begin to see how an artwork might count as performing 
                                                 
21 See Sbisà (forthcoming). 
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illocutions in a derivative sense. In the artworld, we tend to have people who use an artwork 
to say something: normally artists and curators. The artist creates the work, and a curator 
can put the work to a use perhaps not always intended by the artist. So we can either speak 
of the artist or curator asserting, for instance, or of the artworks asserting in a derivative 
sense, perhaps deriving from how the artist or curator uses the artwork. We can ask: what 
does the artist or curator assert? Or, what does the artwork assert?  
This can be divided into two claims: (a) the artist (or curator) performs the illocution 
through the artwork that functions as a vehicle, or (b) the artwork itself performs the 
illocution, but in some derivative sense.  
Both (a) and (b) are implied within the aesthetics literature. For instance, both Novitz 
and Kjørup’s extension of speech act theory to pictures consists of the argument that people 
can use pictures to perform illocutions. They talk of the person behind the picture as 
performing the act, using the picture as a vehicle: “…whereas neither captions and labels nor 
pictures are statements in themselves, they can all function as vehicles for statements 
performed by human beings” (Kjørup, 1974: 218). And a person can warn others by using 
visual signs, for instance, warning others of their vicious dog by placing a picture of the dog 
on their garden fence (Novitz, 1977: 75). This sides with (a): it’s people who perform 
illocutions using various vehicles, such as pictures.  
However, Morris Weitz writes of Guernica: 
 
The painting asserts [that the victory of Fascism is the brutal destruction of 
everything] through the bull, who symbolizes Fascism and who is relatively intact, 
and the other subjects – the soldier, the horse, the women, the children, and the 
houses – which are torn to pieces  (1950: 150, my emphasis), 
 
thus siding with (b), and Stephen Davies writes of Guernica being a protest itself (2006b: 
68). Furthermore, the art critics whom I mention in section 2 talk of the artworks as 
performing illocutions or saying certain things, also siding with (b).  
This divide does not just arise in the case of art; it is first present in Austin’s account 
of ordinary verbal means of performing illocution – is it the person behind the utterance or 
the utterance itself that performs the illocution? Austin affirms the former when he writes 
about uptake: “I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and 
takes what I say in a certain sense” (1962: 115-16). But he also affirms the latter when he 
talks of the “issuing of the utterance” and the “utterance of words” as constituting the 
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performing of an action (6-8). 
That we tend to speak of the illocutionary force of art in both ways – either that 
someone behind the work is saying something and using the work to do so, or that the work 
manages to speak for itself – raises the question of what is really going on.  
In ordinary verbal situations, it depends on the context whether it’s the person behind 
the utterance or the utterance itself performing the illocution. When the speaker is present, 
either spatially or temporally with the hearer, it makes sense to say that she is performing 
the act of warning, for instance, by uttering a certain sentence or by making a certain gesture. 
In verbal situations this is the norm. But when there is no clear speaker – perhaps with a 
railway sign that reads ‘Passengers are warned to cross the track by the bridge only’ (Austin, 
57) – then the utterance itself seems sufficient for the performance of the illocution. 
The performance of illocutions by artworks tends to be more akin to the derivative 
picture, (b): artworks perform illocutions, derivatively on an agent behind the work. The 
reason artworks are able to speak for themselves in this way is because they tend to have 
distant speakers. Communicative artworks have a ‘speaker’ or an artist behind the work, but 
in contrast to many verbal conversational cases, the artist, say, needn’t be present for their 
art to perform illocutions. While it’s necessary that artworks have creators, the artist could 
create the work and then die, and the work still be used in different contexts to perform 
illocutions for centuries to come.  
In this distant speaker picture, what a work does and says is derivative on a person in 
some way, but in a distant way, both spatially and temporally, enabling the works to speak 
for themselves. This is similar to the case of road signs, where we ascribe (or describe) 
intentions to a distant speaker, whether this is a collective body such as the government or 
the council, or a single person. In such cases, even when it’s not clear who the speaker is, 
we can still identify clear intentions. David Goldblatt captures this when he draws an analogy 
between the posting of road signs and the display of artworks: 
 
…the driver has been warned. But by whom? What isn’t clear is that a single 
individual has determined the idea for such a sign or for its appropriate posting. 
There are those who would not be satisfied with saying “the government” or 
“bureau of traffic control.” But the point is that intention can be clear without the 
intender being clearly identified (Goldblatt, 2011, my emphasis). 
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This distant speaker notion of (b) remains faithful to Austin’s speech act theory. When 
discussing a sign at a station that reads ‘Passengers are warned to cross the track by the 
bridge only’, Austin writes: “this serves to indicate that the utterance (in writing) of the 
sentence is…the instrument effecting the act of warning, authorizing, &c” (1962: 57). This 
idea that an illocution can be performed without a clear speaker per se, as with a railway 
sign, is plausible, since it allows other objects such as generic answering machines to 
perform acts such as greetings and assertions, where there is no speaker per se but rather a 
machine that performs illocutions for the speaker precisely because they aren’t available.  
I’ve opted for a derivative picture, and one where the artwork manages to speak for 
itself, on the basis of a ‘distant speaker’. Given this, and given that artworks do not have 
psychological states, from what or whom might the artwork’s supposed illocutionary force 
derive? Who is the ‘distant speaker’, and how should we analyse this? There is already a 
debate in aesthetics about the relation between artwork meaning and the artist’s intentions 
that we can draw on to understand a derivative distant speaker picture of artworks 
performing illocutions. I’ll focus on three options. 
First, the artwork might perform illocutions derivatively on the artist’s actual 
intentions. Here, the distant speaker is the artist. This position would be held by Moderate 
Actual Intentionalists (henceforth just ‘Actual Intentionalist’), who hold that what 
determines an artwork’s meaning is the artist’s intentions that are recognised in the work, 
using evidence drawn from the work’s and artist’s context of creation (Carroll, 2000: 79, 
82). 
Second, the artwork might perform illocutions derivatively on an ideal audience’s 
hypotheses about the artist’s intentions. Here, the distant speaker is again the artist, who we 
then hypothesise about.22 This position would be held by Hypothetical Intentionalists, who 
believe that an artwork’s meaning is determined not by the artist’s actual intentions, but by 
a suitable audience’s hypotheses of the artist’s intentions, which are based on the linguistic 
and artistic conventions that held in the work’s context of creation (Levinson, 1996; 2000). 
These hypothesised intentions needn’t cohere with the actual psychological states held by 
the artist in order to determine the artwork’s meaning.  
On the other side of the spectrum, Anti-intentionalists hold that when deciphering a 
work’s meaning, the artist’s actual or imputed intentions have no relevance at all, and 
                                                 
22 Under some breeds of Hypothetical Intentionalism, the distant speaker could be a ‘hypothesised artist’ as 
opposed to the actual artist being hypothesised about. Levinson holds the latter view, and see Davies (2006a) 
for the former view. 
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interpreters should give the work complete autonomy from the beliefs of its creator.23 They 
recognise that the work has an agent behind it, but what that agent supposedly believes or 
intends for the work is beside the point. There might be quasi-intentions the Anti-
intentionalist can defer to in their theorising about artwork meaning: an artwork might 
perform illocutions derivatively on its own ‘intentions’. This view would use an “object-
orientated use of intention” (Roskill, 1977: 100), where intention is ascribed to the work 
rather than the artist. As Mark Roskill writes: 
 
Thus one finds T. S. Eliot writing of a ‘harmonics of poetry which would interfere 
with the poem’s intention’ (rather than the poet’s); the Marxist critic George Lukacs 
of the ‘intention realized in the work [which] need not coincide with the writer’s 
conscious intention’ (Roskill, 1977: 99). 
 
Goldblatt’s claim about intention being detected in road signs is particularly relevant here: 
within an Anti-intentionalist framework, “the intention can be clear without the intender 
being clearly identified” (Goldblatt, 2011).  
This laid-out terrain in theories of artwork meaning might have parallels with how 
intention is treated in speech act theory more generally. Depending on how you treat the role 
of intention in ordinary verbal speech acts – for instance, whether or not you think Intention 
is true – might affect what you’ll take to be the case with art. In regards to this, I’ll here 
outline some suppositional reasoning.  
If you think something like Intention is true, and the smooth performance of some 
illocutions requires the speaker’s actual intention to perform the act in question, or at least 
requires an imputed intention to the speaker, then this might entail the following.  
Under an Anti-intentionalist framework of artwork meaning, these types of illocutions 
that do require actual or imputed intentions could only be performed defectively. This is 
because Anti-intentionalism dispenses entirely with the artist’s intention – both actual and 
imputed – so there are no intentions playing a role in determining artwork meaning. So the 
particular illocution that would require an intention on the part of the speaker could still get 
performed, but only ever defectively. Under an Actual Intentionalist framework of artwork 
meaning, the types of illocutions that do require actual or imputed intentions will be 
defectively or smoothly performed depending on the artist’s actual intentions. And under a 
                                                 
23 See for example Barthes (1967), Nathan (1982; 2006), and Wimsatt & Beardsley (1946). 
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Hypothetical Intentionalist framework of artwork meaning, the types of illocutions that do 
require actual or imputed intentions will be defectively or smoothly performed depending 
on whether the ideal audience hypothesises or attributes an intention to the artist for the act 
in question. 
On the other hand, if you think something like Intention is not true, and no illocutions 
require any intentions of the speaker – actual or imputed – for their smooth performance, 
then under Anti-intentionalist positions artworks could perform many illocutions smoothly 
without the artist’s actual or imputed intention having any role to play, which fits well with 
the Anti-intentionalist broad picture of artwork meaning.  
However, if Intention were not true, this wouldn’t sit comfortably with either Actual 
Intentionalism or Hypothetical Intentionalism. For if Intention were not true, then artworks 
could smoothly perform many illocutions not intended by the artist, nor even hypothesised 
to be intended by the artist. But recall that for Actual Intentionalism and Hypothetical 
Intentionalism artwork meaning is determined by whatever the artist successfully intends 
their work to mean, or is determined by an ideal audience’s hypothesis of meaning. If, for 
both positions, this ‘artwork meaning’ partly comprises the illocutionary force of a work, 
then the work could smoothly perform illocutions, and so have some meaning-features, not 
actually intended by the artist nor attributed to the artist. This goes against the central tenets 
of Actual and Hypothetical Intentionalism, for some meaning-features, such as illocutionary 
force, would be possessed by the work contrary to what the artist intended, or contrary to 
what an ideal audience hypothesises. However, given that the majority of theorists think that 
something like Intention is true, I don’t take this to be a worrying problem for Actual or 
Hypothetical Intentionalism.  
 
4.4. Uptake in art  
 
According to Austin, uptake is a matter of the audience understanding the meaning and force 
of the locution used by a speaker. However, Austin’s notion of uptake is incomplete, for he 
provides no account of the conditions necessary for securing uptake. 
Strawson offers an intention-based view of uptake, arguing that uptake – 
understanding the force of a locution – must be achieved by the speaker’s knowing and 
intentional involvement (de Gaynesford, 2011: 125). Specifically, Strawson uses Grice’s 
notion of non-natural meaning to provide an analysis of audience understanding (i.e. uptake), 
which amounts to “recognizing what may be called broadly an audience-directed intention 
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and recognizing it as wholly overt, as intended to be recognized” (Strawson, 1964: 459). In 
other words, uptake involves a speaker successfully intending “his audience to recognise his 
intention to produce a certain response by saying what he does” (de Gaynesford, 126), and 
a speaker will not secure uptake “unless his complex intention is grasped” (Strawson, 450). 
That is, the intentions involved in performing the illocution need to be grasped by the 
audience.  
Whether or not we agree with Strawson’s intention-based picture of uptake, it does 
seem that what you take the role of intention to be in performing illocutions will be linked 
to what you think about uptake. If the speaker must possess a particular intention to perform 
a certain act for the act to be performed smoothly, or at least possess an attributed intention 
to perform that act, then uptake will likely involve the audience recognising this actual or 
imputed intention. But if the speaker needn’t possess a particular intention to perform the 
act for the act to be performed smoothly, then uptake will involve something more minimal; 
perhaps a recognition of the purported illocutionary force via the speaker’s use of Internal 
and perhaps External conventions. Equally in the case of art, what you hold for Intention in 
art will likely be mirrored by what you take Uptake to involve in art. As above, I’ll here 
outline some suppositional reasoning for this. 
If something like Intention is true, and for the smooth performance of some illocutions 
in art the artist must possess an actual or imputed intention to perform that act, then uptake 
could be treated within any of our frameworks.  
Under an Actual Intentionalist picture, uptake for those acts that require intention 
would involve the viewer recognising the artist’s actual intention to perform that illocution. 
Under a Hypothetical Intentionalist picture, uptake would involve a suitable audience 
recognising a hypothesised intention of the artist’s, or imputing an intention to the artist, 
given certain evidence, to perform that illocution. And under an Anti-intentionalist 
framework, uptake for those acts that require intention would be more minimal, and 
wouldn’t involve a recognition of any intention behind the purported act. Here, uptake would 
involve the audience understanding the work itself, comprised of its formal content and 
historical setting, i.e. recognising the internal conventions and perhaps external conventions 
employed in and surrounding the work. However, as noted above, if Intention were true, 
then uptake within an Anti-intentionalist framework would only ever secure a defectively 
performed illocution.  
And if something like Intention is not true, and no artist intention – actual or imputed 
– is required for the smooth performance of any illocution in art, then uptake for any 
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illocution could still be treated within at least an Anti-intentionalist framework, as above. 
But what uptake in this case would involve within an Actual or Hypothetical Intentionalist 
framework is less clear. That a speaker’s actual or imputed intentions under this particular 
theory of speech acts isn’t required for the smoothness of any illocution, would mean that 
uptake needn’t track the actual or imputed intentions of the speaker, or artist. But this goes 
against the central tenets of Actual and Hypothetical Intentionalism. Actual and Hypothetical 
Intentionalists could persevere with their picture of uptake offered above, which would 
involve the viewer recognising the artist’s actual or imputed intention to perform that 
illocution. Or, they could be pressed to abandon their theories for determining at least the 
illocutionary forces held by artworks. But again, given that the majority of theorists think 
that something like Intention is true, I don’t take this to be a worrying problem for Actual or 
Hypothetical Intentionalism.  
In sum: Guernica depicts the utter devastation and sorrow inflicted upon an innocent 
town. The visceral depictions carry symbolic and metaphorical contents, and when this is 
coupled with knowledge about the painting’s creation, the average well-informed viewer 
will likely understand the force of this visual locution. More specifically, this uptake might 
involve (i) the audience grasping the intentions actually held by Picasso about the work, (ii) 
the audience hypothesising what Picasso might have meant by the work, or (iii) by the 
audience understanding the work itself, without deferring to any intentions behind the work. 
I do not adopt any one of these options in particular, but have merely provided their 
landscape. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
By utilising Austin’s analysis of illocutionary force, I have argued for the assumption 
commonly made by art critics and philosophers of art that non-verbal visual artworks can 
perform illocutions. Of course, I haven’t defended Austin’s theory of speech acts, and more 
work needs to be done to consider the differences between the illocutionary force of art and 
the illocutionary force of our words. But I hope to have shown that it’s very plausible that 
visual artworks, without containing words, can perform actions such as asserting, protesting, 
and denouncing. This is because artworks, without containing words, can meet the Internal 
Convention, External Convention, Intention (albeit in different ways), and Uptake conditions.  
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To conclude, I want to reflect a little on the implications this has for the Intentionalist 
Debate. Recall that I opted for a derivative picture of illocutionary force in art, and one where 
the artwork manages to speak for itself, on the basis of a ‘distant speaker’. I asked who this 
distant speaker might be in the art case, and explored what Actual Intentionalists, 
Hypothetical Intentionalists, and Anti-intentionalists would have to say about it. However, 
this picture as it stands is too restrictive on who the distant speaker could be in the artworld.  
For both Actual Intentionalists and Hypothetical Intentionalists at least, the distant 
speaker is the artist. But it looks like artworks could perform illocutions derivatively on the 
intentions or beliefs of people other than the artist, such as the curator, which could be a 
single person or a collective entity. Indeed, curators are often indispensable in generating 
environments facilitating an artwork’s performance of illocutions, such as the way Guernica 
was curated at the Spanish Republic’s pavilion at the Paris World’s Fair.  
In the artworld, artists and curators place artworks in exhibition situations to say 
something. The artist creates the work, and a curator can put the work to a use not always 
intended by the artist. This would explain how artworks can perform illocutions not 
envisaged by the artist, as well as works doing things long after the artist has died. So when 
we speak of artworks performing illocutions in a derivative sense, this could be derivative 
on how the artist or the curator uses the artwork. Indeed, Roskill considers the possibility of 
there being more than one creator (1977: 101), or ascribing intentions to collective 
organisations like workshops or schools (102). It should be noted, though, that this notion 
looks incompatible with Anti-intentionalist theories of artwork meaning. If Anti-
intentionalists reject any intention behind the work as determining an artwork’s meaning, 
this will also exclude the curator’s. 
Perhaps we therefore should acknowledge the possibility of an augmented Actual 
Intentionalism or Hypothetical Intentionalism, that doesn’t concern just the artist. We can 
bring in the curator too. On this kind of picture, the artwork might perform illocutions 
derivatively on the artist’s actual intentions or derivatively on the actual intentions of the 
curator, or derivatively on an ideal audience’s hypotheses about the artist’s intentions, or on 
an ideal audience’s hypotheses about the curator’s intentions. This curator could be a single 
person, or a broad collective in some sense.  
Accommodating the curator into a broad intentionalist picture of artwork meaning of 
course requires more developed defence. But for now, I want to merely gesture towards such 
a move. 
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Chapter Two  
2. Can Art Lie? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter explores in detail an offshoot from Chapter 1: the act of lying. We learn from 
art and we believe that it can reveal truths about reality. But can it lie about things? If it 
can, this may explain what we find objectionable in certain artworks, affect how we interpret 
them, and have consequences for the culpability of the artist. The aim of this chapter is to 
establish whether representational visual art can lie, where lying is treated as an insincere 
assertion. I argue that art can lie, but only in contexts where communication should be 
truthful: contexts in which H. P. Grice’s first maxim of quality (“Do not say what you believe 
to be false”) is in effect. I argue that this is a genre/curation sensitive issue, and so whether 
art can lie is a context-sensitive matter. 
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1. Introduction  
 
 
 
 
Many visual artworks seem to lie to us. Yves Klein’s photograph Leap into the Void (1960) 
(Figure. 2) shows the artist supposedly jumping off a roof into the air, hurtling himself 
unprotected from the concrete below. This ‘artistic action’, documented as a photograph, 
was displayed by the artist on newsstands throughout Paris, bewildering all those who 
encountered it (Fineman, 2012: 189). In reality, Klein hired photographers to montage two 
negatives together: one showing Klein leaping into a tarpaulin, and the other showing the 
surrounding scene without the tarpaulin (Fineman, 181). The result is an illusionary 
documentary photograph, which seems to lie that the artist leapt to the ground unprotected, 
refuting the supposed truism ‘the camera never lies’. 
And consider Liu Chunhua’s Mao Zedong Goes To Anyuan (c. 1963). This painting, 
reproduced over 900 million times and one of the most important paintings of the Cultural 
Revolution in China, has been criticised for telling lies about Mao’s leadership. The painting 
Figure. 2 
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depicts a young Mao on a mountaintop, en route to the industrial city of Anyuan, supposedly 
to coordinate a miners’ strike which came to be known as The Anyuan Miners’ Strike of 
1922, which was a defining moment for the Chinese Communist Party. However, the 
painting has been criticised for being “politically-motivated fiction” further exaggerating 
Mao’s actual role in the strike (Pan, 2009). But the painting’s artist has other ideas about his 
work:  
 
With the arrival of our great leader, blue skies appear over Anyuan. The hills, sky, trees 
and clouds are the means used artistically to evoke a grand image of the red sun in our 
hearts. Riotous clouds are drifting swiftly past. They indicate that Chairman Mao is 
arriving in Anyuan at a critical point of sharp class struggle and show, in contrast how 
tranquil, confident and firm Chairman Mao is at that moment (Chunhua, 1968: 2-6) 
But, according to a Business Insider writer: 
This is a lie…Mao’s rule was anything but tranquil, and China’s human-made crisis 
during the decade of the Cultural Revolution was traumatizing enough to convince all 
of China’s subsequent leaders to eschew collectivization and “Mao Zedong thought.”1  
Moreover, lies might be detected in sexist and racist art in general. Titian’s Rape of Europa 
(1559-62) (Figure. 3) – which depicts a scene from a myth, where Jupiter, incarnated as a 
bull, abducts Europa – has been accused of eroticising rape (A.W. Eaton, 2003: 161, 166).  
                                                 
1 Rosen (2015) 
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This eroticising might partly involve the painting telling rape myths, which capture false 
beliefs that are persistently and widely held about rape. In other words, the painting might 
tell lies such as rape satisfies a woman’s secret desires and women are naturally objects. 
And consider the Great Exhibition of German Art (1937). It showcased so-called ‘Aryan’ 
art, which depicted idealised blonde nudes and landscapes. The curator, Adolf Ziegler 
(Peters, 2014: 21, 36, 37), displayed these works so that they were taken to express racial 
purity and represent the Nazi ideal of an Aryan race (Foster et al, 2004: 281), so maybe the 
works lied that the Aryan race is naturally superior. Conversely, it might be thought that the 
Nazis saw modern art – branded ‘degenerate art’ – as the lie: “a dangerous lie perpetuated 
by Jews, communists, and even the insane to contaminate the body of German society,” 
according to a New York Times art critic.2 
Plato accused artists and their artworks for telling ‘wicked lies:’3 as imitations, they 
                                                 
2 Farago, J., (2014, my emphasis).  
3 According to one translation (2003: Book III, p. 84). All other references are from an online translation. More 
precisely, Plato talks about writers and tales telling lies (Book II p. 197, 217; Book III p. 329) but he is clear 
that this extends to all arts (Book X, p. 401). For more on this see Hursthouse (1992: 244) and Rockmore 
(2013: 24). 
Figure. 3 
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were three stages removed from the truth, i.e. false (Book X, p. 403).4 However, there has 
been little philosophical attention as to whether or not art actually lies rather than being 
merely false, for as I’ll show, expressing falsehoods is neither necessary nor sufficient to lie.  
Whether or not art lies matters a great deal. Lying is generally considered a morally 
objectionable thing to do because it normally tries to create in the listener a false belief. The 
person lied to subsequently possesses misinformation, which may be harmful to her or 
others. Moreover, the person lied to feels and has been manipulated, and is “unable to make 
choices for themselves…unable to act as they would have wanted to act” had they had 
adequate information (Bok, 1978, 20-21). If art can lie, this will partly explain what we find 
objectionable in certain artworks, affect how we interpret them, and have consequences for 
the culpability of the artist. For example, if artworks belonging to the western genre of the 
female nude such as Titian’s Rape of Europa tell lies such as women are naturally objects, 
then this will play a role in perpetuating gender inequality. As I argue however, whether this 
particular painting lies or has lied in the past is a complicated matter, concerning doxastic 
and contextual dimensions.  
This chapter is an attempt at some much-needed philosophical enquiry as to whether 
or not art can lie. 5 I make a conditional argument: if art can express truth-evaluable contents 
or messages, then it can lie, but only in contexts where communication should be truthful: 
contexts in which H. P. Grice’s first maxim of quality (“Do not say what you believe to be 
false”) is in effect. I argue that this is a genre/curation sensitive issue, and so whether art can 
lie is a context-sensitive matter. Given this, I show that: Klein’s Leap into the Void did 
indeed lie on one level; the works in the Great Exhibition of German Art and Chunhua’s 
Mao Zedong Goes To Anyuan probably did not constitute lies; and that it depends on who is 
displaying Titian’s Rape of Europa and where it is displayed as to whether or not it lies. 
Section 2 makes some preliminary assumptions and distinctions. Section 3 offers a definition 
of lying which is most suitable for the artworld. Section 4 argues that on this proposal (and 
assuming that art can express truth-evaluable contents or messages in the first place), art can 
lie but only in certain artworld contexts. Section 5 considers how curation can affect what 
lies are told by an artwork. 
                                                 
4 Moreover, Marcia Eaton writes that once we’ve shown how artworks can assert, painters can then lie (1980: 
22). Furthermore, it’s been suggested that other visual representations can lie: Rae Langton and Caroline West 
(1999) claim that some pornographers lie through pornography about women.  
5 I limit my scope to the representational arts to ensure a straightforward investigation. Non-representational 
art may be able to lie, but I leave this for now. 
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2. Preliminaries  
 
This chapter makes two assumptions about the meaning of artworks, namely, that it has two 
components: propositional content and illocutionary force.  
First, I assume that artworks possess propositional content. This assumption is made 
because lying involves expressing certain truth-evaluable contents, i.e. propositions. The 
next section will consider this in more detail, but in sum, lying involves saying something 
you believe to be false. In analysing how artworks might lie, I take for granted that they can 
express propositions in the first place. But, there’s good reason to think that artworks can 
express propositions and so say things with truth values. An artwork might express 
propositions partly through its symbols and subject within its composition (Weitz, 1950: 
149). For example, the mutilated people and intact bull in Picasso’s Guernica (1937) serve 
to express the proposition that the victory of Fascism is the brutal destruction of everything 
(Weitz, 150). Moreover, we can apply propositional operators such as negation or modal 
terms to the depictive contents of pictures, as Alex Grzankowski (2015) has observed, which 
suggests that at least the shallow content of pictures is propositional.6 Chapter 3 offers an 
argument in defense of this propositional claim. 
Second, I assume that artworks can possess illocutionary force. This assumption is 
made because to lie, you need to assert something; you must perform a certain kind of speech 
act (the next section deals with this more closely). In analysing how artworks might lie, I 
take for granted that they can possess illocutionary force in the first place. And we do speak 
as if artworks have illocutionary force. Part of the power of Picasso’s Guernica is that it 
protests against war and pleads for peace – actions which Austin called illocutionary acts.7 
The previous chapter, 1, defends this particular claim.  
These two assumptions are made in order to provide a smooth investigation into 
whether artworks, understood as objects that possess propositional content and illocutionary 
capacities, can lie. Against this assumed background, this chapter analyses how exactly an 
artwork might perform the specific speech act that is required for lying, noting contextual 
and doxastic complexities along the way.  
                                                 
6 For more proponents of the view that artworks can express propositions, see Greene (1940) and Korsmeyer 
(1985). 
7 For support of this claim see Novitz (1977) and Kjørup (1974; 1978). For resistance, see Young (2001) and 
Crane (2009). 
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Moreover, to do justice to the complexity of lying in the artworld, we need to draw on 
our distinction introduced at the beginning of this thesis, between two levels of content in 
an artwork; what I called shallow and deep. When shallow or deep content is expressed with 
a certain force, it generates shallow and deep messages. An artwork’s shallow content 
roughly comprises what a work represents or depicts at its “subject level” (Lamarque, 2009: 
150) or “descriptive level” (Korsmeyer, 1985: 203). For instance, Guernica represents, at a 
shallow level, the bombing of Guernica in the Spanish Civil War. However, the way that 
the attack is depicted serves to express something more; something deeper, such as war is 
barbaric. This deep content in Guernica is expressed with various illocutionary forces, such 
as denouncement.  Deep messages go beyond the shallow level, and form the ‘point’ of the 
piece (Carroll, 2001: 166), belonging to the ‘theme’ of the work.  
However we unpack this distinction, what is important for our purposes is that shallow 
and deep messages needn’t have the same truth-value. Shallow messages can be false whilst 
deep messages true, and vice versa. An artwork with a false shallow message can convey a 
true deep one, as Guernica does: there wasn’t a light bulb in the sky during the attack on 
Guernica, but it’s true that war is barbaric. Moreover, a true shallow message may be used 
to convey a deep falsehood. Leni Riefenstahl’s 1935 film Triumph of the Will does this, 
using raw documentary footage of the 1934 Nuremburg rally to convey false deep claims 
about the glamour of war. And indeed, some artworks convey false messages at both levels 
– consider Gustav Closs’s Nazi St George Slaying a Dragon (1937), which depicts an event 
that never happened in order to convey a false deep message idealising war – or true 
messages at both levels, as does Nick Ut’s famous 1972 photograph The Terror of War 
which depicts a real event – a napalm bombing – to convey a true deep message about the 
horrors of war. Crucially, if an artwork can say false things at a shallow or deep level, then 
maybe an artwork can tell shallow lies, deep lies, or both.  
In sum, this chapter assumes that artworks can have illocutionary force and 
propositional content (and so are truth-evaluable), 8 where the latter is divided in to shallow 
and deep levels. This chapter thus makes the following argument: if art can express truth-
evaluable contents or messages, then it can lie, but only in contexts where communication 
should be truthful. 
 
                                                 
8 See Chapters 1 and 3 for arguments defending these assumptions respectively.  
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3. Lying requires ‘quality’  
 
Plato hints that the artist lies because her art expresses falsehoods. In this crude sense, art 
seems to lie all the time: many artworks say false things. However, merely saying a falsehood 
isn’t lying. Telling a story isn’t lying, nor stating something you believe to be true which is 
in fact false. 
So what is lying? Lying at least involves saying something with a meaning and truth-
value. Whether we lie verbally or non-verbally (for instance, by nodding), what we thereby 
say will at least have propositional content. This also explains why certain deceptive acts, 
like pretending to pack your bags to convince your partner that you’re leaving, are not lies, 
since in such cases nothing is strictly said.   
However, lying is not simply saying something false, for saying something false is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for lying. I may sincerely believe that Mark is hiding in the 
church when in fact he is not: I do not lie when I tell this to Sophie. Alternatively, if I tell 
Sophie that Mark is hiding in the church when in fact I believe he’s in Nana’s cottage, I am 
lying to Sophie, even if it turns out what I told her was actually true. These examples show 
that to lie, what is said needn’t be false. A speaker must merely believe that what she says is 
false. 
While believing the content of one’s utterance to be false is necessary to lie, it’s not 
sufficient. I can utter something I believe (and know) to be false without lying, as when I act 
in a play and utter “I am thy father’s spirit”, or when I wink or smile to signal sarcasm or a 
joke. These are not lies, and this is because my utterances are not assertions: in acting or 
joking, I am not asserting something I believe to be false. Here, my utterances should not be 
taken seriously, and in order to lie I need them to be made in a context where they ought to 
be taken seriously.  
Asserting something is saying something in a context where you ought to speak 
truthfully or sincerely: a context where H.P. Grice’s (1989) First Maxim of Quality “Do not 
say what you believe to be false” is in effect as a norm of conversation.9 Call a context in 
which this maxim is in effect a quality context. This is a default feature of everyday 
conversation, unless there are signals to the contrary. If I wink at you, I temporarily ‘turn 
                                                 
9 More substantive accounts of assertion have stronger normative components (Williamson, 2000). I follow 
Fallis (2009: 35) and don’t aim to give a complete analysis of assertion but merely to capture the normative 
component of the speech act necessary for lying, i.e. assertion, which follows the quality maxim.  
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off’ this quality maxim (Fallis, 2009: 35); during a play, the maxim is not in effect at all. 
Here, in what we can call non-quality contexts, the speakers aren’t asserting something they 
believe to be false, and so they don’t lie. At best, they pseudo-assert things (Fallis, 50).  
The audience and certain conventions in the context of utterance determine whether a 
context is one of quality. For example, the conventions and expectations surrounding a 
conference presentation explain why that presentation forms a quality context. 
Contrastingly, the architecture of a theatre with a stage, curtain, dimmed lights, and a hushed 
audience may create a non-quality context: the actors need not speak truthfully.  
To assert, and so to lie, a speaker must believe that they are in a quality context. If I 
say something I believe false to you in a quality context, but for some reason I don’t believe 
this context holds (perhaps I believe I’m in a play), then I’m not lying. This is because I 
don’t intend you to take me seriously, even if you are doing so. In such a case, I’m not even 
asserting. So, to lie, you must intend to be taken seriously in the first place. 
In addition to a speaker believing she’s in a quality context, in order to assert 
something to someone else, and so to lie, the speaker must also be in a quality context. 
Imagine that I’m performing a play, and I attempt to communicate – through the fourth wall 
– something to you, the audience, which I believe to be false. Regardless of whether I believe 
I’m in a quality context, you won’t take me to be telling the truth, for I am actually in a non-
quality context, in a play. If you don’t take me to be telling the truth in the first place, then 
it doesn’t look like I can successfully assert something to you, and so successfully lie to you. 
In general, in non-quality contexts, the audience won’t recognise the speaker’s intended 
assertion: they take her to be like an actor. Consequently, the speaker doesn’t lie successfully 
because recognition of her supposed intention to assert in the first place isn’t secured.10 To 
assert something to someone, and so to lie successfully, then, the speaker must speak in a 
context where they should be taken seriously in the first place. 
It might be objected that this isn’t necessary to lie: the speaker does not need to be in 
a quality context, they must merely believe they are in one (David Fallis thinks this, 2009: 
48). Intuitions on whether this condition, call it ‘Q’, is necessary for lying are divided in the 
literature. Thomas Carson thinks that a variation of Q is necessary, for if a quality context is 
not in effect, we’d have a puzzling case in which both the speaker and the audience 
misunderstand what is going on (2010: 38).  
                                                 
10 For support of this see literature on ‘misfires’ of speech acts, such as Langton (1993: 316). 
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I agree with Carson: if it’s not the case that interlocutors are in a situation where the 
truth should be told in the first place, then it doesn’t look like a speaker can successfully 
assert something to you, and so successfully lie to you. This is because of a lack of 
‘transmission’ between the speaker and hearer. Much like I cannot successfully lie to you if 
I whisper to you too quietly something I believe to be false – and you just don’t hear me – if 
we’re in a context where the truth need not be told, my attempt at a lie will wash over my 
unsuspecting and unaware hearer, who thinks I’m merely pretending, like an actor.  
Even if we granted that Q is not necessary in ordinary verbal lying cases, it looks like 
Q is necessary for an artwork to lie because of the complexities of the artworld, which will 
become apparent in the following sections. The communication space between a viewer and 
an artwork is different to that of ordinary conversation between interlocutors. Artworks do 
not communicate meaning as directly or clearly as ordinary speech does; for one thing, they 
are visual and not verbal,11 and what an artist believes to be the case – perhaps whether the 
context in which their work is shown is one of quality – is frequently distorted or ignored in 
differently curated exhibitions. To drop Q in our definition of lying as applied to the artworld 
would further muddy the communication space between the artwork and viewer, making 
successful lying very difficult.  
For argument’s sake, assume that it isn’t necessary that an artwork be in a quality 
context to lie. Imagine a viewer, who interprets a painting in a non-quality context as false 
in some way. Given that the context is not one of quality, the standard viewer would likely 
believe: ‘oh, well, the painting’s meant to be false in this way to convey truth in that way’. 
Here, the falsity in the work would be taken to be akin to an actor’s false speech, washing 
over the unaware viewer, and not taken seriously regardless of whether the artist believed 
the context was one of quality. That is, even if the artist believed their work was saying 
something false in a quality context, this isn’t enough to secure the successful 
communication of the lie to a viewer in an art gallery.  
To therefore ensure that lies can be successfully communicated through art, Q should 
be made a necessary condition: the viewer needs to appropriately expect that the truth should 
be told in the first place in order for the artwork to communicate the lie. So, lying – as 
construed for our purposes in its application to the artworld – requires both quality and belief 
in quality: lying is saying something you believe to be false in a quality context, whilst 
                                                 
11 For support of this see Nelson Goodman (1968: 225-254) on the ‘density’ of visual, non-linguistic symbol 
systems. 
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believing that quality applies. More briefly, lying is asserting something you believe to be 
false: an insincere assertion.12 This is captured below: 
 
(L) Person S lies that p to audience H iff: 
 
                (S)    S says that p to H (saying condition) 
                (BF) S believes that p is false (belief of falsity condition) 
                       (BQ) S and H believe that S says that p in a quality context (belief 
of quality condition) 
                (Q)  S and H are in a quality context (quality condition). 13,14 
 
4. Can art lie?  
 
Lying is something we normally take people to do, rather than objects. This is because lying 
involves having beliefs about the truth-value of one’s statement and about the context of 
utterance, and objects cannot have beliefs. But an object can lie in a derivative sense, in a 
way that derives from the use an agent puts it to. Consider verbal objects, like notes or signs, 
which can be used by an agent to lie about something. Bill Clinton can use a note saying ‘I 
did not have sexual relations with that woman’ to lie about his infidelity. Here, the agent’s 
use of a note affects what the note does.  
More generally, whilst we tend to speak about utterers saying things, we also speak of 
utterances saying things. For instance, at a building site Mark puts up a sign saying 
‘Demolition work in progress’. Mark is saying that demolition work is in progress. But we 
also speak of the sign as saying that demolition work is in progress, because an agent uses 
it: it forms an utterance.15 And so with lying. Suppose there is no demolition work in 
                                                 
12 Though there’s disagreement on the details of this view, for support of the broad view that a lie is an insincere 
assertion see Siegler (1966), Shibles (1988), Carson (2006), Sorensen (2007), Fallis (2009), and Saul (2012). 
13 You might think that an intention to deceive is necessary to lie. However, it is widely agreed that such an 
intention is not necessary: you can lie without intending to deceive, i.e. in ‘bald-faced lying’. This is not a 
controversial claim, and receives a lot of support in the literature: see Siegler (1966: 129), Shibles (1988: 102), 
Carson (2006: 289), Sorensen (2007), and Fallis (2009). For simplicity, I too omit an intent to deceive condition 
in my definition. However, even if an intention to deceive were necessary, my argument would still go through.  
14 Many others subscribe to this kind of view - Chisholm and Feehan (1977), Williams (2002), Carson (2006; 
2010), Sorensen (2007), Fallis (2009; 2012), Saul (2012), and Stokke (2013a; 2013b). (L) is similar to Don 
Fallis’s (2009) definition, but, for reasons I’ve given above, my definition adds the fourth condition, Q.  
15 J. L. Austin speaks of both people and utterances performing actions such as lying (1962: pp. 6-8, 57, 151). 
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progress at the site, but Mark puts up the sign to lie that there is. Mark is lying that demolition 
work is in progress, and the sign is lying that demolition work is in progress. So strictly 
speaking it’s people who lie, but objects like signs can lie in this derivative sense. 
This distinction between people lying and objects lying is useful because we can begin 
to see how an artwork might count as lying in this derivative sense. In the artworld, we can 
have two people who use an artwork to say something: artists and curators. The artist creates 
the work, and a curator can put the work to a use not always intended by the artist. So we 
can speak of the artist or curator lying, or of the artworks lying in a derivative sense, deriving 
from how the artist or curator uses the artwork. We can ask: does the artist or curator lie? 
Or, does the artwork lie?  
However, we must distinguish between (i) an artwork lying because a person is using 
it as an aid to her lying, and (ii) the artwork itself lying. Regarding (i), I can lie that my 
ancestor was ‘this person’, and hold up my painting of Elizabeth I. The painting might lie 
because I use it to lie about something. However, the focus here is on what I’ve said and 
what I’ve lied about, not what the artwork is saying or lying about. On the other hand, (ii) 
focuses on what the artwork says, and so what the artwork lies about on the basis of the artist 
or curator’s beliefs. This is different to a person lying and using the work as a mere visual 
aid.  
I’ll focus on the question: ‘can the artwork lie?’ A natural way to answer this will be 
systematically related to our definition of lying (L), but now with a focus on what the artwork 
says and so what it lies about. So, (S) in (L) now becomes: an artwork says that p to H. There 
are four conditions in (L) to meet. Recall that this chapter assumes that artworks possess 
propositional content and illocutionary force. I therefore take it that artworks can express 
truth-evaluable messages, and thus they satisfy condition (S). Consequently, I will not deal 
directly with condition (S).  
I’ll now show how each remaining condition in (L) is met by considering the 
following: (i) Whose beliefs are relevant for assessing lying in the artworld, i.e. can art 
satisfy conditions (BF) and (BQ)? (ii) Does the artworld constitute a quality context, i.e. can 
art satisfy condition (Q)? Answering these questions will explain how an artwork can lie: 
how it can make an insincere assertion. If an artwork can say something in a quality context 
that the artist or curator believes to be false, then it can lie.  
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4.1. Conditions (BF) and (BQ): Whose beliefs?  
 
It’s important to first note whose beliefs are relevant for assessing lying in the artworld. 
Recall that (L) stipulates two belief-related conditions:  
 
(BF) S believes that p is false. 
(BQ) S and H believe that S says that p in a quality context.  
 
For an artwork to lie, someone, most likely the artist or curator, must believe that the artwork 
says something false in a quality context, where communication should be truthful. We need 
to rely on a person behind the work in this respect, because artworks cannot believe things. 
So, applying this to artworks, the belief conditions become:  
 
(BFA) S believes that what the artwork says, p, is false. 
(BQA) S and H believe that the artwork says p in a quality context.  
 
But whose beliefs – the artist’s or the curator’s – are relevant? Over whom does ‘S’ range in 
(BFA) and (BQA)?   
‘S’ must range over the same person on a given occasion, normally the artist or the 
curator. The same artwork can be used to lie by different people, but on any given occasion 
it will be one and the same person’s (or group’s) beliefs that are relevant for the lie: in each 
context ‘S’ is held fixed.  
This is because the person whose beliefs are relevant to an instance of an artwork lying 
will be the person using or presenting the artwork in that very instance. Suppose that Titian 
believes that what Rape of Europa says is false, but he doesn’t intend his work to be taken 
as serious truth (he intends the work to be interpreted in a non-quality context). His belief 
that his painting says something false cannot then be hijacked by a curator into a later, quality 
context. That is, Titian’s belief about the truth-value of what Rape of Europa says shouldn’t 
be separated from his belief about the current context in which Rape of Europa is displayed. 
Instead, the curator herself must believe that what the painting says is false. So S in our belief 
conditions must range over the same person or group in each situation. In each context of 
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use, we should either defer to the artist’s beliefs or the curator’s beliefs. Which person (or 
group) this is depends on the situation.16 
This dependence on the artist or curator’s beliefs when determining whether an 
artwork lies has implications for the Intentionalist Debate in aesthetics, which asks how we 
should detect and interpret the meaning of a work of art.  
Recall that the debate today can be roughly divided into three positions, each one 
assigning different roles to intention in determining artwork meaning. First, Actual 
Intentionalism holds that what determines an artwork’s meaning is the artist’s actual 
intentions that are supported by the work, and which are recognised by the viewer using facts 
that held in the work’s context of creation as evidence (Carroll, 2000: 79, 82).  Second, 
Hypothetical Intentionalism holds that an artwork’s meaning is determined by a suitable 
audience’s imputing intentions to the artist, drawing on facts from the work’s context of 
creation (Levinson 1996; 2010). And third, Anti-intentionalism (including  both 
Conventionalism and ‘The New Criticism’ movement) holds that when deciphering a work’s 
meaning, artist’s intentions have no relevance at all.  
I won’t argue for any of these positions in particular, but whether or how art lies has 
interesting results for this Intentionalist Debate. If you’re an Actual Intentionalist, the artist’s 
actual beliefs partly determine the meaning of the work, and so will have preference or 
weight over what the curator does with a work. So under this framework, whether an artwork 
lies depends on what the artist actually believed, not the curator.  
And if you’re a Hypothetical Intentionalist, hypotheses about the artist’s beliefs 
determine the meaning of the work. So under this framework, whether an artwork lies will 
depend on our hypotheses about what the artist believed, not the curator. Since the 
determiners of meaning here are imputed intentions, then they will track only the likelihood 
that the work is or was lying, so the lies would only ever be ‘hypothesised lies’.  
However, if you’re an Anti-intentionalist such as a Conventionalist or a New Critic – 
and so exclude any reference to intentions and beliefs behind a work – then artworks, under 
an Anti-intentionalist framework, consequently cannot lie, for lying involves having beliefs, 
                                                 
16 Of course, Titian and the curator may happen to hold the same beliefs on an occasion, and may even be the 
same person. 
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which artworks cannot have in themselves. It should be noted, then, that the claim that 
artworks can lie is incompatible with such Anti-intentionalist positions.17 
Recall my claim that whether or not an artwork lies partly depends on the artist or 
curator’s beliefs about what the artwork in question says. But there is currently no place for 
the curator in the existing Intentionalist Debate. Allowing the curator to affect what a work 
does and means, and in this case, whether it can lie, is incompatible with Actual and 
Hypothetical Intentionalism, as well as the Anti-intentionalist positions of Conventionalism 
and the New Critic.  
Perhaps we therefore require an augmented brand of Actual or Hypothetical 
Intentionalism, that doesn’t include just the artist’s beliefs and intentions when theorizing 
about whether a work is lying. We can bring in the curator too. And it’s possible that Actual 
and Hypothetical Intentionalism both have expanded variants which admit reference to the 
curator. On either type of model, the artwork might lie derivatively on the artist’s actual 
beliefs or derivatively on the actual beliefs of the curator, or derivatively on an ideal 
audience’s hypotheses about the artist’s beliefs or on an ideal audience’s hypotheses about 
the curator’s beliefs. This curator could be a single person, or a broad collective in some 
sense. Of course, accommodating the curator and her mental states into a broad intentionalist 
picture of artwork meaning, and specifically into a theory of how artworks lie, requires more 
developed defense. But for now, I’ll merely gesture towards such a development.  
 
4.2. Condition (Q): The artworld is not by default a quality context 
 
To see whether an artwork can assert (and so lie), we need to consider the context in which 
it’s normally displayed to viewers. To assert something, a quality context needs to hold. So 
for an artwork to assert something to a viewer, both it and its viewer need to be in a quality 
context. However, as I shall argue in this subsection, the artworld doesn’t facilitate a context 
anywhere near systematically enough to have this norm by default. It cannot ensure that the 
quality maxim is automatically in effect for either the shallow or deep level of a work’s 
meaning. Consequently, artworks can lie only in certain contexts, because they won’t always 
be able to make assertions.  
You might think that the quality maxim is often flouted in the artworld; Marcia Eaton 
                                                 
17 This is unless the Anti-intentionalist admits reference to the curator’s intentions, if not the artist’s, in 
determining artwork meaning and specifically whether the art lies. But then this kind of position looks to 
collapse into a type of intentionalist approach. 
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makes this observation (1980: 25). Perhaps the general goal of artistic discourse is to do with 
how something is expressed, as well as what’s expressed. Viewers at a Titian exhibition 
might be just as concerned (or more concerned) with the manner of expression as with the 
truth of the work’s shallow or deep messages. Since beauty is the focus, truth in the ordinary 
sense is almost irrelevant: the quality maxim is often flouted. 
However, for a norm or maxim to be flouted in a certain situation, it needs to hold as 
a default feature of that situation. It only makes sense to disregard a norm of communication 
if that norm ordinarily holds steadfastly. So, there’s a difference between a norm applying 
and sometimes being flouted, and that norm not ordinarily applying at all. In ordinary 
conversation, the quality maxim applies by default and can be flouted (such as President 
Trump’s bulshitting) or switched off (for instance by winking). This is not so in the artworld: 
there’s no default quality maxim to be flouted or switched off in the first place there. It’s a 
mistake to assume that a default norm of verbal conversation – obeying the quality maxim 
– also holds in artistic conversations. 
The reason for this is that there are many cases where artists don’t believe that they 
should make artistic statements where the maxim “Do not say what you believe to be false” 
is in effect. And viewers of art frequently don’t believe that the quality maxim is 
automatically in effect either: it’s not appropriate to think that artists or their artworks should 
always make true statements in most contexts. Artists and their works are not frequently 
rebuked for uttering falsehoods, at either the shallow or deep level. There are at least three 
supporting reasons for this.18 
First, in many artworld contexts it’s inappropriate to expect that the truth should be 
told. Some exhibitions don’t deal with shallow or deep truth-value directly, where aesthetic 
experience or art materials are the focus. If what matters is beauty, then truth is not the 
point. 19  This is a familiar sentiment in 20th and 21st century artworld exhibitions. For 
example, many abstract art exhibitions don’t have the quality maxim in effect: consider 
Kazimir Malevich, who developed a series of ‘zero point paintings’ for the 0.10 exhibition 
(1915). According to this show, the surface of a painting isn’t determined by the artist’s life, 
but instead concerns the pictorial material itself (Foster et al, 2004: 131-132). At this 
exhibition it was not the case that the truth should be told at either the shallow or deep level 
of the works. Similarly, exhibitions of non-abstract art with a focus on style will not usually 
                                                 
18 These claims are empirical, and supporting them exhaustively is more a task for art historians. 
19 Korsmeyer makes a similar point (1985: 260). 
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have the quality maxim in effect either. For example, JMW Turner: Adventures in Colour 
(2016) focused on the artist’s use of colour.20 The paintings may still have said true and false 
things in this show, but the show’s curatorial goal focused on the artist’s painting techniques. 
Here, it was not the case that the truth should be told. 
Second, there are many exhibitions of art where it’s unclear whether the truth should 
be told. Perhaps the artworks are complex, and play with the nature of truth and falsity. For 
example, the show Pictures (1977) explored a new sense of the image by questioning 
authenticity and the notion of originality in photography. Referencing images in mass media, 
the works challenged authorship by stealing other images, concentrating on representation 
as such without a concern for what was represented (Foster et al, 580). One work at the show, 
Jack Goldstein’s The Pull, consists of three chromogenic prints. Each print has its own 
appropriated image: one of a diver, a falling figure, and a spaceman. The images of the 
figures have been lifted from unknown sources, isolated from their original contexts, and 
placed at a small scale against three single-colour backgrounds. This makes it look like the 
figures are at a great distance, though the ‘photographs’ are actually fake.21 The viewer’s 
expectations about whether the work should tell the truth in this show, either shallowly or 
deeply, were constantly challenged. So it was unclear whether the works should have been 
telling the truth. 
Contemporary artworks in particular are becoming increasingly complex, especially 
regarding their truth-value. For instance, artworld contexts from the 1960s onwards which 
contain critical or ‘institutional critique’ art present bourgeois and liberal hypotheses which 
the audience is supposed to take as problematic.22 This deliberate complicating of truth and 
falsehood critiques conventional political viewpoints and institutions. To demand of such 
artworks that they should not speak falsely oversimplifies and does a disservice to the 
complex nature of art. It also doesn’t reflect current artistic production and consumption. 
Third, in many cases it’s appropriate for viewers to expect artworks to be shallowly or 
deeply false in some way, perhaps because they represent fictional situations, or because 
audiences and artists are more concerned with the technique of representation, rather than 
fully-accurate representation. Most artworks are at least shallowly false. For example, it was 
appropriate in the 16th century for painters to depict biblical figures in inaccurate clothing 
                                                 
20 ‘JMW Turner: Adventures in Colour’ Turner Contemporary (2016) 
21 ‘The Pull’ Met Museum (n.d.) 
22  See, for instance, Merlin Carpenter’s paintings which form a critique of contemporary systems of art 
reception and consumption (Sonnenborn, 2006). 
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(Varriano, 2006: 119), and it was usual for portrait artists to ignore their sitter’s blemishes 
(West, 2004: 131), thereby expressing a shallow falsehood about the complexion of the 
portrayed.  
It’s also frequently appropriate for viewers to expect deep falsehoods in the artworld, 
even if the works don’t actually express such falsehoods. The Degenerate Art Exhibition 
(1937), curated by Adolf Ziegler (Peters, 2014: 21, 36, 37), was designed to promote the 
rhetoric that modernist art was a conspiracy against German ideals and so “un-German” 
(Barron, 1991: 10-11). Assuming the curation was successful, and encouraged people to see 
the works as anti-truth and anti-Nazi (and ‘Degenerate art’ was indeed seen as “betray[ing] 
a Nordic ideal of beauty” (Peters, 2014: 26)) the audience will have appropriately thought 
that these works told deep falsehoods about German ideals.  
The artworld’s frequent indifference to simple truth-value, the frequent precarious and 
unclear expectations of truth-value, and the frequent expectation of falsehoods, are features 
that make it complex and unclear whether the truth should be told in the artworld, and 
frequently make it clear that artworks need not tell the truth most of the time. They show 
that the quality maxim doesn’t hold systematically for either level of meaning in art: it 
doesn’t constitute a default feature.23,24 Of course, we don’t attend galleries expecting that 
everything we see is false, or that truth in the artworld is irrelevant. Rather, the artworld is a 
complex space with shifting norms. Each show is different, and so it’s difficult to track 
uniform communicatory norms throughout all spaces and shows. Because of this, the norm 
that the truth should be told is not universally and clearly held as it is in everyday verbal 
conversation. Indeed, Lamarque and Olsen (1994) reflect this sentiment when they present 
their ‘no truth’ theory of literature25, which holds that “the concept of truth has no central or 
ineliminable role in critical practice”; a theory which receives wider support in the critical 
community than do ‘pro-truth’ theories (1994: 1). 
Since it’s not a default feature that artists or their works should tell the truth at either 
level of their work’s meaning, art in many cases will fail to satisfy the quality condition of 
(L). If an artwork and its viewers are not in a quality context, then the work cannot assert 
                                                 
23 It might be objected that the artworld’s default context is a quality one because we frequently learn things 
from art. However, to learn something you don’t have to be in a quality context: I can learn about Greek 
mythology and renaissance painting from Rape of Europa in non-quality contexts.  
24 The demands of the art-market might partly explain the preclusion of a default quality maxim in the artworld: 
“The museum, as well as the art market, treat artworks not as messages but as profane things” (Groys, 2016). 
25 This term comes from Elliott (1967). 
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things to the viewer. If it cannot assert things then it cannot lie, because lying is asserting a 
believed falsehood. Titian may intend his painting to lie. But if it’s not the case that 
communication should be truthful in the context in which the painting is shown, the 
messages of the work should not (and likely will not) be taken seriously by its viewers in the 
first place, and so cannot be lies. In a nutshell, simple truth norms in the artworld are 
complicated, and this makes it difficult to lie there. 
 
4.3. Condition (Q): The artworld can contain local quality contexts   
  
Whilst the artworld doesn’t have a quality maxim in effect by default, the quality maxim can 
be ‘switched on’ in an exhibition. This switching on will depend on how the art is displayed, 
and what the art actually is. More precisely, curation (i.e. the exhibition or event in which 
the work is shown) and the genre of the artwork (i.e. the style of the artwork in relation to 
other works in the artist’s oeuvre, and to other similar works within art-historical 
movements) can deem it appropriate to expect that the truth should be told: an art show can 
form a local quality context. In such cases, an artwork can assert something to a viewer, and 
so can lie about something.  
THIS PLACE (2015) at Prague’s DOX gallery, can serve as an example. THIS PLACE 
consisted of twelve photographers’ works attempting to understand and challenge the 
complexities of Israel: its history, geography, inhabitants, and its resonance for people 
around the world. Given this show’s curation and its works’ prevalent genre, it was the case 
that the truth should be told there. That is, the quality maxim was switched on; a quality 
context facilitated. Let’s take curation and genre in turn.  
 
4.3.1. Quality depends on curation  
 
Curation made it clear that the photographs in THIS PLACE were documenting events in 
Israel. Like newspapers or other media images, the artworks acted as true insights into the 
reality of a volatile place. Information on the gallery walls stated that the images combined 
to create “a heterogeneous narrative of a conflicted, paradoxical and deeply resonant 
place…”.26 The show was a documentation of a country in turmoil, and a counter-argument 
to the media’s representations of Israel. This suggests that the show was nearer to the truth 
about the area than was the news media.  
                                                 
26 Cotton, C., (2015) 
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The curator thus invited the viewer into an investigation about Israel and its politics. 
The artist statements and curation information placed next to each artwork achieved this 
narrative.27 With this curation in place, it was clear that the artworks ought to tell the truth. 
 
4.3.2. Quality depends on genre  
 
The prevalent genre in THIS PLACE was documentative monochrome photography. This 
genre partially explains why the show constituted a context where the truth should be told. 
In many contexts, it’s generally appropriate to expect that a monochrome documentative 
photograph complete with annotations and information should tell the truth about something. 
Given that the show was composed mainly of these kinds of photographs, an archival or 
museum aesthetic was created, or curated. And archives and museums are places where 
communication should generally be sincere.  
In contrast, the works in the Pictures (1977) show subverted and challenged this 
documentative photograph genre. This genre-play partially explains why it was unclear what 
to expect from the works in Pictures, and so precluded the quality maxim from taking effect 
there. 
 
4.3.3. Established quality  
 
Local quality contexts in the artworld are not at all unusual. For instance, the norm of quality 
will likely be present in many exhibitions of church art, political art, and realist 19th century 
art, for these genres tend to strive for accuracy and simple truth in what they depict and 
represent, whether the realities of ordinary life or moral truths. However, my point about a 
lack of default quality still stands: whether the norm of quality has been switched on when 
we enter an art gallery very much depends on the genre and movement of the works in the 
show, and how they have been curatorially arranged. It is not the case that the norm is 
automatically in place just because we’re dealing with art simpliciter, in contrast to how the 
norm holds by default in verbal conversation.   
If a quality context is established, and the artist or curator believes this, then the 
artwork can assert that p to the viewer in this quality context. If the artist or curator believes 
that it’s false that p, then the work can lie that p to the viewer. In THIS PLACE, a work’s 
                                                 
27 This echoes Ventzislavov’s claim that, “we are justified to think that curatorial work retains a strong element 
of artistic creativity to the extent that it engenders ever new narratives for artworks to dwell in” (2014: 90).  
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shallow message could be believed false: a photographer could have staged an event but 
presented it as actually happening. This would therefore be a shallow lie. However, the 
work’s deep message could be true: the staged event could be saying something true about 
conflict in Israel. So no deep lies there. But if through a shallow falsehood or truth the work 
reveals a deeper falsehood, then the work would be telling a deep lie.28 This is because in 
this exhibition, communication ought to be truthful, and so assertion is possible. 
So unlike ordinary conversation, the artworld doesn’t constitute a quality context by 
default, unless there are signals to the contrary. I’ve shown what these signals might be: 
curation – including exhibition catalogues and reviews – and genre. These signals can switch 
on the quality maxim, enabling the artworks to assert and therefore lie. 
 
5. Lies and fine-grained quality contexts 
     
Suppose that Titian believes that Rape of Europa says shallow falsehoods such as Europa 
was carried by a bull across the ocean in a quality context, and he knows this. However, 
suppose that he doesn’t take these shallow believed falsehoods to be lies; he considers them 
mere falsehoods. Or, suppose that he doesn’t take his work’s deep believed falsehoods such 
as rape satisfies a woman’s secret desires to be lies; he considers them mere falsehoods. But 
if what I’ve said so far is correct, then everything (shallow and deep) a work such as Rape 
of Europa says in a known quality context believed to be false by the artist or curator, will 
be a lie. Titian will then be accused of creating a shallowly, or deeply, lying painting, even 
though he doesn’t intend this. This seems wrong. For instance, it’s far-fetched to say that 
Titian intended Rape of Europa to lie about the behaviour of bulls. Even in a quality context 
we shouldn’t take seriously such content. The problem then is that my account seems to 
overgenerate and predict lies where intuitively we’d say the artwork has just given us 
falsehoods. 
This problem can be solved by acknowledging that even in a quality context particular 
things said should not be taken seriously, and so count as neither assertions nor lies. For 
                                                 
28 You might think that a deep lie is not a lie because lying is explicitly saying (i.e. asserting) something you 
believe to be false (Stokke, 2013 41-43). Rather, implying something you believe to be false is misleading 
(Saul, 2012: 5). I’ll set this aside, for I think an artwork’s deep messages can be said explicitly, and so can be 
deep lies. Moreover, with art at least, whether it lies or misleads is likely not normatively significant. 
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example, it’s generally inappropriate to provide a list of ailments from which you suffer 
when asked how you are by an acquaintance. Rather, one typically answers, ‘I’m fine 
thanks’. Such pleasantries should not be taken seriously: it’s normally odd to rebuke 
someone for uttering polite falsehoods, like saying you’re fine when really you’re not. 
However, imagine that someone in the same conversation then mentions his recent 
achievements. This content should, and likely will, be taken seriously. Moreover, if what he 
says is false, it’s appropriate to rebuke him for uttering such falsehoods. So, if the quality 
maxim is in effect in a context, it might not apply to every sort of content. It’ll be appropriate 
to take seriously some of what’s said, but not everything that’s said. 
A context can similarly affect different levels of an artwork’s meaning. In a quality 
context, some content should be taken seriously, but others shouldn’t. Different quality 
contexts will varyingly affect the levels of a work’s meaning: quality might apply to the deep 
level but not the shallow level, or vice versa, or to both levels. Depending on which meaning-
levels of a work should be taken seriously, different lies can be told. Consider four 
illustrative contexts. 
 
No-narrative context: Rape of Europa is displayed amongst other paintings in a museum 
or other neutral showing without clear curatorial direction or narrative. 
 
Since the artworld doesn’t constitute a quality context by default, one needs to be established 
via curatorial devices and genre. In No-narrative context there are no such curatorial signals, 
so it remains a non-quality context. Here, it’s not the case that the artist or their work should 
tell the truth, because it’s unclear if any norm of communication at all is in effect due to the 
show’s lack of direction. Since the work therefore cannot assert anything here, it cannot lie 
about anything either, though it may still say dangerous falsehoods.  
 
Style context: Rape of Europa is shown at an exhibition focusing on painting style, 
investigating 16th century art-making techniques.  
 
For the same reason, Style context isn’t a quality context. While there’s curation with a clear 
narrative, it doesn’t deal with truth-value in any clear sense. Its focus is the development of 
art materials. It’s therefore not the case that the artists and their artworks should tell the truth 
at either level. Consequently, Rape of Europa cannot lie in this context. 
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Rape-narrative context: Rape of Europa sits amongst other paintings depicting rape 
in an exhibition with clear narration and curation regarding rape representations. 
Assume that here it’s clear that the curator seeks to show through art how rape should 
be understood.  
 
This is a quality context because it contains certain curatorial devices and genres, which 
point towards a narrative dealing with how rape should be understood. Consequently, here, 
deep truths about rape should be told. So while we should take seriously Rape of Europa’s 
false deep message that rape satisfies a woman’s secret desires, we shouldn’t take seriously 
its false shallow message that Europa was carried by a bull across the ocean. Granting that 
the other conditions of (L) are satisfied here, Rape of Europa would be telling a deep lie 
about rape. The painting would still be saying something false about bulls. But it wouldn’t 
be lying about bulls because the quality maxim in force doesn’t apply to that shallow content. 
It should be noted that a type of exhibition such as Rape-narrative context may seem 
highly hypothetical, which may at first glance threaten the applicability of my account to 
any extant cultural practices. While I’ve merely used the, perhaps fanciful, constructed 
curatorial situation to serve merely as a thought experiment, its plausibility can be 
strengthened by the following observations.  
First, there are many exhibitions of Renaissance art today that curate their works 
within previously overlooked new themes or narratives, and which place these works in 
contemporary moral and political environments. For instance, the show Botticelli 
Reimagined (2016) at the V&A was centered around how the Renaissance artist’s work has 
been received and appropriated in subsequent centuries. It explored how cinema, fashion, 
and contemporary art reconfigured the artist’s famous The Birth of Venus (1584-86). And, 
consider The Other’s Gaze. Spaces of Difference (2017) at the Museo del Prado, which 
applied themes of homosexuality and sexual identity, “presenting a new focus on its 
permanent collections” of iconic Renaissance paintings.29 It is therefore not a big leap to 
imagine an exhibition at some point in time constituting something like Rape-narrative 
context. Indeed, a recent exhibition in Brussels may form a close attempt at this: What were 
you wearing? (2018) displayed replicated clothing worn by victims of sexual assault. The 
overall aim of this show was to dispel the rape myth that what a victim is wearing somehow 
justifies rape.    
Relatedly, the second observation to be made concerns the use of erotic art in private 
                                                 
29 Museo del Prado (n.d.)  
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collections in previous centuries. For example, Rape of Europa was commissioned by Philip 
II to form part of his erotic art collection, composed of other ‘poesies’ (poems in paint) by 
Titian (FitzRoy, 2015: 11). Interestingly, Philip II identified himself as Jupiter, no doubt 
influencing how Titian chose to execute the myth in paint for his patron (FitzRoy, 44-45). 
Hidden from public view in the king’s Royal Alcázar palace, these erotic works including 
Rape of Europa caused a stir. Philip IV’s Queen Elizabeth “found the overt sexuality of 
Titian’s nudes so disturbing when she came to visit her husband that she ordered them to be 
covered over” (56), and, the highly conservative Catholic society of Spain disapproved of 
the king’s erotic treasures (57). 
It should also be noted that Rape of Europa belongs to the genre of “‘heroic’ rape 
imagery”, which had as one of its primary functions to “elucidate marital doctrine” 
(Wolfthal, 1999: 10), functioning as “lessons for the bride” and visualising “the ideal traits 
that were expected of a new wife” (Wolfthal, 12). Moreover, art historians still disagree as 
to whether Rape of Europa expresses a “tragic or lighthearted interpretation of the myth” 
(FitzRoy, 48), as the painting has been interpreted as showing a combination of both fear 
and ecstasy surrounding Europa’s abduction.  
This supposed ambiguity in the painting, as well as the fact of the work’s genre, could 
easily be traded upon and exploited by a corrupt curator; one who seeks to perpetuate the 
myth that rape is erotically charged, where the lines between consent and fear are blurred. 
So, we need only imagine a corrupt curator who wishes to knowingly sneak such a rape myth 
expressed in a work of art into a particular quality context. And, even if this scenario turns 
out to be rather unlikely, what I have at least done is show therefore how difficult it is for 
art to lie. Indeed, if we want to take seriously what lying strictly involves, then lies told by 
art are going to be hard to come by. 
 
Bull-narrative context: Rape of Europa sits amongst other paintings depicting bulls 
interacting with humans in an exhibition with clear narration and curation regarding 
real-world bull behaviour. Here, assume it’s clear that the curator seeks to show through 
art how bulls actually behave. 
 
This is also a quality context because it contains curatorial devices which point towards a 
narrative dealing with how bulls behave in the real world. Here, the truth should be told 
about bulls. Consequently, we should take seriously Rape of Europa’s shallow message that 
Europa was carried by a bull across the ocean, but perhaps not take seriously its deep 
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message that rape satisfies a woman’s secret desires. Granting that the other conditions of 
(L) are satisfied here, Rape of Europa would be telling a shallow lie about bulls. The painting 
would still be saying a dangerous falsehood about rape, but it wouldn’t be telling a deep lie 
about rape because the quality maxim in force doesn’t apply to that content. Again, I admit 
the highly hypothetical nature of this scenario, but just as above, I intend it to merely act as 
a thought experiment demonstrating how my account might work.  
So, the lies told by an artwork depend on the type of quality context in effect: it 
depends on how the quality context has been curated. Whilst the artist’s work will be saying 
many falsehoods, many of these shouldn’t be taken seriously in the first place, and so won’t 
be lies. It’s likely, then, that if Rape of Europa is shown in a quality context, it won’t be 
lying about bulls because it’s unlikely that we should take seriously such content in the first 
place.  
 
6. Conclusion   
 
If art can tell the truth, then art can lie. However, I’ve shown that it’s difficult for an artwork 
to lie for at least two reasons. First, a quality context is required, and the artworld is a 
complicated world which doesn’t offer the quality maxim by default. But, quality can be 
established by curation and genre in individual shows within the artworld, enabling lies to 
be communicated to the audience. And second, whether or not a work has lied partly depends 
on the beliefs of the artist or curator. The issue of course is that ascertaining the actual beliefs 
of the artist or relevant curator about the work in question is no small feat, especially when 
we can no longer directly ask the artist.  
There are several upshots to this. First, there are implications for the Intentionalist 
Debate more widely. For Actual Intentionalists, the lies told by artworks will be determined 
by the artist’s actual beliefs; for Hypothetical Intentionalists, determined by hypotheses 
about the artist’s beliefs, giving us hypothesised lies; and for Anti-intentionalists, artworks 
cannot lie. Crucially though, acknowledging the role of the curator and the exhibition 
narratives that they facilitate in determining how artworks might lie, opens up some other 
possible intentionalist positions that have been hitherto unnoticed: that Actual and 
Hypothetical Intentionalism, at least, have expanded variants which admit reference to the 
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curator. These are unexplored possibilities, and for now I leave them unexplored, and merely 
note them as interesting results from an investigation into how art might lie to its audience. 
Second, I’ve shown that just because an artwork might be false at either level, and 
perhaps dangerously false, this doesn’t mean that it lies. This has implications for the 
examples of putative lies in art with which we began this chapter. It’s likely that Rape of 
Europa hasn’t told a shallow lie about what happened to a particular woman and bull, 
probably because Titian or the curators have not believed that the painting ought to be 
communicating sincerely about such shallow details, or because the painting hasn’t been 
displayed in a context where the truth should be told at this shallow level. But, put into the 
wrong hands and context (i.e. a certain exhibition that switches on the quality maxim), then 
Rape of Europa could indeed tell a deep lie about rape. Now, whether or not the painting has 
indeed lied about rape depends on the beliefs of the artist or curator. And as I said above, 
ascertaining the actual beliefs of Titian or subsequent curators would be no small feat. So, 
discovering whether Rape of Europa has indeed told lies over the centuries is a task best 
suited for the art historians, but, it is a possible situation for which I have at least laid down 
the philosophical foundations. 
And Klein’s Leap into the Void was indeed a shallow lie rather than just a shallow 
falsehood. This is because it depicted an event that didn’t happen, and was knowingly 
presented in a quality context, established by the fact that the work was displayed outside of 
the gallery on public newsstands, and by the fact that the photograph appeared to belong to 
a documentary genre; a genre that we frequently expect to contain truths. Moreover, Klein 
believed that what the work was saying or representing at a shallow level – that he leapt to 
the ground unprotected – was false. This artwork was thus a shallow lie. 
But, artworks like those in the Great German Exhibition, and Chunhua’s Mao Zedong 
Goes To Anyuan – contrary to our initial observations – were likely not deep lies, for the 
artists (such as Chunhua) and curators (such as Ziegler) will have likely believed that the 
works’ deep messages were actually true. Such works of art are dangerous falsehoods, and 
propaganda in general will a lot of the time be dangerously false, though it will not always 
lie. On the other hand, if Chunhua or Ziegler, for instance, believed that their artworks’ deep 
messages were actually false, then the works in question would be deep lies.  
My argument demonstrates that whether an artwork lies is sensitive to contextual 
conditions, and to the beliefs of its artist or curator. However, artists don’t have complete 
power over this. Titian may have wanted Rape of Europa to lie about rape, but whether it 
does depends on where and how the painting is displayed. On the other hand, an artist may 
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not intend their artwork to lie at all, but their art may be subsequently used to lie by a curator. 
Works at the Degenerate exhibition were taken to lie about German society, even though 
the artists themselves likely had no such intentions. If the fascist curators of the show 
believed that the messages of, for example, Freundlich’s sculpture Large Head (1912) 
(Figure. 4), were false, and if they successfully curated a quality context, then Large Head 
would be lying – derivatively on the curator’s beliefs – about German ideals. This partly 
reveals the power that curation can have over what an artwork can mean, and whether it can 
lie.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 4 
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Chapter Three 
3. Artworks Express Propositions: A Soamesian Picture 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Chapter 2 assumes that art can express propositions, and a lot rests on this assumption. 
Propositions are the bearers of truth-value. And if art cannot express propositions, then it’s 
unclear how art can lie, given that lying involves expressing or saying something believed 
to be false. Chapter 3 argues that artworks do have propositional content, thereby providing 
support to the assumption made in Chapter 2: artworks can say true and false things. Call 
this ‘the proposition theory of art’. In particular, I hold that the shallow and deep messages 
of artworks are propositional. I deal with three main difficulties for this view, and I show 
how Scott Soames’s (2014b, 2014d) recent theory of propositions can help us understand 
how artworks have propositional content. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Many visual (non-linguistic) artworks represent things, and so have content: that is, there is 
something they represent. But for centuries, art critics and art viewers talk as if, through this 
representation, visual artworks say things, express messages, or have meanings. That is, 
artworks seem to communicate meaning to us. For instance, recall the large and looming 
painting, Guernica, composed of a myriad of dark angular shapes exploding into distorted, 
screaming figures: a famous anti-war symbol, partly because of what it communicates. 
According to one art critic, “Life, says the painting, is an ordinary carnal, entirely 
unnegotiable value” (Clark, 2013: 246). 
But how does an artwork do this? How should we understand artwork meaning? In 
this chapter, the meaning of artworks will again be understood as having two components: 
content and force. Just like when we speak we express certain contents with forces such as 
asserting, commanding, or requesting, an artwork’s content is also put forth with certain 
forces, such as assertion. These two components of content and force combine to create 
messages, informing the overall meaning of the work.  
Recall that artworks don’t appear to ‘speak’ at just one level: I stipulated that an 
artwork’s representative content can be divided into two levels; shallow and deep. Shallow 
content roughly comprises what a work depicts at a descriptive or literal level, and is 
normally constituted by the work’s composition, use of pigment, size, shape, and medium. 
Deep content goes beyond this shallow level, forming the ‘point’ or ‘theme’ of the piece, 
and is normally generated by the particular handling of the work’s shallow content, and also 
by its use of symbol and metaphor. For example, Guernica depicts the airstrike using 
chaotic, jagged forms, and on some interpretations, the intact bull to the left of the 
composition symbolises Fascism. This deep content, when expressed with an illocutionary 
force such as assertion, comprises a deep message, for instance: Fascism is barbaric. In 
general, when shallow or deep content is expressed with a certain force, it generates shallow 
and deep messages.  
What is the nature of these shallow and deep messages in art? More familiar messages 
– messages that people express or communicate with words – are considered to be 
propositional in content. But it isn’t obvious that messages expressed by visual, non-
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linguistic artworks are propositional. Rather, it is more common to hold that artworks have 
a distinctive kind of content, such as ‘pictorial content’.1  
This chapter defends the view that visual (non-linguistic) art has propositional content. 
That is, these works “contain” or “express” propositions: those things also expressed by 
sentences. Call this ‘the proposition theory of art’.2 In particular, I hold that the shallow and 
deep messages of artworks are propositional. I leave it open whether artworks can express 
other kinds of content that are non-propositional. For instance, artworks might have 
‘emotional content’ (whatever this might be), which may be non-propositional.  
I aim to defend the proposition theory of art by drawing on recent philosophical work 
on the nature of propositions. Section 2 gives a broad overview of the proposition theory of 
art. Section 3 outlines the supposed main inadequacies of the theory. Section 4 gives a brief 
survey of how propositions have been understood in the philosophy of language, and offers 
Scott Soames’s (2014b, 2014d) recent account. Section 5 adapts this account to artworks 
and tries to solve the problems faced by the proposition theory of art. The burden of proof 
will be left to my opponent to show that either Soames’s account of propositions is wrong, 
or that it cannot be applied to art.   
 
2. The proposition theory of art  
 
Propositions are traditionally understood as the pieces of information encoded by sentences 
and extracted by agents. That is, understanding the meaning of a sentence amounts to 
grasping the proposition it expresses. Different sentences can express the same proposition, 
i.e. they can have the same meaning: “snow is white” and “Schnee ist weiß” both have the 
same meaning; they both express the proposition that snow is white. Propositions are the 
bearers of truth-value: sentences are true or false in virtue of whether the propositions they 
express are true or false. We also speak of things being necessarily or possibly true: it’s 
necessary that 2+2=4, and swans could have been pink. So propositions also seem to have 
modal attributes: they can bear modal truths about whether something is necessary or 
possible. Propositions are also identified with those things agents bear attitudes to: we 
                                                 
1 See Crane (2009), Haugeland (1998), Peacocke (1987, 1992), and Sainsbury (2005). 
2 Proponents of this view also argue that linguistic art such as novels and poems express propositions. However, 
this chapter (as well as the whole thesis) will focus only on non-linguistic visual art, as the problems with the 
propositional theory of art are mostly concerned with the claim that visual art can express propositions.  
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believe, doubt, and assume that something is the case. To believe that grass is green, for 
example, is to bear a cognitive relation to the proposition that grass is green.  
The proposition theory of art holds that artworks express propositions: those entities 
also expressed by natural language, but in art they are expressed in a “distinctive 
communicatory medium, [and] may be as true or false as a scientifically expressed 
proposition” (Greene, 1940: 425). Moreover, the theory holds that propositions (or ‘truth-
claims’ as Weitz sometimes says) in art are expressed at both the shallow and deep level3, 
where shallow propositions are understood as “descriptive” (Greene, 1940: 444) or sitting at 
the “surface” of a work (Weitz, 1950: 143-145), and deep propositions as perhaps 
“evaluative” (Greene, ibid), or sitting at a level of “depth” (Weitz, ibid): 
 
If a work of art has ‘anything to say’ it must be regarded as the expression, in an artistic 
medium, via artistic form, of a proposition (simple or complex) which is both factual 
and normative, that is, which not only describes an objective situation but formulates 
an evaluation of it… artistic expression of one or more descriptive and evaluative 
propositions (Greene, 1940: 443-444, my emphasis). 
 
According to proponents of the proposition theory of art – propositionalists – propositions 
in art are expressed via illocutionary acts such as assertion, questioning, or criticism. It is 
then up to the viewer and artist “to supply the language that crystallizes them into definite 
statements”, as Korsmeyer affirms (1985: 264). 
Propositionalists hold that the expression of propositions by art is possible due to the 
representative features within the artwork (Korsmeyer, 262). This has been likened to 
expression by the act of kneeling in prayer (Weitz, 1950), which, within a Christian context 
expresses the proposition that there is a God who is worthy of human respect (or something 
equivalent). Rather than being expressed verbally, the worshiper gestures it as part of her 
total act: “the action is the medium of conveying the asserted proposition” (Weitz, 1950: 
149).  
It is proposed that the propositions expressed in art are presented in much the same 
way, mainly through the artwork’s depiction of its subject matter within its formal elements, 
and its use of symbol and metaphor (Weitz, 1950: 149). The former method, which relates 
to the work’s basic plastic elements and what the work simply depicts, will compose shallow 
                                                 
3 Alex Grzankowski’s (2015) argument that pictures have propositional content focuses on what he calls 
‘depictive content’ (151), which I take to be shallow content. 
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propositions. For instance, it is partly because of what Guernica depicts that it expresses the 
propositions that a woman grieves for her dead child, that a light bulb is in the sky, that a 
woman holds a light and so on, or, using Grzankowski’s example, when looking at a picture 
depicting a man jumping over a car, “the proposition that the man is jumping over the car, a 
proposition encoded in the picture” (2015: 161).  
The latter method, which involves symbol and metaphor for instance, will generate 
deeper propositions. For example, the horse in Guernica is normally interpreted as a symbol 
for the massacred civilian population of Guernica (Gottlieb, 1965: 111). Moreover, the 
woman to the right of the painting who stretches out a light above the scene unfolding 
beneath her has been interpreted as a symbol for “Civilisation” or “History” or 
“Enlightenment” (Gottlieb, ibid). The intact bull – which on some interpretations symbolises 
Fascism – and the screaming people and animals, “serve to express the proposition that the 
victory of Fascism is the brutal destruction of everything” (Weitz, 1950: 150 my emphasis). 
In this example, the shallow content (comprised of what the painting depicts), combined 
with symbolic meanings and external knowledge about the work’s history, partially explain 
how the work expresses its deep messages. Indeed, it is how the painting’s objects have been 
depicted which explains how these deep messages are expressed in such a visually effective 
and disturbing way. 
 These artistically expressed propositions at both the shallow and deep level are 
construed in a familiar way: they are the bearers of truth-value, the objects of cognitive 
attitudes, and they represent the world (Greene, 1940: 425, 443). 
Alex Grzankowski has recently offered a powerful argument that pictures, at least, 
have propositional content at the shallow level (he doesn’t deal with what pictures 
“artistically represent”, for example: “all manner of things from liberty to discontent to a 
lost love” (151); using my terms, this seems to refer to deep content). Grzankowski observes 
that we can apply propositional operators such as negation or modal terms to the depictive 
contents of pictures, which suggests that, in my terms, the shallow content of pictures is 
propositional (Grzankowski 2015: 161).4 I agree with this, but I go further to try understand 
how visual artworks, including pictures, might express propositions in the first place at both 
levels. 
There is motivation for adhering to the view that visual artworks have propositional 
content, and in particular identifying shallow and deep messages in art as propositional. First, 
                                                 
4 Also, see Novitz (1977: 86-106) for his proposition theory of pictures.  
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it explains and accommodates the intuitive observation that artworks somehow ‘say’ things, 
and seem to be true or false. In particular, artworks seem to convey truth-values at their 
shallow and deep levels. Shallow messages can be false whilst the deep messages are true, 
and vice versa; both can be true; and both can be false. For example, some of Guernica’s 
shallow messages seem false: there was no light bulb in the sky during the airstrike. 
However, the painting appears to say true deep messages regarding the nature of war. 
Moreover, a true shallow message may be used to convey a deep falsehood. Leni 
Riefenstahl’s 1935 film Triumph of the Will does this, using raw documentary footage of the 
1934 Nuremburg rally to convey false deep claims about the glamour of war. And indeed, 
some artworks convey false messages at both levels – consider Gustav Closs’s Nazi St 
George Slaying a Dragon (1937), which depicts an event that never happened in order to 
convey a false deep message idealising war – or true messages at both levels, as does Nick 
Ut’s famous 1972 photograph The Terror of War which depicts a real event – a napalm 
bombing – to convey a true deep message about the horrors of war. 
The messages that artworks express have certain characteristics: we bear cognitive 
attitudes to them, we ascribe to them a truth-value, and they represent states of affairs. For 
example, we interpret Guernica as saying that war is barbaric. I can believe that war is 
barbaric, it seems true, and the message appears to represent a certain state of affairs. Given 
that propositions are taken to play these roles, and given that meaning is generally identified 
with propositions, the claim that the meaning of an artwork is to be partly understood as 
propositional is motivated.5 
Second, analysing the meaning of an artwork as propositional generates explanatory 
power in other debates in aesthetics. It opens up the possibility of art offering propositional 
knowledge, and it helps explain art’s relation to morality: an artwork can be celebrated or 
accused for what is says or the messages it expresses (this will normally be in reaction to the 
work’s deep messages). For instance, we generally value works like Guernica because of 
what they say about certain events and concepts, and how they say these things. 
 
 
                                                 
5 While the propositions expressed by an artwork bear a truth-value, this may not be considered an artistic 
merit and relevant to artistic value; truth-value might be hard to determine and perhaps less urgent given how 
we interact with art (Korsmeyer, 1985: 257).  
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3. Three problems  
 
Despite its initial appeal, the proposition theory of art has frequently come under fire. While 
we can agree that sentences express propositions, it’s controversial that artworks do. Three 
main difficulties can be extracted.  
 
3.1. The disanalogy problem   
 
There are important disanalogies between art and sentential language, and so opponents of 
the proposition theory of art generally argue that artworks simply aren’t the kinds of vehicles 
that can express propositions like sentences do. This is captured in James Young’s (2001) 
complaint about the proposition theory of art, which he sees as “clearly a non-starter” (46): 
 
…since statements are vehicles of information, and pictures are not, pictures are not 
statements. Since pictures in general are not statements, works of pictorial art are not 
statements (Young, 46). 
 
And E. H. Gombrich’s claim that: 
 
…the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ can only be applied to statements, propositions. And 
whatever may be the usage of critical parlance, a picture is never a statement in that 
sense of the term. It can no more be true or false than a statement can be blue or green 
(Gombrich, 1960: 59). 
 
A first naïve attempt to articulate the problem can be given. It might be complained that 
visual art doesn’t have the “transparency of the verbal sign” (Rieser, 1950: 700), and that 
this prevents artworks from being vehicles of both shallow and deep propositions. Indeed, 
language is conventional; its marks have meaning due to rule-governed conventions, and it 
contains a relatively fixed vocabulary and rule-governed grammar, resulting in 
compositionality (the ability to generate infinite sentences) (Margolis, 1974: 176-177). 
However, art is frequently inventive and progressive in the way it depicts objects at the 
shallow level. The claim that it possesses anything like a fixed vocabulary and syntax is far-
fetched. That art doesn’t share these features with language supposedly betrays the 
hopelessness of the proposition theory of art. 
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Underlying these objections is the assumption that only linguistic vehicles such as 
sentences can express propositions. Since the artworks with which we’re concerned are not 
linguistic, they cannot express propositions. Call this the linguistic constraint.  
The linguistic constraint can easily be rejected however. This is because things other 
than sentences do have propositions as their content. It’s generally accepted amongst 
philosophers of language that at least maps, visual signs such as road signs, and diagrams, 
have propositional content (King, Speaks & Soames, 2014).  For example, maps appear to 
have propositional content, whereby the small points representing towns can be treated as 
the analogues of words in a sentence, and similarly have semantic values: the towns they 
represent. The spatial relations between these can be treated as sentential relations, which 
also have semantic significance by representing the relations between the towns. The 
proposition assigned to the map will be constituted by these spatial relations (King, 2014: 
191).6 Opponents of the proposition theory of art who wish to hold on to a kind of linguistic 
constraint, then, will be unreasonably restricting the class of objects that express 
propositions. Just because sentences are the most familiar things to express propositions, 
doesn’t entail that they are the only things that do.   
However, the disanalogy problem can be strengthened. It could be argued that while 
objects like maps, diagrams, and visual signs are counterexamples to the linguistic constraint 
– thereby showing that things other sentences have propositional content – this doesn’t entail 
that artworks can express propositions. This is because the above counterexamples are still 
each employed within a system of strong, static conventions, and artworks are not. 
While artworks often use conventional symbols at their shallow level (like using a 
dove to represent peace), which thereby contribute to the work’s deep messages, this doesn't 
go far enough to show that all artworks can be construed in terms of a vocabulary and 
grammar. Nothing like the finite grammar that helps generate well-formed sentences can be 
formulated for the arts (Margolis, 179): this would probably hinder creation. Artworks aren’t 
novel expressions within a language; rather, they constantly institute new conventions that 
aren’t collected as “admissible expressions formed in a stable vocabulary and finite 
grammar”, as Margolis writes (1974: 178).7 If such a syntax cannot be established at a 
                                                 
6 However, King states that it’s doubtful that there is a proposition shared between the map and a sentence, and 
so no sentence will express the same proposition as the map (2014: 193). He finds this result plausible, 
however. 
7 This problem has been highlighted elsewhere: Morgan writes: “It’s difficult to see any clear sense in which 
the elements in most pictures might be called ‘linguistic’…Only those that have a combination of elements 
that obey a conventionally established syntax [might be called linguistic]” (1953: 23).  
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work’s shallow level, it becomes unclear how the work might express shallow propositions, 
as well as deep propositions (which apparently partially rely on this shallow content). 
So while maps, diagrams, and signs use strong conventions and systems, artworks do 
not contain anything this systematic. According to the objection, something like syntax or a 
systematised convention is required within the object for it to express or contain 
propositions. As Carolyn Wilde writes, “talk of ‘propositions’…is not strictly appropriate 
when speaking of something which lacks syntactical structure” (2007: 134). Call this the 
syntax constraint. 8  This constraint seems a genuine problem for art, as opposed to the 
linguistic constraint, which was earlier dispensed with. The disanalogy problem should 
therefore be construed as placing this syntax constraint.  
 
3.2. The (in)determinacy problem  
 
It might be argued that the fact that propositions are determinate and artwork meaning is 
indeterminate gives us reason to doubt that artworks have propositional content. Wilde 
anticipates this objection: 
 
The idea that any work of art ‘proposes a thesis’ or ‘presents a proposition’ is 
problematic. For it seems to imply that we can expect some determinate meaning from 
a work of art. Yet a common assumption is that although works of art are subject to 
interpretation, whatever is communicated…is not equivalent to any determinate 
statement (2007: 119). 
 
The problem is that propositionalists might be misconstruing the nature of artwork meaning. 
Claiming that artworks have propositional content isn’t faithful to the fact that artworks 
admit of many interpretations.9 Rieser (1950) raises a similar worry:  
 
                                                 
8 The syntax constraint rules out a particular theory about artwork meaning, related to the proposition theory 
of art. Bennett (1974) claims that pictures coupled with a label or title are sentences, thus requiring syntax. But 
many artworks are untitled and without labels, and to construct a syntax like Bennett suggests for all artworks 
will likely not work. So Bennett’s account should be rejected from the outset because a strict syntax cannot be 
established for all art. 
9 Of course, utterances of ambiguous sentences might leave it unclear as to what propositions are expressed, 
but normally the set of possible candidates are reasonably restricted.  
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It is certainly far-fetched, to say the least, to look at a still life picturing two worn-out 
shoes [van Gogh] and to say…that this is a statement. What statement? “These are 
two old shoes” or “You should wear such shoes…” (1950: 696).  
 
Rieser’s point here can be interpreted as perhaps relating to shallow content initially: “these 
are two old shoes”, and then relating to a somewhat deeper content with the more normative: 
“you should wear such shoes.”  
The problem is that when we analyse the candidates for the meaning of a particular 
artwork, shallow or deep, we end up with options that are too fine-grained. It is indeterminate 
which content – p1 or p1.5 or p1.75 or pn – forms part of the expressed set of messages. It then 
becomes arbitrary or artificial which contents are to be included in the set expressed by the 
artwork, which constitute the work’s meaning. There can be no fact of the matter which of 
the many candidates is the relevant one. This problem of indeterminacy seems to arise for 
both levels of content. It arises at the shallow level: which of the following is Guernica 
expressing?: that there is a horse to the left, or, that there is a horse x inches to the left, or 
that there is a horse y inches to the right, and so on. The problem also arises, perhaps more 
pertinently, for deep content. Guernica’s deep content also seems to be endless: that fascism 
is brutal, that fascism is the brutal destruction of freedom, that fascism is the brutal 
destruction of truth, that fascism is the brutal destruction of love, and so on. 
In sum: for the sake of argument, assume that the proposition theory of art is correct, 
and that artworks have propositional content. Since propositions are determinate meanings, 
then artworks have determinate meanings. Artworks do not have determinate meanings at 
either level. We should therefore reject our assumption: the proposition theory of art is 
incorrect; artworks don’t have propositional content.  
 
3.3. The expression problem   
 
Proponents of the proposition theory of art might be running into a red herring. They may 
be conflating propositions expressed about an artwork, with propositions expressed by the 
artwork. While we can refer to the contents of pictures with sentences that express 
propositions, this is insufficient for showing that the content being described is also 
propositional: “describing the content and being the content are not the same thing” as Tim 
Crane argues (2009: 460). In other words, the fact that we can read shallow and deep 
propositions into an artwork doesn’t mean that the work has propositional content at either 
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level (Rieser, 1950: 698). Propositionalists still leave it mysterious as to how exactly 
artworks “express” or “contain” propositions.  
 
4. What are propositions? 
 
The above debate between those who think artworks can express propositions 
(propositionalists) and those who think they cannot (anti-propositionalists) arises from a 
dispute over the appropriate vehicles of propositions. As such, the nature of propositions is 
our pivot point, for what we allow as a vehicle for propositions depends on how we 
understand propositions in the first place.  
Propositionalists claim that artworks can express propositions partly because 
propositions are independent from language, and can be expressed by things other than 
sentences. Anti-propositionalists argue that artworks cannot express propositions because 
propositions are dependent on language, and artworks lack the fundamental features of 
language. This disagreement is due in part to different understandings of what propositions 
actually are. If we consider propositions in a narrow sense, i.e. that they are dependent on 
language, then artworks do not have propositional content:  
 
If a proposition is defined as a verbal expression of which truth and falsity is 
predicable, then pictures are surely not propositions, for they are not verbal…It is, I 
think, only in this very narrow sense of ‘proposition’ that we can exclude the notion of 
‘pictorial truth’... (Morgan, 1953, 23).10  
 
However, if we consider propositions in a broad sense, i.e. that they are not dependent on 
language, then this leaves open the possibility that artworks have propositional content: 
 
Like with propositions, [pictures] can serve as evidence for states of affairs, arouse 
similar responses in the audience’s mind, be ambiguous, require interpretations, and 
they are subject to verification and disverification…(ibid). 
 
                                                 
10 I take ‘pictures’ here in the loose sense including visual artworks like paintings and sculptures. 
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In this section I outline the traditional conception of propositions. After outlining its 
inadequacies, and showing that the opponents of the proposition theory of art partly rely on 
it, I outline an existing new theory which offers a refreshing way of conceiving propositions. 
I argue that propositions should be construed not in the narrow sense, but in the broader 
sense.  
 
4.1. Traditional approach   
 
Normally attributed to Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege, the traditional approach holds 
that propositions are those entities that are the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of 
our attitudes, and the meanings of sentences. Frege and Russell draw a very close 
relationship between the structure of sentences and the structure of propositions. 
Propositions are complex structures composed of the meanings of the constituents in 
sentences, and we access propositions through these sentences.  
Under this conception, propositions are taken to be timeless unchanging entities, which 
we are acquainted with by a passive intellectual awareness (Soames, 2014a: 25-26, 
explaining this traditional approach). The fact that propositions represent things in the world 
and are bearers of truth-value does not derive from the prior activities of agents. Rather, it is 
part of their nature, independent of human minds and language. And since propositions are 
the primary bearers of intentionality, the intentionality of cognitive acts must be explained 
in virtue of the relations we bear to propositions. In other words, Frege and Russell 
distinguish what is judged or believed, for example, from the cognitive events of judging 
and mental states of believing.  
Anti-propositionalists adhere to parts of the traditional approach of propositions; they 
draw a close structural relationship between propositions and sentences. The syntax 
constraint in particular falls out of treating propositions as those entities expressed only by 
sentential objects; whether these are natural language sentences or other objects with syntax 
or established conventions, like maps and diagrams. 
However, the traditional approach to propositions faces problems. First, it’s unclear 
what makes propositions representational and hence bearers of truth, and the meanings of 
sentences. Since the traditional conception sees propositions as structures having intentional 
properties independently of agents, a logical unifying relation that holds the constituents of 
the formal structure of the proposition together needed to be found. That is, there is more to 
the proposition that A differs from B, than the constituents A, B, and the relation of 
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difference. In a mere formal list of constituents and relations, nothing is predicated of 
anything, and so cannot represent things as such. There is nothing inherent in such a formal 
structure that makes it representational and so capable of being true or false. Indeed, Russell 
notoriously struggled to find this relation. We cannot say that it’s the endowing of 
representation to the formal structures that makes them representational; since for Russell 
propositions aren’t things that have meanings, they are meanings. So the idea that 
propositions are to be identified with a mere formal structure is a problematic starting point 
(Soames, 2014a: 26-32).  
Second, there’s a lack of explanation as to how agents access these entities, and how 
we bear attitudes to them. If propositions are representational by their natures and 
independently of agents, it becomes mysterious how exactly agents bear cognitive attitudes 
to them. 
And third, if propositions are representational independently of agents and experience, 
it becomes mysterious how an uttered sentence expresses a proposition. It’s unclear how 
propositions become attached to sentences, and merely positing an otherworldly expressing-
relation further mystifies this relationship.  
So the anti-propositionalist’s arguments rest on a problematic conception of 
propositions. They might want to bite the bullet and accept this underlying traditional 
approach. However, as I will show, there’s a more attractive proposal that bypasses the 
problems that the traditional conception faces. Once this new view is considered, I hold, the 
anti-propositionalist’s three problems can be solved or dissolved, and the proposition theory 
of art gains new support. I now turn to one of these new theories of propositions.  
 
4.2. Propositions as cognitive event-types 
 
According to Scott Soames (2014b), we must avoid positing propositions in a platonic realm 
beyond agents, with no explanation of how we bear attitudes to them, contrary to the 
traditional approach. Moreover, we can’t characterise propositions as simply talk about 
sentences, because “propositions have a life beyond language” (2014b: 92). 
We should instead identify propositions with the cognitive actions of agents. Consider 
Mark who says, ‘Jeremy has a green coat.’ Here, Mark is predicating the colour green of 
Jeremy’s coat, which we can call a ‘cognitive action’ or a ‘cognitive event.’ For Soames, 
propositions are the types of cognitive events that agents perform. So, the proposition that o 
is green is “the minimal event type” where an agent predicates being green of an object.  
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Entertaining a proposition is the most basic attitude we can bear to a proposition, and 
forms the basis of other instances of event types such as asserting, judging, and seeing. All 
of these attitudes are instances of cognising an object in a certain way (Soames, 2014d: 229), 
for example, predicating greenness of a coat. Propositions are therefore kinds of cognitive 
doings, and entertaining them isn’t thinking about them in special ways, but “embodying” 
them in one’s cognitive life.  
This ‘event type’, i.e. proposition, is representational because every instant of it is 
where an agent represents something to be such-and-such, such as Mark representing 
Jeremy’s coat as green. What the proposition represents is what is representationally 
common to all such cognitive instances. Since in each instance an object like Jeremy’s coat 
is represented as green, we speak derivatively of the proposition itself representing that 
object as green (Soames, 2014b: 96). In other words, to entertain the proposition that o is 
green is to predicate greenness of o, and this is an instance of the event type that is the 
proposition.11 
For Soames, propositions represent things as being a certain way, and so are the 
contents of cognitive states like belief, doubt, or uncertainty that something is the case. He 
claims that propositions are also the content of many perceptual states: seeing and hearing 
constitute relations between an agent and something else.12  
According to Soames, propositions are the content of sentences, thought, and 
perception. The latter two are talked about using sentences, so the same propositions can 
function as content for all three. That is, we choose sentence s that expresses proposition p 
that is part of the cognitive or perceptual state we want to articulate (2014b: 93). 
Soames’s account is attractive because it solves the three problems that the traditional 
account of propositions faces. First, an account of propositions needs to explain how 
propositions represent the world and so have truth conditions. According to the traditional 
approach, propositions have intentional properties inherently and independently without 
need of interpretation by agents, but they therefore cannot be explained by the relation they 
bear to agents. Soames’s account bypasses this problem. The intentionality relation that 
                                                 
11 For Soames, the truth conditions of the proposition are due to the representational features of their possible 
instances. To entertain the proposition that o is green is to simply predicate greenness of o and represent it as 
such. From this we get truth conditions: the proposition is true iff o is represented to be a certain way, and is 
that way, and false iff o isn’t that way. Moreover, these conditions can modalise: for every metaphysically and 
epistemically possible world state w, the proposition that o is green is true at w if at w, o is green. Consequently, 
the perception of an apple as green will have a true or false proposition as its content (Soames, 2014b: 95). 
12 I won’t defend the claim that perceptual experience has propositional content, though it’s likely that being a 
propositionalist about art comes hand in hand with being a propositionalist about perceptual experience.   
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propositions bear to agents is not to be identified with being interpreted by agents, but with 
having instances in which agents represent things. Since the proposition that o is green is 
the event type of an agent’s action of predicating greenness of o, it represents as such because 
the instances themselves are representations. Thus, the event type couldn’t be what it is 
without bearing its intentional properties; it can be inherently intentional and be the 
interpretation of sentences, without itself being the sort of thing that needs interpretation 
(96-97).  
Second, Soames’s theory explains our epistemic relations to propositions. When we 
predicate properties of objects, and thereby entertain propositions, this is done before our 
knowledge of the concept of propositions. Rather, we gradually understand the concept 
through performing cognitive actions, thereby making propositions the objects of thought 
and attitudes.  
And third, Soames’s account also goes some way to demystifying the expression-
relation between a sentence and proposition. For Soames, sentences are similarly event 
types, instances of which are utterances. Utterances are concrete events at certain times and 
places where the agent produces auditory, visual or tactile tokens endowed with semantic 
and syntactic properties. For example, when Mark utters, ‘Jeremy’s coat is green’, he is in 
that context uttering the sentence ‘Jeremy’s coat is green’. Sentences and propositions are 
both event types, but the event type proposition p (the performance of a propositional act 
such as referring) differs from the event type sentence s (the performance of the sentential 
act of using s to refer): 
 
When an event is an instance of both a sentential and propositional type, there is no 
extra inner event of grasping the proposition over and above using the sentence 
meaningfully (Soames, 2014b:105).  
 
This means that a sentence s expresses a proposition p when the agent who understands s 
can entertain p by uttering s. For example, Mark expresses the proposition that Jeremy’s 
coat is green when he says ‘Jeremy’s coat is green’, because he is entertaining that 
proposition by uttering that sentence. The expressing-relation should therefore be conceived 
as being grounded in a by-relation. This by-relation holds between two things that are done 
when the agent can do one of those things by doing the other: entertaining p by uttering s. 
In sum, under Soames’s account, propositions are not tied to language and are prior to 
syntax and established conventions and systems. He points out that there are many actual 
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and possible agents, including humans, who bear propositional attitudes to propositions 
presented to them in “perception and non-verbal thought” that seem not to be presented in 
any sentential form (2014c: 174). Moreover, languages are complex social institutions, and 
to engage in them one must have beliefs and desires. So there is no speaking a language 
without possessing a rich store of propositional attitudes. Without the existence of 
propositions prior to language, it becomes unclear how language is even born (175). It is 
thus a mistake to start with a “thoroughly linguistic account of propositions expressed in 
language, with the hope of grafting it on later accounts of those with which we are non-
linguistically acquainted” (177).13 Instead, we should begin with an account that isn’t tied to 
a single “mode of presentation” such as language or other sentential objects. 
Soames’s account of propositions can only help us if it can be used to explain how 
artworks have propositional content. In the next section I try to show that it does. In fact, the 
proposition theory of art might even be a natural development of Soames’s proposition 
account.  
 
5. A sketched Soamesian proposition theory of art  
 
This section uses Soames’s conception of propositions as cognitive event-types to sketch a 
proposition theory of art that avoids the anti-propositionalist’s three problems. 
 
5.1. Artworks and cognitive events  
 
Within art theory, artworks are often regarded as kinds of events or actions, rather than mere 
representations or illustrations. For example, an artwork is considered a “bundle of affects” 
(O’Sullivan, 2001: 125), or an “instantaneous occurrence”, as Jean-François Lyotard writes 
of Barnett Newman’s abstract colour-field paintings (1984: 241). In this spirit (but by no 
means letter), I want to suggest that artworks are manifestations or triggers of artistic 
cognitive event-types, the events of which are performed by either the artist and/or the 
viewer of the work. This is a new way of understanding how artworks might express 
propositions.   
                                                 
13  This point of Soames’s was originally presented as a criticism of King’s “logo-centric” account of 
propositions.  
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In 1889, Vincent van Gogh painted the view from his east-facing window in the Saint-
Remy-de-Provence hospital, resulting in the famous painting The Starry Night (1889) 
(Figure. 5).  
 
 
 
Recall that propositions are the types of cognitive actions performed by agents. For instance, 
when van Gogh looked up at the sky and saw that it was starry, in his mind he predicated 
starriness of the sky. The type of action performed here, predicating starriness of an object, 
is the proposition. So, van Gogh entertained that proposition when he gazed at the 
magnificent night-sky. He might have performed this cognitive action out loud as well, by 
uttering the sentence, ‘The sky is starry tonight’ to himself. There too, he was entertaining 
the proposition by uttering a specific sentence. Another way he entertained that proposition 
was by creating the painting The Starry Night. When he painted swirls and spirals into the 
painting of the night-sky, he was cognising, and in some situations specifically predicating, 
swirls and spirals of that night-sky. So too when he painted the glowing and exploding balls 
of fire, he was representing various properties of that night-sky.  
Figure. 5 
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The resulting artwork The Starry Night forms a trace of van Gogh’s cognitive actions. 
As a result of what he did with the paintbrush, the work represents the night-sky in various 
ways: the painting predicates spirals and glowing balls of a sky, and predicates a deep green 
of the cypress tree in the foreground, derivatively on the artist’s painterly actions.14 The work 
itself is a manifestation of various cognitive actions of the artist. Indeed, this notion is 
reflected in Immanuel Kant’s (1790) claim that an artwork is the product of a rational doing 
(facere), in contrast to the effects of nature: 
 
Art is distinguished from nature as doing (facere) is from acting or producing in general 
(agere), and the product or consequence of the former is distinguished as a work (opus) 
from the latter as an effect (effectus). By right, only production through freedom, i.e., 
through a capacity for choice that grounds its actions in reason, should be called art 
(Guyer & Wood (eds.), 2000: 182). 
 
The proposition that the sky is starry is the content of a cognitive state, for example, 
whenever an agent (say van Gogh) predicates being-starry of an object o, here, the sky. 
When van Gogh does this whilst painting, two concrete events – the artwork and van Gogh’s 
cognitive state – occur at a certain time and place. This suggests that the proposition, the 
event-type that the sky is starry, is manifested in the painting as it predicates being-starry of 
the sky. This event-type is representational because every instant of it is where the artwork 
represents something to be such-and-such. The Starry Night is to be seen, then, as a way of 
cognising the sky as spirally, and has as its content the proposition (the event-type) that the 
sky is starry.  
More precisely, under my sketched view, the following all have the same propositional 
content, roughly that the sky is starry: 
 
1. van Gogh’s utterance of the sentence ‘It’s a starry sky’; 
     2. van Gogh’s cognitive experience of the night-sky during his stay at the hospital; 
     3. van Gogh’s painting The Starry Night. 
 
                                                 
14 Matravers also hints at this idea when writing about the expression of emotion in the arts: “[often] we see 
the paint as the product of the actions of (for example) an anguished person…we see the painting as the result 
of an action performed in a certain manner” (2009: 627). 
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It should be noted, however, that van Gogh needn’t have explicitly intended to make 
manifest certain cognitive event-types or propositions in his painting, for the painting to 
manifest these cognitive event-types. When he painted the starriness of the sky, or the deep 
greenness of the cypress tree in the foreground, he needn’t have been consciously making 
such predications. The painting, if executed in the appropriate way – for instance, by placing 
the stars in the sky and not in the earthy ground – will still be manifesting such predications.  
The reason for this is because the painting can still be interpreted by the viewer as 
manifesting certain cognitive actions. Perhaps by hypothesising what the agent who created 
the work was doing with the colours and shapes in the work, the viewer can decipher or 
cognise such a predication when inspecting the work.15 When she engages with The Starry 
Night, the viewer can detect the work’s basic (or shallow) elements, such as its visual and 
compositional placement of the colours yellow, blue, and green with various represented 
objects such as the sky, stars, and trees. Through this comprehending, the viewer 
simultaneously predicates those colours of the sky and trees, which are cognitive actions, 
and therefore propositions. The viewer thereby entertains these basic propositions, such as 
the sky is starry and the cypress tree is green. In other words, the viewer can entertain or 
grasp this type of cognitive action which forms a content of the painting, for instance, the 
predication of glowing yellow stars to a night-sky. The viewer entertains and so interprets 
that proposition when viewing the painting, without the artist necessarily intending to make 
that particular predication with his medium. 
So far, I’ve dealt with basic cognitive actions such as predicating colours of objects. 
These give us shallow propositions. But, as noted earlier, artworks generally have a meaning 
that goes beyond such shallow content. The Starry Night doesn’t just represent a night-sky. 
Interpretations by art historians tend to focus on van Gogh’s mental health at the time 
of creating the work, as well as his beliefs about religion and the afterlife. For example, Sven 
Loevgren argues that the painting embodies “a never-to-be-forgotten sensation of standing 
on the threshold of eternity” and symbolizes “the final absorption of the artist by the cosmos” 
(1971: 182). This is backed up by the observation that the cypress tree in the foreground is 
a symbol of death (a common symbol in Mediterranean countries) (1971: 184), and Vojtech 
Jirat-Wasiutynski’s assertion that the cypresses in the painting “separate the nocturnal vision 
from the fore-ground and yet act as a visual link with the heavens” (1993: 661). Moreover, 
                                                 
15 This idea is again loosely hinted at by Matravers when he writes about the expression of emotion in the arts: 
“We do not have to believe that we are looking at the externalisation of the inner state of the actual artist 
(although we often do)…we might simply hypothesise that the artist painted in this way” (2009: 627). 
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Lauren Soth sees The Starry Night as “a religious picture, a sublimation of impulses that, 
since Van Gogh’s loss of faith in the Church, could not find their outlet in conventional 
Christian imagery” (1986: 301), where the colours contribute to this deeper meaning: “The 
blue for Christ and the citron-yellow for the angel became the sky, and the stars and moon” 
(1986: 312). 
These themes constitute deeper messages of the work about the artist’s well-being and 
religion. But how are such deep messages generated? How do we get propositions about the 
afterlife, for example, from basic cognitive actions such as predicating colours of objects, or 
predicating stars of skies?  
My Soamesian picture can also explain the expression of deep propositions. Deep 
propositions are still propositions and so are also types of cognitive action, but just more 
complex. For example, the artist might predicate religious properties to the earth and nature 
via their painterly decisions, which the viewer grasps and thereby performs themselves. The 
difference with shallow propositions is that these deeper propositions are generated by what 
is depicted (and so also the shallow propositions), but also by what I’ll call ‘extra-aesthetic’ 
information and knowledge. We first have minimal shallow propositions: the work has 
shallow content informed by the artist’s cognitive manipulation of composition, pigment, 
size, shape, and medium, amongst other things. Coupling these shallow building blocks with 
extra-aesthetic information enables other cognitive event-types – propositions – to be 
expressed, which go beyond those that manifest shallowly in the work, and beyond the 
cognitive actions that the artist specifically had in mind. These mechanisms can help 
generate deep content from this shallow content.16 
The notions of building-blocks and extra-aesthetic content can be found in the 
literature on the proposition theory of art. For instance, Weitz (1950) argues that: 
 
Painting can make certain truth claims mainly through its constituents of the symbol, 
the subject, or both working in relation to the plastic expressive elements (1950: 149). 
 
In my terms, the ‘subject’ and ‘plastic expressive elements’ here are shallow content, and 
the ‘symbol’ here constitutes extra-aesthetic features. These work together to form 
propositions, or what Weitz calls “truth-claims”. He gives the following examples:  
 
                                                 
16 Other pictorial pragmatic mechanisms might include implicature (Abell, 2005) or presupposition (Bantinaki, 
2008). 
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In Hobbema[‘s landscapes], it is the subject and its traditional transparently symbolic 
associations that embody the truth claim. The subject of the landscape is usually the 
representation of old, decaying trees being contrasted with the representation of young, 
powerful-looking, new trees. We interpret this subject as a sign of certain objects and 
concepts; these concepts have certain traditionally associated meanings; these 
meanings comprise the assertional propositional claim that nature is the struggle 
between the old and the new, the decaying and the living (149-150). 
 
In the “Resurrection,” by Piero della Francesca, there is present, as one of the 
constituents, the truth claim that man is in ignorance and darkness whereas God is in 
Truth and Light…we may say that the picture contains this truth claim through the very 
simple device of flooding the representations of Christ and the sky with tremendous 
light, and leaving the representation of man on the earth in relative shadow and 
darkness. All of these elements, with their transparently symbolic associations, add up 
to the assertional truth claim (150). 
 
In the “Guernica,” by Picasso, there is being asserted, among other things, that the 
victory of Fascism is the brutal destruction of everything. The painting asserts this 
through the bull, who symbolizes Fascism and who is relatively intact, and the other 
subjects — the soldier, the horse, the women, the children, and the houses — which 
are torn to pieces. All of these elements serve as a collective sign of the assertional 
proposition or truth claim regarding the nature of Fascism…“That Fascism means the 
brutal destruction of everything” (150-151). 
 
In these examples, the depictive content at the shallow level includes particular 
representations of old and young trees, of people in darkness and divine figures bathed in 
light, and of certain animals and destructive scenes. The objects that have been depicted 
carry certain “symbolic associations,” which we can describe as our ‘extra-aesthetic’ 
information. There is also the notion of these factors ‘adding up to’ or ‘serving as a collective 
sign for’ deeper propositional messages.  
More precisely, we can understand this ‘adding up to’ by defining a function that takes 
as arguments a work’s shallow content, and extra-aesthetic factors such as symbolic 
associations, and gives as a value a deep message. In Soamesian terms, we start with simple 
cognitive actions such as predicating colours of objects, and from this we build more 
complex cognitive actions such as cognising celestial skies as religious. These deeper 
messages are generated by the work’s shallow propositions and extra-aesthetic information.  
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For example, the depicted stars and sky in The Starry Night are painted with yellow 
and deep blue hues. The artist and viewer predicate these colours of the depicted objects. 
This gives us shallow propositions. But in these predications the viewer and possibly the 
artist can contribute extra-aesthetic information regarding the symbolic associations of these 
colours. Under one art historian’s interpretation, this generates propositions about religion, 
or more precisely, cognitive actions such as predicating Christ and angels of the night-sky. 
I won’t go into detail here, but one such function that generates deep artistic 
propositions could be a metaphor relation.17 Consider Guernica. Picasso has depicted a light 
bulb in the sky by using an elliptical form. He’s also depicted the horse’s screaming mouth 
as containing an elliptical bomb-like form. According to one art historian, the two depicted 
forms fuse together to create a “metaphorical connection”: associations of technological 
sources of power (the light bulb) are linked with associations of war and weapons (Green, 
1985: 67). Here, the shallow contents expressed by the light bulb and the bomb are fused 
together to create deeper messages. And some metaphors have been ascribed to The Starry 
Night, for instance its “celestial metaphor for eternity” (Jirat-Wasiutynski, 1993: 658). Art 
historian Judy Sund writes: 
 
Its genesis in the artist’s mind suggests the metaphorical intent of The Starry Night; it 
is a picture that seems to reflect Van Gogh’s unconventionally upbeat meditations on 
death. …For Van Gogh, starry skies…bespoke the infinite…and wakened deep-seated 
religious sentiments…The vertical projections of [The Starry Night’s] cypress and 
steeple are images of aspiration; the flame-like tree extends to the picture’s upper edge, 
touching and enframing the stars as it goes, and the elongated church spire echoes and 
underscores this upward movement - which wishfully forecasts the artist’s escape from 
earthly darkness into astral light (1988: 672-673). 
 
The artist might not foresee these deep meanings, but these meanings are still propositions 
because they are types of cognitive actions, for example: of ascribing destruction to power-
sources, or predicating eternity of life. Such metaphorically expressed cognitive event-types 
needn’t be directly tied to the artist’s decisions and conscious cognitive actions. Rather, they 
are generated by what the artist has given us in the artwork on a shallow level, combined 
with extra-aesthetic knowledge about the context of creation or reception, and historical 
                                                 
17 For more on this see Chapter 4. 
 99 
 
 
resources. Metaphor is just one example of a function that takes us from the work’s minimal 
aesthetic content to these more interesting and powerful messages. 
An analogy with language might help. In the same way that Gricean implicatures have 
propositional content, which are generated by the combination of literal propositions 
expressed by uttered sentences and speaker intentions and contextual elements (Grice, 
1975), an artwork’s deep contents are also propositional in that they are partially generated 
by shallow propositions and extra-aesthetic information, as well as their being cognitive 
actions. Furthering this analogy, we can think of minimal, shallow aesthetic content as 
similar to the semantic content of an uttered sentence, and extra-aesthetic information as 
similar to extra-linguistic or extra-semantic information.18 
So how do artworks express propositions? Recall that Soames sees the expression-
relationship between sentences and propositions as being grounded in a by-relation: we 
entertain p by uttering s. Mark entertains that Jeremy has a green coat by uttering the 
sentence ‘Jeremy has a green coat.’ This can be extended to the relationship between 
artworks and propositions. A person entertains a certain proposition p by creating (if they’re 
the artist) or understanding and viewing (if they’re the viewer), the artwork. So an artwork 
expresses a proposition when a person entertains that proposition by creating, or by viewing, 
that artwork.  
Under this sketched view, artworks are traces or manifestations of cognitive events, 
the types of which are propositions. Just like when Mark verbally predicates greenness of a 
coat, which constitutes an instance of predication and thus an event-type of predication (a 
proposition), The Starry Night materially predicates spirals of a sky through paint, and 
through this, predicates religious properties to the natural world. In other words, artworks 
are composed by physical or material cognitive actions or ‘doings’ by the artist; intended or 
not, but at the very least, decipherable by the viewer. Since it’s widely agreed that artworks 
are necessarily the products of an agent’s creation19, all artworks are therefore products of 
cognitive action, and so capable of expressing propositions in this way.  
In sum, artworks are products of an agent’s action. Artworks therefore can represent 
states of affairs, either by imitation or abstraction techniques, thereby manifesting 
predications of properties to objects, for example, spirals of a sky. An artwork expresses 
                                                 
18 I take this to be only a loose analogy. But, the notion of an implicature has been applied to pictures. See 
Abell (2005). 
19 See Gover (2018: 3). 
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shallow and deep propositions by being a method, in addition to sentences, by which we 
entertain certain propositions. 
It should be noted that I don’t take the above to mean that artworks therefore depict 
propositions. Rather, artworks have propositional content, and I take it that there’s a 
difference between an artwork depicting a proposition and that artwork having propositional 
content. Drawing an analogy with propositional attitudes from Grzankowski (forthcoming) 
can help make this clear. While we don’t typically desire or fear propositions themselves 
(see Prior, 1963; 1971 and Rundle, 1967), theorists are attracted to the idea that some of our 
desires and fears are propositional attitudes. Grzankowski locates the difference between a 
desire having propositional content and the desiring of a proposition in the notion of 
‘representing-the-same-as’:  
 
My belief that grass is green has the proposition that grass is green as its content. Notice 
that both the belief and the proposition represent the same as each other… 
Schematically, one V’s that p iff one is in a V-state that has the proposition that p as its 
content iff one is in a V-state that represents the same as the proposition that p… Notice 
that this suggestion allows us to differentiate fearing the proposition that p from fearing 
that p. When I (perhaps irrationally) fear a proposition, I need only represent it but I need 
not represent the same as it (forthcoming). 
 
Similarly with depiction, a painting might depict an object whilst having a shallow or deep 
proposition as at least part of its content. For example, at least part of what is depicted in van 
Gogh’s The Starry Night is that there’s a starry night-sky with a church steeple, small town, 
and cypress trees below (amongst many other things). But the painting doesn’t depict a 
proposition. Rather, the proposition forms at least part of the content of the painting in that 
the painting represents the same as what the proposition (in my case, the cognitive action) 
represents.  
In other words, an artwork A depicts that p iff A is a depiction that represents the same 
as the proposition that p.20 According to my account, the reason why an artwork can depict 
that p is because the work is a product and stimuli of a collection of cognitive actions. What 
is depicted will be relevant to determining what the artwork expresses. For example, The 
Starry Night depicts a vibrant night-sky, and expresses the shallow proposition that the sky 
is starry (or something similar). The depiction of the object and the corresponding shallow 
                                                 
20 I thank Alex Grzankowski (p.c. 16th March 2019) for this way of clarifying the idea.  
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proposition will then help towards generating deeper propositions such as death is 
effervescent (or something similar). 
 
5.2. Shallow propositions and depiction theories  
 
While I don’t think that visual artworks depict propositions, my propositional theory of art 
should still be placed in the depiction literature, specifically in relation to shallow 
propositions, which are more intimately related to depiction than deep propositions are. 
Recall my claim that the viewer ascribes cognitive doings to the painting derivatively on the 
artist when engaging with the artwork. At least at the shallow level, this invokes a particular 
“standard of correctness” within depiction (Abell & Bantinaki, 2010). This standard is a 
necessary condition for depiction: it is needed in order to explain how something forms a 
depiction of something else, rather than it happening to resemble something else or 
accidentally invoking a particular experience in the viewer. Recall that there are two 
approaches to this standard: the first being that something must have been intended by its 
maker to bear certain relations – resemblance or experiential, for instance – to its object; the 
second being that the picture must be somehow causally connected to its object.  
How does my approach to how artworks express propositions relate to this standard of 
correctness? According to my account, artworks are products of cognitive actions of the 
artist which are detected by the viewer, so mental states and intentions play a role in 
determining pictorial content. Consequently, regarding a work’s shallow propositions at the 
level of depiction, I invoke a broadly intention-based line of thought for such a standard: the 
artist needs to have intended to make a depiction in the first place for their work to be a 
depiction in general. But, my account doesn’t invoke an intentional standard regarding what 
ends up getting depicted. My account does not rely purely on the conscious intentions of the 
artist, but invokes ascribed intentions on the part of the viewer as well. 
This therefore invokes an amended intentional standard of correctness, whereby 
something depicts something else when it has been made with the express intention to 
broadly represent or depict something, but what it ends up actually depicting can be 
independent from the artist’s intention, and determined by the viewer ascribing an intention 
to the artist in a well-informed way.21 This will likely involve drawing on background 
                                                 
21 This is somewhat similar to Lopes’s thoughts on artist intention and depiction: “Intending to depict an object 
is not necessary or sufficient for depicting it; nor is knowing what the artist intended to depict necessary or 
sufficient for understanding her picture” (1996: 159). 
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information about the kinds of thing that exist, what’s generally depicted in the work, 
techniques of picture production, and direct perception of the artwork itself (Hopkins, 1998: 
137-138). For example, given that we know that van Gogh was deliberately trying to 
partially capture the view from his window at the hospital, and given his general oeuvre at 
the time of composition and his experiments with colour, it will be legitimate to ascribe an 
intention to him that he was meaning to depict that scene in a particular way. And under my 
theory, this act of depiction partially involves the artist performing and expressing a 
cognitive action in their artwork, thereby generating at least a shallow proposition in the 
process. 
The two broad theories of the correctness standard governing depiction – intention-
based and causality-based – form a choice point for depiction theorists. As for the other 
relations or conditions that are necessary for depiction, recall that there are three diverging 
approaches: resemblance-based, convention-based, and psychology-based. Where does my 
proposition theory of art sit in relation to these? Crucially, my theory about how artworks 
express propositions doesn’t constitute a new or unique theory of depiction in itself. This is 
because I don’t think that artworks depict propositions, so I do not thereby invoke a new 
depiction theory altogether, and my theory could at first sight be treated as sitting alongside 
existing positions about what depiction involves. Indeed, the mere claim that a work’s 
content is propositional (at least at the shallow level) doesn’t necessarily point towards a 
particular theory of depiction: Grzankowski suggests that his claim that depictive content is 
propositional can sit alongside resemblance-based theories as well as psychological 
approaches (2015: 151-159). 
But, a particular theory of how exactly visual artworks express propositions will likely 
have links to certain theories of depiction. And on closer inspection, my theory seems to sit 
more comfortably in a broadly psychological theory of depiction, because I partially rely on 
a spectator performing certain types of cognitive actions (predication for instance) when 
engaging with a work of art.  
Recall that a broadly psychological approach to depiction has two main strands: 
experiential theories and recognitional theories. An experiential theory holds that for 
something to depict an object it must elicit in the spectator “a perceptual experience with a 
certain phenomenology” (Abell & Bantinaki, 2010: 5). In contrast, a recognitional theory 
holds that for an object to depict something it must “engage those mechanisms that are 
responsible for our ability to recognise that object in the flesh” (2010: 6).  
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My theory of how artworks express propositions, specifically at the shallow level, may 
call specifically for at least a recognitional theory of depiction. According to recognitional 
theories of depiction, for something to depict an object it must invoke our capacities for 
recognising objects in ordinary visual perception (Lopes, 1996; 2005, Schier, 1986).  
Under my theory, the viewer sees in an artwork that various properties have been 
predicated of certain objects by an agent. For example, she sees that colours have been 
predicated of objects such as vegetation, sky, buildings. She sees that stars have been 
predicated of a sky, that a church with a steeple is in a village, and so on. These predications 
are traces of cognitive actions of the artist. The viewer therefore (as well as the artist when 
creating the painting) requires certain recognitional skills: she needs to recognise that a tree 
and a star are somehow in the work in order for her to perform the required cognitive actions 
which constitute the shallow propositions (which can then form a basis for deep 
propositions). In order to entertain the proposition that the sky is starry which forms a 
shallow content of the painting, the viewer must be able to perform the cognitive action of 
predicating stars of the night-sky when viewing the painting. In order to do this, she must be 
able to first recognise that these objects are in the work by using processes normally used in 
everyday perception of non-pictures, for instance: of skies, trees, and steeples in the flesh. 
This process involving cognitive action echoes Lopes’s thought that: 
 
To understand a picture is, in basic cases, to entertain a thought which links the visual 
information presented by the picture with a body of stored information from its subject 
(1996: 157-158). 
 
Given that my theory calls for such capacities in the viewer suggests that it sits well with a 
depiction theory that makes use of ‘sub-personal’ processes. Whether or not my theory 
requires more than these sub-personal processes, and that the experience in the viewer needs 
to be consciously felt in some way as per phenomenological approaches, remains to be seen.  
In sum, I haven’t set out here to argue for a particular theory of depiction. Rather, I’ve 
noted that because my proposition theory of art makes use of agents performing cognitive 
actions, this suggests that it invokes a broadly psychological theory of how exactly a picture 
depicts an object at the shallow level, and has obvious links with at least recognitional 
approaches.  
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5.3. Solving the three problems  
  
The anti-propositionalist’s disanalogy problem was that only objects possessing syntax or 
strong, static conventions can express propositions, and since art doesn’t possess these 
features, it does not have propositional content.  
This problem can be dissolved because it is misconceived about the nature of 
propositions. Under the Soamesian account, propositions – which are cognitive doings – 
existed before language, and so are conceptually prior to linguistic elements like syntax. To 
therefore tie propositions closely to syntax is misconceived. Now, artworks do make heavy 
use of convention in both their creation and interpretation. For example, there are many 
established depictive conventions in art.22 For instance, we know that when an artist paints 
a tree green, they are likely predicating that colour of that tree, perhaps either for purposes 
of imitation or of symbolism/metaphor. However, we don’t need to make the stronger, and 
perhaps less plausible, claim that artworks employ syntaxes. For even without this feature, 
artworks cannot be ruled out as vehicles of propositions in this way. The anti-
propositionalist’s syntax constraint, and so the disanalogy problem, misconstrues the nature 
of propositions and so misses the mark as an argument against the propositionalist.  
Second, the (in)determinacy problem was that propositions are determinate but 
artwork meaning at both the shallow and deep level is indeterminate. When trying to 
establish what an artwork says or means, it seems indeterminate which meaning we give to 
a work. The set of interpretations will be very large. Because of this, it becomes arbitrary or 
artificial which candidate interpretations we accept as the meaning of the work. The 
indeterminacy of artwork meaning suggests, then, that artworks don’t have propositional 
content.  
This problem can be solved by conceding that artwork meaning tends to be 
indeterminate, but showing that it doesn’t follow that its content isn’t propositional. Rather, 
a large set of propositions can be expressed, and, particularly at the deep level, context will 
make some of these propositions more salient than others.  
First, it should be noted that the mere fact that artworks express many things doesn’t 
in itself preclude this content from being propositional. Similarly, another way that visual 
artworks may differ to language is that they have expressive limitations in not being able to 
express certain propositions (such as negated ones, perhaps).23 But, as Grzankowski argues, 
                                                 
22 For example, see Hyman (2006) and Panofsky (1955). 
23 For more on this see Grzankowski (2015: 158) and Schier (1986). 
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this doesn’t entail that the contents that pictures do express are not propositional. It merely 
entails the claim “that there are some propositions pictures don’t express. It does not follow 
that all contents pictures do express fail to be propositions” (2015: 158).  
An artwork, which, on my sketched view, manifests cognitive event-types, can be 
simultaneously an instance of many cognitive event-types, i.e. it can express many 
propositions. Indeed, the reason many artworks cause a stir is because “their messages are 
vivid, direct, and independently comprehensible” (Korsmeyer, 1985: 261). The fact that 
artworks do tend to assert many propositions of varying levels of generality explains why 
they invite so much curiosity and rich interpretation across different contexts. This open-
endedness however doesn’t preclude artworks from expressing propositions, or articulating 
statements, as Korsmeyer argues (1985: 265). So, we can concede that artwork meaning is 
normally indeterminate at its shallow and deep levels, but this is because artworks express a 
large set of propositions.  
Despite this, we can still show how what an artwork expresses, at least at the deep 
level, can be narrowed down. Consider The Starry Night, which, on my sketched view, is an 
instance of several event-types that are propositions. How do we avoid the artificiality of 
picking one proposition over another to be a candidate in the expressed set? To do this we 
need to take a small detour, looking at similar cases that occur in language.   
The utterance of a certain sentence can, depending on the context, express a multitude 
of propositions. Which one is ‘salient’, that is, which one is to be the accepted meaning of 
the utterance, depends on various elements of the context of utterance and context of 
interpretation. This is familiar with utterances of ambiguous sentences, where certain 
parameters of the context of utterance restrict what is said. According to one theory, speech 
act pluralism, an utterance of a sentence expresses a set of propositions relative to a context 
of interpretation. A minimal proposition is always expressed, forming ‘what is said’, but 
several other propositions are pragmatically implied, which may form what is saliently said 
by the utterance, determined by the context of interpretation. A consequence of this is that: 
 
…speakers don’t have first person authority over what they say. By uttering a 
sentence, they might end up saying things they are not aware of having said—they 
might even end up saying things they would deny having said (Cappelen, 2008: 271).  
 
Relating this back to visual art, within the set of propositions expressed, only specific ones 
will be salient and therefore ‘said’ by the artwork depending on the context. Following the 
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analogy with language (but by all means not necessarily the specific theory of speech act 
pluralism), in many cases the shallow content of an artwork can be construed as ‘what is 
said’ at a minimal level by a work. That is, this content will likely be stable across contexts. 
For instance, Picasso’s Guernica will shallowly express in most contexts that Guernica was 
destroyed in the Spanish Civil War, and roughly, the horse is in pain, and the woman holds 
her dead child, and so on. Several other propositions will be generated, many of them deep 
messages, forming what is saliently said by the artwork, determined by its context.  
While a single artwork might say a myriad of things, in many cases it is not hard to 
narrow down the contenders for what is expressed. Choosing a candidate proposition to be 
a member of an artwork’s expressed set of messages will only be an artificial choice if the 
interpreter ignores the context containing relevant knowledge surrounding the artwork, just 
as with language cases. For instance, Guernica was first shown to the public in 1937 soon 
after the ancient town was destroyed in the tenth month of the Spanish Civil War, and was 
displayed in the entrance hall of the Spanish Republic’s pavilion at the Paris World’s Fair. 
The show was curated such that Guernica sat opposite a large commemorative photograph 
of Garcia Lorca, the socialist poet who was executed during the outbreak of the war, and 
outside the pavilion was a cinema showing graphic films of the war (Clark, 2013: 240-242). 
Armed with this context it seems appropriate to say that Guernica was expressing the deep 
proposition that war is barbaric. It is these particular curatorial and historical contexts, 
making salient certain expressed propositions, which are important for interpreting the 
meaning of an artwork. In natural language we are always careful to do this, so it shouldn’t 
be any different with art. 
And last, the expression problem was that propositionalists look as if they’ve confused 
content about (describing) artworks with content in (expressed by) artworks. 
Propositionalists leave it mysterious how exactly artworks “express” or “contain” 
propositions.  
This problem can be solved when we understand the relationship between artworks 
and propositions within a Soamesian framework, by rethinking our concepts of propositions 
being “in” something, or “expressed” by something. If, as I’ve argued, artworks are instances 
of cognitive doings, then they are just another way or method, in addition to sentences, to 
articulate or entertain the event-types that are propositions. Soames writes that a sentence s 
expresses proposition p when the person who understands s can entertain p by uttering s. 
Something similar can be said of artworks. A person entertains a proposition p by creating 
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(if they’re the artist) or understanding and viewing (if they’re the viewer) the artwork. So 
the artwork expresses p when an agent entertains p by creating, or viewing, that artwork.  
Propositions are embodied in the cognitive life of agents. Artworks are just one of the 
ways in addition to sentences to entertain these propositions. In sum, I hope to have shown 
that treating propositions within a Soamesian framework, and conceiving of artworks in 
relation to this conception, helps solve the three problems that faced proponents of the 
proposition theory of art.  
 
5.4. An objection  
 
My sketched Soamesian proposition theory of art might seem unappealing because it might 
look like it is committed to the view that an artwork means whatever its artist intends it to 
mean, even when that intention is not supported or detected in the work itself. Recall that 
this ‘identity thesis’, maintained by a position about artwork meaning called Extreme Actual 
Intentionalism, is widely rejected in the philosophy of art. It might be argued that because 
under my view artworks are composed of the cognitive actions of artists, this restricts what 
a work can mean propositionally. It may only express those propositions which are the types 
of the artist’s cognitive actions. Accordingly, the types of cognitive actions might only be 
those that are intended by the artist. This may have the undesirable consequence of ‘Humpty 
Dumptyism’, the view that a speaker can mean anything by their words merely by willing it 
irrespective of whether they can be understood. Similar constraints appear in art as well: The 
Starry Night could not be about donkeys just by van Gogh’s willing it so. But because I’ve 
argued that artworks are composed of the cognitive actions of the artist, it might be objected 
that the artist can mean anything they wish by their art. If true, then my view entails a kind 
of identity thesis about artwork meaning, and so should be rejected.  
In response, my sketched view does not entail an identity thesis about artwork meaning 
because, just like with language, the artistic vehicle expressing the proposition must be 
communicable to the viewer. To express a certain proposition in language I have to use the 
correct sentence. So too in art: the meaning of an artwork isn’t determined alone by the 
artist’s mind. Rather, the meaning of an artwork is partly determined by what we’re given 
in the painting itself: by what’s been depicted, as well as the symbolic and metaphoric 
associations of what is depicted at this shallow level.  
According to my view, it’s not the case that the artist predicates something of an object 
in her mind, and then paints anything whatsoever, and that the painting thereby expresses 
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the type of action performed merely in the artist’s mind. Even if van Gogh performed in his 
mind the cognitive action of predicating donkeys of the sky that night, it’s not the case that 
his The Starry Night consequently depicts this or expresses the proposition that there are 
donkeys in the sky, or any deeper propositions related to this donkey-content such as that the 
sky is an agent for Yahweh (or any other symbolic association of donkeys specifically).24  
For The Starry Night to express these donkey-related propositions at either the shallow 
or deep level, the correct actions in creating the painting would need to be executed, for 
instance, putting down the correct painterly marks. The artist cannot merely make the 
decision to do something, but also must actually execute this in the work, which is then 
visually presented to the viewer. That is, the artist’s cognitive action must be capable of 
being communicated to a suitable audience. The act of cognising that does form an artwork’s 
propositional content is the one that the artist actively and actually produces with the 
paintbrush. There must be a successful depiction of something, which can then be used as a 
springboard for deeper propositions. The viewer can then entertain or grasp the type of 
cognitive action, such as the predication of spirals and not donkeys to a sky. This 
communicability condition prevents my sketched view from generating any kind of identity 
thesis about artwork meaning.  
Upholding this communicability condition may look to invoke a broadly Moderate 
Actual Intentionalist position about artwork meaning, according to which artwork meaning 
is determined by the artist’s successfully realised intentions. Under this position, in order for 
the artist’s intention to determine the meaning of the artwork, it must be communicable to 
the viewer through the artwork (thereby avoiding the Humpty Dumptyism of Extreme Actual 
Intentionalism). 
But there are other options available. As I’ve argued, for such cognitive actions or 
propositions to be decipherable in the work itself it needn’t be the case that the artist actually 
intends to express these cognitive actions with the artistic medium. This is because the 
painting can still be interpreted by the viewer as manifesting certain cognitive actions: 
perhaps by hypothesising what the artist might have been doing with the colours and shapes, 
the viewer can decipher or cognise such predications, simple and complex, when inspecting 
the work.  
My Soamesian proposition theory of art is therefore also compatible with a broadly 
Hypothetical Intentionalist treatment of artwork meaning, according to which an artwork’s 
                                                 
24 See Way (2011: 199) and Bough (2013: 141). 
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meaning is determined not by the artist’s actual intentions, but by a suitable audience’s 
hypotheses of the artist’s intentions (Levinson, 1996; 2010).  Given that the artist’s cognitive 
actions manipulate the artistic medium (such as the paint on a canvas), thereby expressing 
propositions, this doesn’t mean that the artist must possess the relevant intentions to 
determine such propositions. Rather, the viewer uses relevant information and evidence to 
hypothesise what the artist might have been intending to do with the artistic medium, and 
impute these intentions; hence the particular standard of correctness of depiction that I 
invoke above. With The Starry Night, viewers can ascribe cognitive actions to van Gogh 
when he produced the painting.25 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
I have defended the proposition theory of art – the view that artworks express shallow and 
deep propositions – by showing that once we rethink the nature of propositions, far more 
weight is given to this view. In doing this, I’ve attempted to show how artworks might 
express propositions. Using a Soamesian framework of propositions as cognitive event-
types, I sketched a new proposition theory of art with a Soamesian twist that avoids the 
problems raised by the anti-propositionalist. This sketch of how artworks express 
propositions is only a starting point, but I think one that merits further investigation. 
To conclude, some general upshots. First, I’ve only considered Soames’s theory of 
propositions, but this isn’t the only new and interesting theory of propositions currently out 
there. It would be fruitful to further the debate by considering these other new theories and 
seeing how they fare in the artworld. Second, Soames’s theory potentially faces problems 
that I haven’t dealt with in the present chapter. However, I do hope to have at least shown 
that once we reanalyse what propositions are, and in particular reject traditional accounts 
that tie the nature of propositions to language, the proposition theory of art gains far more 
credibility. And last, my sketched view of Soamesian propositions in art might invoke a 
specific framework of artwork meaning in general: perhaps a broadly Hypothetical 
                                                 
25 It should be noted that chapters 1, 2, 4, and 5 in this thesis deal with other artworld agents beyond the viewer 
and artist, i.e. the curator, contributing to the meaning of an artwork. Perhaps we should therefore make room 
for cognitive actions performed by collectives or plural agents – a fusion or joint cognitive action performed 
by the artist, viewer, and curator, for instance – thereby generating propositional content in a work. This 
deserves more consideration than I’ve given it.    
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Intentionalist treatment of artwork meaning. But it should be noted that what I’ve said in this 
chapter is by no means an argument for such a position, and should rather be seen as an 
application of one theory of artwork meaning to analyse the manifestation of cognitive 
event-types in an artwork, and this of course requires further investigation and defense.  
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Chapter Four 
4. Metaphor in Art 
 
Abstract 
 
Visual artworks tend to say a lot more than what they merely depict. For instance, van 
Gogh’s oil painting A Pair of Shoes (1896) has been taken to say things about the nature of 
labour and the life of the peasant. But a problem arises: how are such messages expressed, 
when all is depicted is a pair of boots? It might be argued that it’s unclear how artworks 
can express such ‘deep’ meanings without words, and how familiar pragmatic mechanisms 
used to express deep meanings in verbal conversation might translate to the artworld. 
Chapter 4 argues that metaphor can help explain how an artwork expresses these deeper 
messages. I first explore how we should understand metaphor in art more generally. I 
consider a seemingly obvious contender, that of visual metaphor (Carroll, 1994), but I argue 
that this should be rejected. I then develop an alternative proposal, which aims to do justice 
to a neglected phenomenon in the generation of metaphors in art: an artwork’s historical 
context and its curation can help generate metaphors in the artwork. This power to draw on 
metaphor is one way that artworks can convey their deeper meanings. 
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1. Introduction    
 
 
 
 
Vincent van Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes (1886) (Figure. 6) depicts two undone boots on the 
ground, with their laces tangled over their haggard leather. Taken at face value, the work 
just depicts two old boots. This is its surface meaning – its ‘shallow’ content, generated at 
the “subject level” (Lamarque, 2009: 150) or “descriptive level” (Korsmeyer, 1985: 203) of 
the work. To take another example, the subject or descriptive level of Titian’s Rape of 
Europa (1559-62) (Figure. 3) consists of a woman being abducted by Jupiter, who is 
disguised as a bull. This in turn expresses a surface or ‘shallow’ message, such as Jupiter 
abducted Europa. 
 
 
 
Figure. 6 
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However, paintings like A Pair of Shoes and Rape of Europa seem to say far more than what 
they merely depict. For example, Heidegger wrote about A Pair of Shoes in his “The Origin 
of the Work of Art”: 
 
A pair of peasant shoes and nothing more. And yet. From the dark opening of the worn 
insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged 
heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the 
far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind…In the shoes 
vibrates the silent call of the earth…(Heidegger, 1950: 101). 
 
Heidegger’s interpretation of van Gogh’s painting highlights what might be called the ‘deep’ 
content or messages of the work: A Pair of Shoes seems to express a deep message about the 
nature of labour. 1 One might likewise argue that the way Titian depicts the abduction in 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 3 for an argument that these shallow and deep messages are propositional. 
Figure. 3 
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Rape of Europa – the way the shallow level is given – serves to express certain deep 
messages about rape. Perhaps it expresses certain rape-myths, for example, rape satisfies a 
woman’s secret desires.2 And what we often find most effective or profound about an 
artwork is its deep messages. While “sometimes shoes are just shoes”, a rich artwork might 
say or convey many deep messages through its shallow content: “the visitor coming away 
from [van Gogh’s still-life] may realize that a pair of shoes can contain an entire universe”, 
as a viewer puts it.3  
But a problem needs to be solved in order to make tenable this claim that an artwork 
can have deep meaning: how exactly are deep messages of an artwork expressed or 
conveyed? How does A Pair of Shoes say things about labour when all that is depicted is a 
pair of boots?  
There may well be several mechanisms that artworks use to generate their deep 
content.  I wish to suggest that metaphor is one such mechanism. I argue that metaphor can 
help explain how art expresses deep messages. In order to do this we need an account of how 
visual artworks might be metaphorical in a non-verbal way. Artworks could of course easily 
use verbal metaphors, for instance where a verbal metaphor is scrawled over a painting as 
part of the work’s composition. But I want to look at how visual artworks use metaphors 
which are distinctively non-verbal. For instance, A Pair of Shoes contains no words at all, 
metaphorical or otherwise. But this doesn’t mean that it cannot be metaphorical in some 
way.4 If we have a successful account of metaphor in art more generally, we can use this to 
partially explain art’s deep meaning.  
Section 2 argues that metaphor should be seriously considered as one of the 
mechanisms by which art expresses deep content – a ‘metaphor-based account’ of deep 
content. Here I outline what we should want from a metaphor-based account. I then consider 
two candidates for explaining how artworks use metaphors in the first place. Section 3 
considers a seemingly obvious contender, that of visual metaphor, but I argue that this should 
be rejected. Section 4 develops an alternative proposal, which aims to do justice to a 
neglected phenomenon: factors of an artwork’s historical context and even its curation can 
                                                 
2 For a study of this painting, see A. W. Eaton (2003). 
3 Horton (2009). 
4  That we use metaphors in describing art is uncontroversial: language in art criticism is frequently 
metaphorical (see Baxandall, 1991). For instance, describing a painting as ‘sad’ even though the painting 
cannot literally be sad. I’m concerned instead with metaphors in artworks, and the metaphorical nature of 
artwork meaning.  
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help generate metaphors in the artwork. This power to draw on metaphor is what enables 
artworks to convey their deeper meanings.5 
 
2. Metaphor-based accounts of deep content 
 
Metaphor can go some way in explaining art’s deep content, I shall argue, and here I shall 
outline what we need from such an account. 
Metaphor is a non-literal use of language, a device “in which one thing is represented 
(or spoken of) as something else” (Camp & Reimer, 2008: 846). This is familiar in literary 
artworks, and everyday speech: 
 
(a) Our brains ache in the merciless iced east winds that knive us6  
(b) Alison has a heart of gold. 
 
Here, the wind is represented as knives, and Alison’s personality is represented as golden. 
Metaphor often draws a resemblance between two or more things not normally associated: 
the cold wind described by Wilfred Owen does not contain actual knives. Rather, ‘knive’ is 
used metaphorically to express the extremity of the cold. One way of achieving this is by 
applying a property to something to which such labels do not normally apply; “calculated 
category mistakes” as Nelson Goodman calls them (Goodman, 1968: 73). 
The representation achieved by a metaphor is often understood as involving a ‘source 
domain’ and a ‘target domain’.7 The target domain consists of the object or concept to be 
described, like the wind. The source domain consists of the object or concept whose features 
are to be mapped on to the target domain, like knives. Features from a source domain are 
mapped on to a target domain, forming a new meaning binding the two domains. For 
instance, the features of knives (sharpness, danger, pain) are mapped on to the wind, 
resulting in an effective way of describing the wind as extremely cold. A is represented as 
B, which yields the metaphorical meaning, C.8 
                                                 
5 I restrict my scope to visual art (paintings, sculpture, film, installation). Henceforth read ‘art’ as ‘visual art’.  
6 From Wilfred Owen’s “Exposure” (1914). 
7 See Lakoff & Johnson (1980). Source and target domains have also been referred to as ‘vehicle’ and ‘tenor’ 
(I.A. Richards, 1937), or ‘home realm’ and ‘target realm’ (Goodman, 1968). 
8 I will not address the precise relationship between literal content and metaphorical content. For more on this 
in the philosophy of language see Borg (2001) and Camp & Reimer (2008). 
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There might also be non-verbal metaphors in art, which operate in similar ways. 
Indeed, a theory of how art uses non-verbal metaphor will need to include the mechanisms 
of source and target domain, in order to capture a defining aspect of what metaphor is. An 
artwork might constitute a whole metaphor itself, or it may use metaphors within its 
composition. Art criticism frequently draws attention to the metaphors used in art to express 
messages. A. W. Eaton writes that some artworks use metaphor to suggest an analogy 
between a person and an inanimate object through “visual similarity and proximity”. Often, 
a woman is compared to an inert object, which is to be consumed or used, such as in Titian’s 
Venus and Music (1547) or May Ray’s Le Violon d’Ingres (1924) (Eaton, 2012: 288). Van 
Gogh’s work in general has been considered “not only a metaphor, but a bundle of metaphors 
or metaphorical expressions” (Rough, 1975: 366), and Picasso conceived of his own work 
as “plastic” metaphors (Gilot & Lake, 1964: 296-297).  
Metaphor is frequently used in art as a political tool. In 2014, Banksy created a small 
mural in Clacton-on-Sea, Essex, consisting of five pigeons holding up signs reading “go 
back to Africa”, “migrants not welcome”, and “keep off our worms” towards a colourful 
migratory swallow. The piece was created a week ahead of a by-election in the town 
triggered by the local Conservative MP’s defecting to the UK Independence Party (UKIP). 
The piece has been interpreted as a potent and satirical non-verbal metaphor: while the piece 
does use words, its metaphor isn’t verbal. But it succeeds potently in mocking the rise of 
anti-immigration sentiment in Britain today. It’s clear that UKIP and its sympathisers are 
being represented as pigeons, and migrant populations as swallows. 
Art and metaphor have something in common: they have a ‘meaning-range’ (Jessup, 
1954) that is not wholly determined by intentions, yet which abides by certain constraints. I 
shall suggest that, at least in some cases, this is more than just a similarity: the meaning of 
the artwork depends on the meaning of the metaphor it contains.  
To fill out some details in these aspects of meaning-range: first, the speaker’s or 
artist’s intention alone doesn’t determine the meaning of their metaphor or artwork. A 
metaphor cannot mean just whatever a speaker intends it to mean; what is said is constrained 
by the sentence uttered and the context of utterance. I cannot mean by mere will that my 
utterance of, “Alison has a heart of gold” means that London’s Shard is very tall. As Emma 
Borg notes, “a speaker can intend to mean p by her metaphorical utterance of ‘s’ as much as 
she likes, if p is not one of the possible metaphorical interpretations of ‘s’, then she cannot 
succeed in conveying it” (Borg, 2001: 232). Similarly, an artwork cannot mean just whatever 
the artist intended. Guernica (1937) could not be about a child’s tea-party just if Picasso 
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wills it so. For the artist’s intention to be relevant in interpretation, it needs to be supported 
by the artwork’s shallow content and other evidence, perhaps about the artist and the context 
in which the work was made. 
Second, the meaning of a metaphor or an artwork can depart from the speaker’s or 
artist’s intention. Even if a speaker uses a metaphor with proper meaning conventions, the 
conveyed metaphorical meanings can depart from and go beyond what she intended. Rich 
and interesting metaphors in particular tend to have a myriad of meanings (it is not the case 
that a metaphor always has just one single correct interpretation) and these can go well 
beyond what the speaker specifically had in mind. Indeed, the extent to which a metaphor 
can be paraphrased – i.e. adequately translated or captured in literal language – depends on 
how novel or rich it is. For example, in Stanley Cavell’s defence of his claim that metaphors 
can be comfortably paraphrased, he uses a rather simple or haggard metaphor “Juliet is the 
sun”: 
 
Now suppose I am asked what someone means who says, “Juliet is the sun.” … I may 
say something like: Romeo means that Juliet is the warmth of his world; that his day 
begins with her; that only in her nourishment can he grow…and so on. In a word, I 
paraphrase it…Metaphors are paraphrasable (1969: 73). 
 
Cavell’s addition of “and so on” here nicely captures the expanse of the meaning-range of a 
metaphor: the “pregnancy” of its meanings as William Empson said. However, it should be 
noted that while metaphors can to some extent be captured by literal language, I agree with 
Max Black that a complete paraphrase is likely not going to be possible because something 
always seems to be lost in such complex paraphrases: 
 
…up to a point we may succeed…But the set of literal statements so obtained will 
not have the same power to inform and enlighten as the original… [the literal 
paraphrase] fails to be a translation because it fails to give the insight that the 
metaphor did (Black, 1962: 46). 
 
Even with simple and familiar metaphors like “Juliet is the sun”, the list of literal expressions 
will likely be endless. So, at least for many metaphors, they cannot be entirely compacted 
into a list of literal language expressions; a paraphrase.9  
                                                 
9 For a comprehensive outline of the history of metaphor and paraphrase, see Stern (2001). 
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Similarly, the meaning of an artwork can have autonomy from what the artist intended. 
To properly interpret an artwork we must take into account at least the artist’s oeuvre and 
the work’s surrounding political and moral context. This will yield many acceptable and 
plausible meanings of the artwork, that frequently depart from what the artist intended.  
And third, it’s not the case that just anything goes. There are restrictions on what 
meanings are expressed by a metaphor or an artwork. While metaphorical meaning has 
autonomy from the speaker’s intentions, and there can be a plenitude of legitimate meanings, 
these are still constrained. There are correct and incorrect interpretations of what a metaphor 
means: not anything goes (Borg, 2001: 234). Knowledge about the relevant society and its 
language conventions will restrict the meaning possibilities of a metaphor. For example, 
contextual considerations will limit what is communicated by “Alison has a heart of gold”. 
Depending on the society in which the metaphor is uttered, ‘gold’ as applied to someone’s 
heart will have certain associations; in this case, positive associations such as kindness, and 
not negative associations such as selfishness. Similarly, while the meaning of an artwork has 
autonomy from the artist’s intentions, and there can be a plenitude of legitimate meanings, 
these are still constrained. Depending on its context of creation or display, there are correct 
and incorrect interpretations of what an artwork means: not anything goes. Amongst the 
several meanings of Guernica, that the work celebrates war is not one of them; when 
interpreting the work we should consider the origins of the painting as a response and 
denouncement of the bombing of the Basque town.10  
These three features common to artwork meaning and metaphorical meaning comprise 
a range of meaning: both artworks and metaphors can, and normally do, have a large set of 
meanings, but this set is restricted by various features such as the content of the sentence 
uttered/the painting’s shallow content, and relevant contextual considerations and world 
knowledge. In other words, metaphors and artworks express a set of meanings with a range, 
and do not express a singular meaning, and do not express unlimited meanings where 
anything whatsoever goes.   
An artwork, which already has a meaning-range, can contain a metaphor, which itself 
has a meaning-range. Here, the overall meaning of the artwork will be influenced by the 
                                                 
10 This chapter is neutral on whether an artwork’s context of creation is the only context we should consider 
when interpreting a work’s meaning. There might be legitimate interpretations that are a result of analysing a 
work against a different context. See Chapter 5 for defence of this latter claim. For more on this see Davies 
(1996: 20-35) and Davies (2006b). In either case, there will still be correct or incorrect interpretations of a 
work’s metaphor which will be affected by the context of display.  
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meaning of this metaphor. Containing a metaphor, I want to suggest, is one way that deep 
messages can be expressed by artworks – one way an artwork can express meaning that goes 
beyond its depicted surface is by its use of metaphor. When trying to understand this, we 
should respect the feature of meaning-range. And, as becomes clear later on, while I argue 
that some of a work’s deep content can be generated by the work’s use of metaphor, by this 
I don’t mean that the content of the metaphor in the artwork can be entirely and fully captured 
in language, i.e. paraphrased. Non-verbal metaphors in art are unparaphrasable in the sense 
that a complete paraphrase in language will not be forthcoming. I return to this point in 
Section 4.  
To partly model deep content in art as metaphorical content, we need to understand 
how artworks use non-verbal metaphors in the first place. The next section considers a 
seemingly obvious contender, which has been described simply as visual metaphor. But I 
shall argue that, whatever its interest, visual metaphor cannot fulfil the task assigned. 
 
3. Visual metaphor 
 
According to this first proposal I want to consider, visual artworks use non-verbal metaphors 
only when they use visual metaphors. 11  A visual metaphor is a composite image 12 : a 
deliberate fusing together of at least two disparate visually recognizable objects, typically 
by superimposing one image over another image, combining, for example, the image of a 
priest, and a pig (as in Hieronymus Bosch’s The Temptations of Saint Anthony (1501) 
(Figure. 7)); or the image of a woman, and of a violin (as in Man Ray’s Violon d’Ingres 
(1924) (Figure. 8)). Both these artworks are visual metaphors because they display this 
technique of assembling disparate elements into one visual field: a technique I call pictorial 
fusion. 13, 14  
                                                 
11 I take Carroll’s ‘Visual Metaphor’ (1994, in his 2001) as representative of this view.  
12 ‘Image’ here should be interpreted loosely as including painting, drawing, sculpture, installation, and film. 
13 This is my own term. Carroll (1994) uses “homospatiality”. 
14 For a different construal of what a visual metaphor is, see Aldrich (1968), though my arguments in this 
chapter also apply to Aldrich’s account. 
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To be a visual metaphor, the elements fused together in the image must be “recognisable by 
looking” (Carroll, 1994: 362): they need to be salient for the viewer to negotiate the visual 
metaphor. Moreover, the separate elements that are visually unified must be physically 
noncompossible: the unified object into which they fuse cannot physically exist (Carroll, 
354). This requirement captures the felt tension in metaphors: the application of one property 
or label onto something to which it is not normally associated.15 Furthermore, for an artwork 
to be or use a visual metaphor, according to Carroll, the artist must intend to create this 
salient pictorially fused image. Moreover, uptake of this intention in the audience is 
necessary for the successful communication of the metaphor (Carroll, 367). 
Just as with verbal metaphor, one depicted object forms the source domain: a pig or 
violin, and the other depicted object forms a target domain: a priest or a woman. The viewer 
is then prompted to map the associations of pigs (source domain) on to priests (target 
domain) (Carroll, 355). This conceptual mapping exposes the supposed piggish features of 
priests such as selfishness, or the supposed instrumental features of women such as being 
objectified or ‘played’.16 According to this account, visual metaphor offers the only way to 
                                                 
15 See Forceville (2002: 9) for further discussion of this point. 
16 This has been considered the result of “homospatial thinking”, which “consists of actively conceiving two 
or more discrete entities occupying the same ‘space’, a conception leading to the articulation of new identities” 
(Rothenberg, 1980: 18). 
Figure. 8 Figure. 7 
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understand non-verbal metaphor in visual art. We can summarize the visual metaphor 
account as follows: 
 
VISUAL METAPHOR: A visual artwork contains a non-verbal metaphor iff it contains 
‘visual metaphor’, i.e. when a source domain and target domain are deliberately and 
successfully given by the artist through the work’s pictorial fusion of salient non-
compossible elements.17  
 
VISUAL METAPHOR has several virtues as an account of metaphor in art. First, it captures the 
important pictorial element of visual artworks by claiming that the source and target domains 
must be given by pictorial fusion in the work. Second, it captures artworks that we intuitively 
think are metaphorical, such as Violon d’Ingres, and perhaps even Banksy’s mural, for this 
work seems to pictorially fuse pigeons with UKIP supporters, suggested by the signs held 
by the pigeons. And third, the account remains faithful to how metaphor works more 
familiarly in language: it makes use of the mechanisms of source and target domain, and 
captures the fact that a metaphor fuses together disparate elements.  
Despite its initial appeal, though, it should be rejected as an account of metaphor in 
visual art more generally because it neglects the crucial role that context plays in supplying 
a source or a target. In its explanation of how art uses metaphor, VISUAL METAPHOR claims 
that the source and target domains must be given exhaustively and deliberately by the work’s 
visual content, i.e., by what it depicts, contained within the artwork itself. But this doesn’t 
leave room for context. Specifically, it leaves no room for the source and target domains to 
be influenced by factors external to the artwork.18 
 ‘Context’ here will be understood as the collection of circumstances or parameters 
surrounding an artwork. There will likely be several types of external factor that can 
generate metaphors in art, but I’ll focus on just two types of parameter that have been 
hitherto neglected in relation to metaphors in art. First, the curation of the artwork, i.e. the 
                                                 
17 The ‘iff’ in this account may seem strong, though Carroll does appear to hold this kind of view: while he 
doesn’t explicitly say that the only way artworks can be non-verbally metaphorical is by using visual metaphor, 
he does gesture towards this (2001: 360-61). However, even if it turns out that Carroll does not hold this strong 
view, VISUAL METAPHOR can still be seen as just a dialectical move and remains a possible position to be 
refuted. 
18 Carroll acknowledges the effects of context to some extent: an image with pictorial fusion may be presented 
in a context where it shouldn’t be taken metaphorically, for instance in a science-fiction context where the two 
visual elements are not technically physically noncompossible (1994: 362-363). However, in section 4, I make 
the different and further claim that context can also provide a source or target domain and thus have a direct 
role to play in determining metaphors in art. 
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exhibition or event in which the work is shown. And second, the history of the artwork, i.e. 
its style in relation to other works in the artist’s oeuvre and to other similar works within 
art-historical movements, and the wider context that the work was responding to or in which 
the work was created. 
Many artworks use non-verbal metaphor, even though they entirely lack pictorial 
fusion; and this cries out for explanation. For instance, sources of light in Picasso’s Guernica 
have been interpreted as metaphors for life, destruction, truth, and deception (Green, 1985: 
67), and Ai Weiwei’s installation Sunflower Seeds (2010) has been interpreted by many as 
a metaphor for the downtrodden Chinese populace under Mao Zedong.19 According to 
VISUAL METAPHOR, these examples are not metaphors at all, for they contain no clear 
pictorial fusion. But this result is odd. In particular, Ai Weiwei’s Sunflower Seeds seems to 
be a paradigmatic case of metaphor in art. Indeed, the use of metaphor in the interactive 
installation explains its political and moral power, inviting the viewer to see the Chinese 
people under Mao as sunflower seeds, expressing a myriad of meanings about famine, 
individuality, and oppression. And to return to our original examples, VISUAL METAPHOR 
rules out van Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes and Titian’s Rape of Europa as being non-verbal 
metaphors, for they don’t use pictorial fusion either.  
For Carroll, the idea that all artworks are visual metaphors “strains credulity” (Carroll, 
1994: 360). This is because even if there is some sense in which all artworks invite a kind 
of exploration of meaning, this isn’t sufficient for it to count as metaphorical: there must be 
a visual interaction between the source and target domains (Carroll, 361). Carroll is correct 
that not every artwork is a purely visual metaphor, partly because a source and target domain 
are not always visually detected. For a metaphor to be entirely visual, maybe there does 
need to be pictorial fusion in the artwork. But most artworks do not exhibit this pictorial 
fusion and so, according to VISUAL METAPHOR, do not use non-verbal metaphors. This 
exhaustive focus on a work’s visual elements, and the consequent exclusion of context in 
theorising about the work’s metaphors, would leave out much of the metaphor in art. 
So an account that excludes context in its theorising, like VISUAL METAPHOR, is thus 
too strong to accommodate non-verbal metaphor in art, for it accommodates very little and 
excludes most art. In doing this, VISUAL METAPHOR leaves unexplained many instances of 
artworks that do seem metaphorical but do not use pictorial fusion. Therefore, to correctly 
                                                 
19 For example, see Cunningham (2011) and Chayka (2010). 
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predict the large domain of artworks that are metaphorical or use metaphors in some way, 
context should play a role in our theorising.  
 This shows that an account of metaphor in art that neglects contextual elements such 
as curation and history in its theorising undergenerates and consequently lacks explanatory 
power. The argument goes: if context does not play a role in determining metaphors in art, 
then only a very small number of artworks are yielded as metaphorical. However, more 
artworks seem metaphorical than this small number, and this intuitive fact ought to be 
explained. Therefore, context should play a role when we theorise about metaphors in art. 
Call this argument Undergeneration.  
Recall, furthermore, that metaphors and artworks both have meanings with a range. 
If we don’t include context in our theorising when determining metaphors in art, then this 
meaning-range of the work’s metaphor, and so the overall meaning-range of the artwork, 
isn’t accommodated. This is because context is needed to both expand and restrict this 
meaning-range.  
First, curatorial and historical-related parameters of the context are needed to expand 
an artwork’s meaning-range: to give the meanings of the metaphor in the artwork autonomy. 
When interpreting sentences in a language, it is insufficient to use just the sentence’s form 
and the speaker’s intentions: we also normally inspect the context of utterance in our 
theorising. Equally, the artist does not have complete authority over what their art means, 
specifically over whether there are any metaphors in the artwork, and what they might mean. 
Metaphors in art should be considered in relation to the context of display or in relation to 
the work’s history. VISUAL METAPHOR leaves no room to interpret other types of source or 
target domains not deliberately put there by the artist. Indeed, VISUAL METAPHOR posits as 
a necessary condition the artist’s intention to create a metaphor for an artwork to be or use 
visual metaphor. But this is wrong: we should want our account of metaphor in art to allow 
for the possibility of accidental metaphors: those expressed metaphors that were unintended 
by the artist.20 Identifying contextual factors surrounding the work, such as its curation or 
information about the work’s history, would enable the viewer to interpret a work’s 
metaphors in a way not envisaged by the artist, allowing the work’s set of meanings to 
expand.  
                                                 
20 It might be the case that intentional metaphors are the default, “Usually when we interpret something as a 
metaphor, this something was probably meant to be construed as a metaphor…” (Forceville, 2008: 468-469), 
but this doesn’t entail that metaphors must be intentional.  
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Second, curatorial and historical-related parameters of the context are needed to 
restrict the myriad interpretations of a given work. Depending on the exhibition in which 
the work is shown, and depending on the artist’s oeuvre and the work’s history, certain 
interpretations will be legitimate and others will not. Context is needed to capture the fact 
that ‘not anything goes’. It might be the case that VISUAL METAPHOR could place 
appropriate restrictions on what meanings are generated through the pictorial fusion in a 
work. However, information about the work’s genre and its general history, as well as the 
way the work has been curated, will still be needed to restrict the range of meanings 
expressed by the work and its metaphors. 
An account of metaphor in art should accommodate the fact that artworks and 
metaphors have a meaning-range. If it doesn’t, the account won’t reflect legitimate 
interpretation practices in metaphor theory, art theory, and art history. Indeed, one of the 
apparent virtues of VISUAL METAPHOR was that it remained faithful to how metaphor works 
more familiarly in language, i.e. its use of source and target domains. But metaphors in 
language also have a meaning-range. So by not capturing the fact that artworks and 
metaphors have a meaning-range VISUAL METAPHOR falls short of being faithful to how 
metaphor actually works.   
So, this second argument goes: if context does not play a role in determining non-
verbal metaphors in art, then the fact that artworks have a meaning-range isn’t 
accommodated. But this fact should be accommodated. Therefore, context should play a 
role when we theorise about metaphors in art. Call this argument Meaning-range. 
While the pictorial fusion requirement in VISUAL METAPHOR might successfully 
capture visual metaphor – for a metaphor to be entirely visual, perhaps there does need to 
be pictorial fusion – VISUAL METAPHOR should be rejected as an account of metaphor in art 
more generally, for it neglects context in its theorising, and consequently undergenerates 
and doesn’t capture a fact about the meaning of art and metaphors. 
 
4. Artistic metaphor  
 
According to VISUAL METAPHOR, van Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes is not a metaphor, nor 
contains metaphor. This is because it contains no pictorial fusion: there is no salient fusion 
of two disparate images. All we are given is a pair of boots.  
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We can agree that A Pair of Shoes is not a visual metaphor, but it can still be a kind of 
non-verbal metaphor. Let us call it an ‘artistic metaphor’, which uses different modes of 
input for the source and target domains which are not purely pictorial, but are not linguistic 
either. Rather, the inputs are contextual. Typically, the source domain can be provided by 
the shallow content of the artwork, and the target domain provided by contextual parameters 
surrounding the work, such as the work’s curation and the work’s own history.21,22 Crucially, 
the aspects fused together in a metaphor in an artwork needn’t both be visually present in 
the work. The target domain can be something outside the work itself. So, an artwork need 
not be a visual metaphor or use visual metaphor to have non-verbal metaphorical content. 
This section will focus on the work’s curation and the art history of the piece as particular 
contextual parameters, but it’s likely that there are further types. 
 
4.1. Curation as a contextual parameter  
 
First, the context of display such as an exhibition with certain curatorial strategies can offer 
and bring the target domain, composed of an object, group of people, or even a concept, into 
fusion with the artwork. In other words, curation provides the target domain. Consider an 
example.  
 
Exhibition: centred upon van Gogh’s several paintings of shoes, this show is curated 
with statements about labour and peasant life in France in the 19th century.  
 
Here, the activity of LABOUR will be fused with the depicted object of battered boots, where 
only the boots are strictly visible in the painting, and LABOUR is made salient by surrounding 
knowledge and curation. Taken in isolation, A Pair of Shoes gives us a source domain: two 
thickly painted boots in earthy tones. When shown in a context that makes salient LABOUR, 
the features of this source domain are mapped on to features of the target domain by the 
audience’s conceptual act of fusion. Here, we’re asked to represent labour as van Gogh’s 
pair of old boots, which are painted in a particular way: A Pair of Shoes becomes a metaphor 
                                                 
21 The idea that the source and target domains needn’t be co-present visually to form a metaphor in art is not 
new: Forceville has argued that the source and target domains within a metaphor in a visual work can be cued 
by using sound, or even by olfactory, tactile, or gustatory techniques “…thereby turning the metaphor into a 
multimodal one” (2008: 468). I agree with Forceville, but I make the further overlooked claim that the source 
– but most likely target – domain of a metaphor can be informed by contextual parameters such as a work’s 
curation and its historical factors.   
22 Curatorial devices and historical factors will overlap in many instances. 
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for labour. The target domain is not explicitly visible or depicted in the painting but is 
detected in the surrounding curated context.23  
 
4.2. Art history as a contextual parameter  
 
Another closely related way the target domain can be provided is through knowledge about 
the work’s history. This knowledge will be constituted by a variety of variables, such as 
accepted connotations of the symbolism24 of what is depicted in the work, and historical 
factors pertaining to the work’s creation and the events to which it was a response. We know 
that van Gogh painted many works to do with labour and peasant life. He created series of 
wheat fields, peasants, and shoes, and frequently studied miners, capturing these everyday 
subjects in a vibrant, often dramatic, raw style. Vincent van Gogh’s expressive style 
frequently sought to convey emotions:  
 
They’re immense stretches of wheat fields under turbulent skies, and I made a point of 
trying to express sadness, extreme loneliness […] I’d almost believe that these canvases 
will tell you what I can’t say in words, what I consider healthy and fortifying about the 
countryside [part of a letter from Vincent van Gogh to Theo van Gogh and Jo van Gogh-
Bonger, Auvers-sur-Oise, 1890].25 
 
Once we consider these works in relation to their history and to one another, we see that 
together they make salient the activity of labour, and feelings of toil and solitude. Such 
paintings can then form source domains, the features of which are mapped on to the targets 
made salient by this art historical knowledge. In other words, art history provides the target 
domain. Taken in isolation, A Pair of Shoes gives us merely a source domain: two worn-out 
boots. But when considered in relation to the artist’s other still-life paintings of shoes, the 
motif of labour and toil becomes apparent, and forms a target domain. The features of the 
source domain are then mapped on to the target domain by the audience’s conceptual act of 
fusion. Again, we’re asked to represent labour as van Gogh’s pair of old boots. A Pair of 
Shoes becomes a metaphor for labour. 
                                                 
23 Again, the idea that curators bring artworks into new narratives echoes Ventzislavov’s claim that curation 
“engenders ever new narratives for artworks to dwell in” (2014: 90). 
24 More of course needs to be said on what will count as ‘accepted symbolism’ of the time; this will likely vary 
depending on what society is currently relevant to interpretation.  
25 Royal Academy of Arts (2010) 
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4.3. Some normative constraints  
 
The artistic metaphor is a result of the viewer’s conceptual action of fusing the two domains 
together. This echoes Lakoff and Johnson’s claims that, “Metaphor is primarily a matter of 
thought and action, and only derivatively a matter of language” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 
153), and “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in 
terms of another” (op. cit., 5). 
Whether an artwork is a non-verbal metaphor depends on whether a source and target 
domain can be reasonably detected, and whether these can be appropriately fused together. 
If these two domains can be appropriately detected, artist intention becomes somewhat 
redundant, contra VISUAL METAPHOR. An artwork can be placed in a certain context which 
may provide a target domain not envisaged by the artist. For example, even if van Gogh did 
not intend A Pair of Shoes to be taken metaphorically about labour and peasant life, a target 
domain formed of LABOUR could still be provided by his oeuvre, or provided by an 
exhibition about peasantry life. This target domain could be appropriately fused with the 
source domain provided by the depicted battered boots. Here, given the evidence of the 
work’s history and genre, and its curation, the metaphor can be reasonably interpreted even 
if van Gogh did not have it in mind and was merely treating the boots as a still life exercise.  
The legitimacy of the viewer’s conceptual fusion has restrictions. Viewers should not 
haphazardly detect the target and source domains: they should not posit objects to form target 
domains that are wildly different to the ones that are clearly salient. Consider again 
Exhibition. The central piece is A Pair of Shoes. The show provides information about van 
Gogh’s series of works to do with peasant life, informing the viewer about the work’s genre 
and history. It would be inappropriate for a viewer at this show to posit a target domain 
consisting of something wildly different such as EUTHANASIA, in light of all the preceding 
evidence to the contrary in the exhibition, which clearly suggests that LABOUR should be 
considered, or something similar. Here, it would be wrong to specify EUTHANASIA as the 
target domain, and so it would be wrong to map features of the source domain in A Pair of 
Shoes on to EUTHANASIA, and thus wrongly interpret the work’s metaphors. So, a target 
domain and source domain must be appropriately detected.  
Similarly, there will be restrictions as to what the curator can bring into fusion with 
the artwork. For instance, in relation to A Pair of Shoes, labour or loneliness will be more 
appropriate contextual factors compared to the activities of hiking or boot-making. This is 
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because we’re explicating the metaphor within van Gogh’s artwork and not just any old 
image of boots.  
As Chapter 5 will show, the history of an artwork is integral to its identity and meaning, 
and curation must respect this when placing the work into new situations. As such, the 
activities of hiking or boot-making look irrelevant to the artwork A Pair of Shoes, and so 
will likely be unsuitable candidates for target domains. The specific constraints deserve more 
attention than I’ve given here, but the thought is this: just as viewers must be sensitive to the 
context in which a work is shown, curators also must be sensitive to the work’s history and 
what the potential meanings latent in the work might be. Taking an artwork too far away 
from its historical origins risks treating the work as any old image of boots, thereby no longer 
using the artwork but merely a canvas with certain painterly marks. And as Chapter 5 will 
show, artworks cannot be reduced to their mere material parts.  
 
4.4. Artistic metaphor and deep content  
 
With all of this in mind, my proposal can be summarised below: 
 
ARTISTIC METAPHOR: A visual artwork contains a non-verbal metaphor iff it contains 
artistic metaphor, i.e. when a source domain and target domain are appropriately 
detected, where at least one of these domains is visible in the artwork itself, and the 
other may be outside the work, and determined by external contextual parameters 
such as curation or art history.26, 27 
 
How might ARTISTIC METAPHOR form an account of deep content in art? The key is in the 
mapping from the source domain to the target domain, but contra VISUAL METAPHOR, this 
needn’t happen through pictorial fusion. Provided that a source domain and target domain 
are appropriately detected, where at least one of these domains is visible in the artwork itself 
(this will normally be the source domain), and the other (normally the target domain) is 
                                                 
26 ARTISTIC METAPHOR does not stipulate that the mapped features from the source domain to the target domain 
must be physically noncompossible, but they usually will be (labour is not literally a pair of boots). Moreover, 
artist intention to create a metaphor is, I hold, not necessary for an artwork to use artistic metaphor. 
27 For now I leave it indeterminate whether this relation is symmetric: perhaps a source domain can be provided 
by the context and the target domain be provided by the artwork. The crucial point is that at least one of the 
domains must be detected in the artwork. My account differs somewhat from A. W. Eaton’s observations about 
metaphor in art (mentioned earlier), in that my account allows one of the domains to be provided externally to 
a work, whereas Eaton draws on examples where both domains are visible in the painting itself. 
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offered outside by the work’s curation or history, the viewer is prompted to map features 
from the source domain on to the target domain. This results in A being represented as B, 
which conveys certain messages, i.e. C, depending on what fusion is taking place. 
Consider two illustrations of this explanation. First, if the target of LABOUR is made 
salient with A Pair of Shoes, then labour will be represented as van Gogh’s painted pair of 
rugged boots. This asks us to consider particular boot-features from van Gogh’s still life 
(source domain) and apply them to the nature of labour (target domain): 
 
[van Gogh’s boots SOURCE] are rugged and timeworn, but provide comfort and safety  
        *[LABOUR TARGET] is rugged and timeworn, but provides comfort and safety. 
 
The distinctive quality of the source domain, which is given by the way van Gogh has 
depicted the boots, contributes to the qualities to be mapped on to the target domain. Indeed, 
it’s been observed that in our experience of many pictures we tend to see the medium as well 
as the object depicted. In this way, pictorial experience is considered a two-folded one, 
incorporating a “configurational dimension” relating to the picture’s medium, and a 
“recognitional dimension” relating to the picture’s subject (Abell & Bantinaki, 2010: 12).28 
In our case, van Gogh’s subject has been painted with liberal brushwork and impasto 
(Hendriks & Tilborgh, 2011: 257, 260), which, together with the earthy tones combine to 
create a depictive ‘mud’ of the depicted boots. This style forms the end of van Gogh’s 
‘Nuenen period’ where he “Languish[ed] in the sullen blacks and browns that express the 
‘human all too human’ side of things” (Estienne, 1953: 22), and, “Living as he did in a rough, 
gloomy countryside with overcast skies [he] restricted his palette mainly to sepias and 
bitumens” (Estienne, 92). These muddy and battered textures of the source domain combine 
with the target domain of labour, generating the deep content relating to ruggedness and the 
timeworn. The starred claim about labour (the metaphorical meaning C, i.e. the fusion of the 
source and target domains) comprises a deep message about the nature of labour, which will 
serve as a springboard for further deep messages.29  
Second, we can see how Titian’s Rape of Europa – which isn’t considered 
metaphorical under VISUAL METAPHOR – might, under ARTISTIC METAPHOR, use metaphor 
to express deep messages about gender inequality, and about rape. In the painting, a bull 
abducts a woman across the sea. Background knowledge of history and genre, and perhaps 
                                                 
28 See Gaut (2007: 71-86) for more on artistic means of expressing an attitude in a painting.   
29 See Chapter 3, section 5.3 for issues of indeterminacy of deep content.  
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curation, tell us that the bull represents the god Jupiter: the supposed epitome of the male 
sex. The painted bull forms a source domain, and the character of Jupiter forms the target 
domain. Features of Titian’s bull can be mapped on to Jupiter. However, this character of 
Jupiter can also form a source domain itself, having THE MALE SEX as its target domain. 
Features of the bull in the painting (Jupiter), then, can be mapped on to our concept of the 
male sex.  
The distinctive properties of the source domain, which are given by the way Titian has 
depicted the bull in the abduction, contributes to the qualities to be mapped on to this target 
domain of the male sex. Consider Charles FitzRoy’s description of the painted scene: 
 
The bull dominates the dynamic composition, surging across the waves, with the 
hapless figure of Europa lying in a position of abandonment on his back. There is a 
palpable, erotic charge to the painting, not only in the way that the princess clutches 
the bull’s horn, her arm encircling his neck. But also in the way the flying and 
swimming cupids gaze at the dishevelled clothing scarcely covering the princess’ 
genitalia, while the fiery colours in the sky seem to match the strength of the 
animal’s lust (2015: 2). 
 
On close inspection of the painting, the lustful bull is dragging Europa away against her 
will, but he looks on the surface rather docile. Garlanded with flowers, the bull doesn’t look 
particularly aggressive; he’s calm, but crucially, he’s in control. While Europa is haplessly 
splayed on his back, he moves in a way which is collected, cool-headed, and determined. 
His control, quiet confidence, and dominance over the situation are accentuated by the fact 
that he looks out at the viewer, dewy-eyed, in sharp contrast to Europa whose face is 
obscured and difficult to read. The bull’s harnessing of the viewer’s gaze is a “standard 
artistic device for psychological identification” (Eaton, 2003: 178), wherein the viewer is 
called to adopt the perspective or point of view of the character looking out of the artwork. 
These painterly features of Titian’s treatment of the bull create an effective yet sinister 
selection of source qualities – desire, lust, control, yet supposed harmlessness – which are 
mapped on to our target domains. 
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[Titian’s bull SOURCE] is powerful yet harmless, and epitomises lust, dominance, and 
masculinity 
         *[Jupiter SOURCE/TARGET] is powerful yet harmless, and epitomises lust, dominance, and 
masculinity 
         *[THE MALE SEX TARGET] is powerful yet harmless, and epitomises lust, dominance, 
and masculinity. 
   
The starred claim about the male sex (the metaphorical meaning C, i.e. the fusion of the 
source and target domains) comprises a deep message about the male role in society. The 
ominous combination of the seeming serenity in the bull’s expression and the fact that he’s 
abducting an unwilling victim, generates source qualities from the painting that give our 
target domain of the male sex a sinister air.  
Once we relate the bull metaphor to the depicted rape in the painting, other deep 
messages will be conveyed about the nature of rape, which may perpetuate gender injustice 
and inequality.30 More specifically, this bull metaphor is put to a certain use in the work’s 
eroticising of rape: 
 
…the painting depends upon our sympathy for its ‘rough hero’, the god in the taurine 
disguise who looks out at the viewer, a standard artistic device for psychological 
identification. It is his attitude toward Europa’s rape that we are supposed to adopt: 
that is, the work calls upon viewers to be sexually aroused by Europa’s helplessness, 
fear, and vulnerability; to find her both terrified and sexually excited, willing and 
resisting, and so on (Eaton, 2003: 177-178). 
 
The “light-hearted feel” of the bull (FitzRoy, 2) contrasted with the ambiguity of Europa’s 
mental state in the painting, accentuate rape myths such as “rape satisfies women’s secret 
desires to be taken and ravished…” (Eaton, 163). In the painting, “This fantasy is at odds 
with itself, fluctuating between the victim’s resistance and consent, innocence and guilt, 
unwanted terror and sexual pleasure” (Eaton, 164). In other words, the bull is depicted in a 
way that purportedly justifies his act: the victim is being abducted and then impregnated 
against her will, but the bull performing this action is actually harmless and ‘knows what’s 
best’ for the victim. This quiet control and dominance of the bull with corresponding 
                                                 
30 Other mechanisms will generate these further deep messages. See Eaton (2003; 2012) for more on how they 
might get expressed by the painting (though she does not analyse the painting in terms of ‘deep messages’). 
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pernicious undertones translate into our target domain of the male sex, and contribute to the 
dangerous nature of the metaphor and the work in general, which has an “ethically defective 
vision of rape” (165).31 
Recall I said in Section 2 that metaphors in art will likely be unparaphrasable, in the 
sense that a complete paraphrase of their meaning into literal language won’t be forthcoming. 
Now, my linguistic renderings of the content of the artistic metaphors in both the van Gogh 
and Titian examples above (their metaphorical meanings C, regarding labour and the male 
sex) can be seen as ‘paraphrases’ of the artistic metaphors. This is, though, compatible with 
the general unparaphrasability of metaphors in art. What I’ve done here is merely offer a 
first stab or small sample of what the artistic metaphors are conveying – comprising some 
of the work’s deep content – and this can be done while acknowledging that a complete and 
adequate paraphrase won’t be forthcoming. In a similar vein, Carroll notes about visual 
metaphor (which can be seen as a close cousin of artistic metaphor): 
 
…it is not evident that one can really paraphrase all the relevant visual correspondences 
that the visual metaphor raises in language. [There are cases where] it is very hard to 
reduce the visual metaphor to a linguistic statement. Indeed, it may be practically 
impossible (Carroll, 1994: 358). 
 
I won’t attempt to fully explain why artistic metaphors resist complete paraphrase, but I’ll 
gesture at a couple of reasons. First, linguistic metaphors in general are difficult to 
paraphrase adequately (Stern 2001: 191, Carroll 1994: 358), so artistic metaphors are going 
to be even more difficult, given that they don’t offer a source or target domain in the same 
medium in which the paraphrase would be given. Moreover, when we write or say out-loud 
an artistic metaphor (“labour is this pair of battered boots”) they’re likely going to be 
unfamiliar and ‘fresh’, and so their content will be difficult to capture in literal language.  
Second, the distinctive nature of the domains in an artistic metaphor will complicate 
matters. The surface features, or medium, of the painted or sculpted artistic metaphor, give 
the metaphor a distinctive quality. For instance, the metaphor in van Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes 
is, minimally, “labour is this pair of boots”. But when we inspect the painting, we see that 
the boots have been captured and depicted with expressive and lively marks, with thick, dark 
brown and yellow tones, which all contribute to the texture of the battered and haggard 
                                                 
31 See Eaton (2003) for a compelling argument for this interpretation.  
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leather. These depictive features that comprise the source domain of the metaphor will be 
difficult to capture adequately in a linguistic statement.  
Moreover, consider the work’s genre, its history, and the artist’s identity which also 
form target domains (for instance, van Gogh’s isolated life and his interest in peasant 
existence). These all feed in to how we interpret and experience the painting and its metaphor, 
and will enrich the metaphor expressed. Some of these artistic features of the work’s source 
and target domains will likely be lost in literal language; because of the distinctively artistic 
means of expression in the artwork, its metaphor cannot be entirely crystallised into language.   
The crux of ARTISTIC METAPHOR is that we shouldn’t analyse artworks in isolation 
when considering whether they are non-verbal metaphors. Rather, they must be considered 
in relation to the artist’s oeuvre and the work’s general history, and/or the context of display 
involving curatorial strategies in different exhibitions which respect the work’s history and 
artistic style. Whether artworks are non-verbal metaphors, and determining the metaphorical 
meanings expressed by them, is sensitive to such contextual details. This is different to the 
VISUAL METAPHOR account, which saw metaphor in art as being a function of purely visual 
elements in an artwork.  
Because the ARTISTIC METAPHOR account of deep content in art makes much needed 
room for context, it has two welcome consequences. First, it accommodates and explains 
many more examples of artworks which do seem to use metaphor. Rather than under-
generating and excluding most art like VISUAL METAPHOR does (as per my Undergeneration 
argument), ARTISTIC METAPHOR accommodates all the artworks that VISUAL METAPHOR 
accommodates, and more. Artistic metaphors can be visual metaphors, but not all artistic 
metaphors will be visual metaphors. More precisely, the fusion of domains can be purely 
visual within the artwork; in which case we’d have an artistic metaphor and specifically a 
visual metaphor (like Man Ray’s Violon d’Ingres), or the domain fusion can be partly 
contextual; in which case we’d have an artistic, but not purely visual, metaphor. For instance, 
under my proposal, Ai Weiwei’s Sunflower Seeds is an artistic metaphor. The target domain 
consisting of the oppressed Chinese peoples, which is offered by the curated exhibition and 
surrounding knowledge about Ai Weiwei’s work and Chinese history, is fused with the 
source domain consisting of tiny sunflower seeds strewn across a large expanse of space in 
their millions. But it is not a visual metaphor, for no pictorial fusion occurs in the work 
(pictorial fusion would be achieved here if the ‘seeds’ were, on closer inspection, constructed 
as tiny Chinese people).  
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By assigning a role to context in determining metaphors in art, most artworks 
consequently have the capacity to be or use metaphors, for they can always form a source 
domain, the features of which can be mapped on to a contextually provided target domain. 
This frees up art’s ability to be metaphorical, rather than restricting metaphor in art to purely 
visual mechanisms. My proposal therefore has more explanatory power than VISUAL 
METAPHOR. 
Second, ARTISTIC METAPHOR accommodates the fact that artworks and metaphors 
have a meaning-range. First, it gives the needed expansion of this range. Because a source 
and target domain can be appropriately detected using the artwork itself and its surrounding 
context, artist intention consequently does not determine the presence or extent of the 
metaphors, or their meanings. This allows the possibility of accidental metaphors in art, and 
for the metaphors themselves to be more open-ended. My proposal also gives the needed 
restriction of this meaning-range. That the audience and the curator should not attempt to 
detect or create source and target domains haphazardly, but must do so as an enlightened 
response to the information and evidence offered, captures this restriction: not anything goes.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
I’ve considered the mechanism of metaphor as providing a partial solution to the problem of 
how an artwork’s deep messages are expressed. I first sought an account of how artworks 
use non-verbal metaphors: I argued against the VISUAL METAPHOR account, and then 
developed an alternative proposal, ARTISTIC METAPHOR. Using this, I tried to show how it 
helps explain deep meaning in art. In sum, a source domain is provided by the shallow 
content of a work, and a target domain can be offered by contextual parameters surrounding 
the work, such as curation and the work’s history. Deep messages are generated by the 
mapping of features from the source domain on to the objects in the target domain. Artistic 
metaphor, then, is one way that artworks like A Pair of Shoes can “contain an entire 
universe.”  
My account of metaphor in art has implications for the Intentionalist Debate in 
aesthetics, which asks how we should detect and interpret the meaning of a work of art. To 
conclude, I want to outline these implications. 
Recall that the Intentionalist Debate can be divided into two main camps: Originalist 
and Anti-Originalist. According to Originalists, the facts that determine the meaning of an 
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artwork are exhausted by the (relevant) facts about the work’s original context, i.e. the 
context in which it was created. Anti-Originalists deny this claim: it is not the case that the 
facts that determine the meaning of an artwork are exhausted by the (relevant) facts about 
the work’s original context. Various positions fall under each of these camps, each one 
assigning different roles to the artist’s intentions in determining artwork meaning. 
Recall that Originalist positions include (i) Actual Intentionalism, (ii) Hypothetical 
Intentionalism and (iii) Conventionalism, and recall that a traditional Anti-Originalist 
position was adopted by the ‘The New Criticism’: an Anti-intentionalist movement in 
aesthetic theory which spelled the ‘death of the author’. The New Critic not only denies the 
Originalist claim, but makes the additional move of entirely rejecting a work’s original 
context as informing its meaning; historic facts such as facts about the society in which the 
work was created are irrelevant to work meaning.  
My account of metaphor in art should be placed in this Intentionalist Debate. 
According to ARTISTIC METAPHOR, metaphors in art are generated by the fusing together of 
the source domain and target domain. The target domain can be determined by external 
contextual parameters, such as curation of the work, or the work’s history. The ‘curation’ of 
the artwork consists of the exhibition or event in which the work is shown. And the ‘history’ 
of the artwork consists of its style in relation to other works in the artist’s oeuvre and to other 
similar works within art-historical movements, and the wider context that the work was 
responding to or in which the work was created.  
ARTISTIC METAPHOR is therefore incompatible with all of the Originalist positions: 
Actual Intentionalism, Hypothetical Intentionalism, and Conventionalism. This is because it 
is an Anti-Originalist position: it allows curation to provide new target domains, and, 
crucially, leaves open the possibility that the curator draw on facts from new, non-original 
contexts that depart somewhat from the context in which the work was created. Allowing 
the possibility that the curator draw on new events from later periods when generating new 
target domains thereby allows non-original contexts and new events to potentially affect the 
meaning of the artwork in question, in this case, affect what metaphors might be expressed 
by the work. 
Moreover, my position is also incompatible with the New Critic Anti-Originalist 
position. This is because my account also allows the work’s history, i.e. facts about the 
historical setting in which it was created, to provide target domains, thereby allowing the 
work’s original context to affect the overall meaning of the artwork, specifically what 
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metaphors are generated. While Anti-Originalist, ARTISTIC METAPHOR still acknowledges 
the importance of a work’s original context in determining that work’s meaning.  
So if my arguments about metaphor in art are correct, then Actual Intentionalism, 
Hypothetical Intentionalism, and Conventionalism are all ruled out, for these are all 
Originalist positions. The existing Anti-Originalist approach – that of the New Critic – is 
also ruled out, because my approach still gives a work’s original context theoretical 
importance in determining artwork meaning. This leaves us with a need to carve out new 
space in the debate, and I’ll sketch one possible path. 
Under ARTISTIC METAPHOR, the source and target domain must be reasonably 
detected, and so appropriately fused together. This process could be understood under a 
partial Hypothetical Intentionalist framework, as involving the audience detecting a 
metaphorical fusion by either hypothesising what the artist might have intended, via the 
work’s history, or hypothesising what the curator intended, given the show’s curatorial 
narrative and concepts. The reason a partial Hypothetical Intentionalist approach should be 
used here is because my position is incompatible with the whole of Actual Intentionalism. 
Because curation can offer new target domains not envisaged by the artist, my account treats 
artist intention as redundant. It is not necessary that the artist intend their work to be 
metaphorical for it to be metaphorical, nor does what a metaphor convey depend on what 
the artist intended. This captures part of the meaning-range of a work of art, namely, that the 
meaning of an artwork, and metaphorical meaning in general, can go beyond what the artist 
or speaker had in mind.  
ARTISTIC METAPHOR thus carves out space for at least an Anti-Originalist variant of 
Hypothetical Intentionalism which draws on the curator in non-original contexts. Under this 
expanded Hypothetical Intentionalism, we needn’t hypothesise just what the artist was doing 
with their work, but rather what the curator, broadly speaking, was doing with the work.  
Who we hypothesise about will depend on context. When viewing A Pair of Shoes at 
the van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam, we’d likely hypothesise about van Gogh’s intentions 
for the work, using evidence drawn from the show, which would include public biographical 
and art historical information: perhaps van Gogh had the target concept of LONELINESS in 
mind. There, the target domain would be provided by the work’s general history (which has 
been provided in a broadly curatorial way). But, if we were at a show about the nature of 
contemporary labour and toil, and not a show about van Gogh’s work and life, then we’d 
likely hypothesise about the curator’s goals and intentions for the show using evidence 
drawn from the exhibition, which could be provided by new narratives and events. There, 
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any target domains to be fused with the painting (which forms the source domain) would be 
provided by the work’s progressive curation.  
ARTISTIC METAPHOR is thus an Anti-Originalist position, but not as strong as the New 
Critic approach, for it invokes a two-dimensional theory of artwork meaning: it allows both 
the original context and non-original contexts (via the curator) to play a role in generating 
metaphors in art, and so play an overall role in determining the work’s meaning.  
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Chapter Five 
5. Alter-Pieces: Against Originalism in Art 
 
 
Abstract 
 
All but one of the preceding chapters have made use of the mechanism of curation. Chapter 
1 acknowledged how curation can help facilitate a work’s performance of certain 
illocutionary acts, Chapter 2 argued that the way a work is curated can affect whether or 
not the work lies, and Chapter 4 offered an account of metaphor in art that assigns the 
curator a role in providing target domains when generating the metaphors. In sum, I’ve 
claimed that curation can affect the meaning of an artwork. If this is true, then artwork 
meaning can shift over time: different curators will have different beliefs and different 
agendas about the curated works, thereby affecting what the work does and says.  
However, this flies in the face of a dominant view in the philosophy of art: what I call 
Originalism. Originalism in art is the view that the meaning of an artwork is fixed by factors 
that held at the time of the work’s creation: artworks cannot change in meaning. Over time 
and through different curation, their meaning remains fixed. If Originalism is true, and 
artwork meaning cannot change, then curation cannot affect artwork meaning. 
This final chapter, 5, argues against Originalism, and shows that artworks can change 
in meaning, given certain conditions (I call this view ‘Constructivism’). A typical motivation 
behind Originalism is the plausible ontological claim that an artwork is a historically 
indexed object; its meaning is informed by its original context, and typically, Constructivist 
views don’t do justice to this. I argue for a version of Constructivism that does do justice to 
this nature of artworks: an artwork receives its meaning in its original context, but the work 
can accumulate (alter) in meaning in subsequent contexts. Given that artworks can change 
in meaning, then, the curator is therefore not ruled out as playing an important role in 
determining artwork meaning. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Matthias Grünewald’s Isenheim Altarpiece (1516) (Figure. 9), which originally stood in the 
Monastery of St Anthony during the 16th century, is a startling depiction of the Crucifixion. 
The large painted panels depict various biblical scenes and life-sized figures, including the 
Crucifixion, St Anthony being tormented by demons, and the Lamentation where Christ’s 
body is removed from the cross.  
The Monastery of St Anthony was a hospital, devoted to caring for the sick. The order 
was known for caring for those afflicted with ‘Saint Anthony’s Fire’ (Hayum 1977: 507), a 
disease with horrific symptoms including intense burning of the limbs, gangrene, 
hallucinations, and muscle cramps which led to disfiguration and amputation (its cause was 
discovered to be poisoned rye). 
It is believed that the altarpiece was commissioned specifically to aid the healing 
program at the hospital, and that it contains as central to its meaning themes of disease and 
Figure. 9 
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healing, and specifically, references to Saint Anthony’s Fire (Hayum, ibid). 1  Each day 
patients would assemble before the imposing altarpiece, seeking comfort in its identification 
of the crucified Jesus with the patients, and with their disease and agony (505). This 
identification echoed the theological doctrine according to which Jesus is identified with 
those in need: 
 
… ‘I needed clothes and you clothed me, I was sick and you looked after me, I was in 
prison and you came to visit me’… ‘Lord, When did we see you sick or in prison and go 
to visit you?’… ‘The King will reply, “Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one of the 
least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me”’ (Matthew 25: verses 35, 37, 
40). 
 
However, several centuries later, the altarpiece seemed to change in meaning. Or at least, it 
appeared to acquire a meaning in addition to its specific Saint Anthony’s Fire meaning. The 
altarpiece was brought to Munich for restoration, and was then exhibited to the public there 
at the Alte Pinakothek for almost a year, during the unsettled time between the German 
Armistice in November 1918, and the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919. In that year, the 
altarpiece apparently came to symbolise the ‘German spirit’, denoting the pain inflicted on 
German soldiers at the Front in trench warfare (Stieglitz, 1989). Injured soldiers who had 
experienced the horrors of the trenches would come from far and wide to gaze upon the 
altarpiece, which “bore witness” to the suffering of the German people (Stieglitz, 93). Now, 
Christ in the altarpiece seemed to be identified with the injured German soldiers and the 
German people: their suffering and agony was identified with Christ’s suffering and agony. 
Did the altarpiece alter in meaning? If you were an Originalist, your answer to this 
would be: “No. The meaning of an artwork is fixed by factors that held at the time of the 
work’s creation: the ‘original context’. Artworks cannot change in meaning: as time goes 
by, their meaning remains rigid.” But if you were a Constructivist your answer would be: 
“Yes. An artwork’s meaning can change in subsequent contexts over time: artwork meaning 
can develop autonomy from the artist and the political and social context in which she 
created the work.” 
The aim of this chapter is to argue against Originalism and argue for Constructivism: 
I try to show that the Originalist claim that artwork meaning is rigid and cannot change, is 
false. Focusing on the Isenheim Altarpiece as a case study, I argue that artworks can change 
                                                 
1 This is also supported by Henning & Rasmusen (2001: 667). 
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in meaning. However, a typical motivation behind Originalism is the plausible ontological 
claim that an artwork is a historically indexed object; its meaning is informed by its original 
context, and typically, Constructivists don’t do justice to this. I argue for a version of 
Constructivism that does do justice to the importance of a work’s origin: an artwork receives 
its meaning in its original context, but the work can accumulate (alter) in meaning in 
subsequent contexts. Section 2 makes some preliminary distinctions. Section 3 outlines the 
two rival theories, and Section 4 develops the altarpiece case study. Section 5 considers a 
candidate response from the Originalist, namely, that what changed in the altarpiece in 
Munich was not its meaning but its ‘significance’. Section 6 argues that this response does 
not accommodate my example, and that the altarpiece did in fact change in meaning. Section 
7 concludes by developing a Constructivism that does justice to the importance of a work’s 
origin.  
 
2. Preliminaries  
 
As with the previous chapters, the ‘meaning’ of artworks will be understood as having two 
components: content and force, where the former is further divided into shallow and deep 
content. Just as in ordinary language, artworks express contents,2 and put forth such content 
with certain illocutionary forces.3 These two components in art combine to create shallow 
or deep messages, informing the overall meaning of the work.  
Shallow and deep messages can be general or specific. For instance, Guernica has 
been taken to be an anti-war symbol more generally, comprising deep messages about the 
nature of war. But specifically it depicts the bombing of the Spanish town – this could be 
construed as shallow – and specifically the painting expresses horror towards that awful 
event – this could be construed as deep. The same can be said about the Isenheim Altarpiece. 
The altarpiece’s content generally represents the Crucifixion, and specifically Saint 
Anthony’s Fire. The former expresses deep messages about Christ’s humanity and human 
salvation more generally, and the latter expresses deep messages about Christ bearing the 
suffering of the patients in the hospital, specifically taking on their pain, and healing the 
Saint Anthony’s Fire disease (Hayum: 509, 512). 
                                                 
2 See Chapter 3 for an argument that this content is propositional. 
3 See Chapter 1 for an argument supporting this claim.  
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How might artworks express such messages? One method is their use of symbols. 
Symbols are tools for expressing meaning: they can denote or refer4 to things, and have 
illocutionary force; they can do things. Roughly speaking, a symbol is anything that stands 
for something else. When something x stands for something else y, x represents y or is a 
symbol for y, where y is the referent or denotation of that symbol (Hospers, 1946: 29). 
Language is the most familiar symbol system, but symbols can also be purely visual. 
Evidenced by iconographic discipline, art is full of visual symbols. For instance, in 
Christian paintings, the halo is a conventional symbol for divinity, and the colour white is a 
semi-conventional symbol for purity (Hospers, 38). ‘Conventional’ here means that the 
symbol stands for its referent or denotation only because of a common convention; the 
relation between the symbol and what is symbolised is an arbitrary one (words fall into this 
category). ‘Semi-conventional’ here means the fact that one convention was selected rather 
than another “is not an accident” but the result of some ‘natural relation’ or resemblance 
between the symbol and the referent or denotation (such as white and purity) (Hospers, 
1946: 33). Such symbols require prior understanding of certain conventions, without which 
the viewer cannot go far in interpreting the work. Moreover, parts of artworks will also 
naturally symbolise or represent things, primarily by depicting something else, perhaps with 
some degree of resemblance (Hospers, 49-50). For instance, sheep in a painting will depict 
or be a natural symbol for sheep in the world.5 
The relationship between visual symbols, depiction, and denotation should be noted. 
Visual symbols in art can denote things as well as depict things, but such a claim needn’t 
involve a commitment to a conventionalist theory of depiction (a theory held by Goodman, 
1968 and Kulvicki, 2006). A visual symbol may denote or refer to an idea, theme, or object, 
because of pre-established conventions: for instance, the halo symbol will denote divinity. 
‘Conventional’ symbols do this. But this doesn’t necessarily mean that the halo symbol 
depicts divinity via a convention. Rather, the halo symbol can depict the object of a halo via 
some other relation such as resemblance.6 Such symbols can indeed denote things while 
                                                 
4 This relation may be one of denotation or reference, but my argument doesn’t hinge on this detail.  
5 Some theorists hold that such ‘natural’ symbols in art are also conventional: “Realism is relative, determined 
by the system of representation standard for the given culture or person at a given time” (Goodman, 1968: 37). 
Whether a picture is realistic to nature or not “depends at any time entirely upon what frame or mode is then 
the standard” (ibid). Alternatively, ‘natural symbol’ has been considered to refer to depiction via non-
conventional relations (Hyman, 2006: 161-162). I won’t take a stand on this dispute.  
6 Grzankowski makes a similar point (2015: 151). For issues about depictions of non-existent objects, see 
Abell (2009) and Hyman & Bantinaki (2017). 
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depiction may be governed by non-conventionalist principles.7 In other words, it is possible 
to treat denotation and depiction as distinct relations contra Goodman (1968). For instance, 
a visual symbol of Christ on the cross in visible agony will depict (but needn’t denote) the 
dead person Jesus Christ, but denote (and not depict) the theme of Christ embodying the 
suffering of humanity. This illustrates a potential case where the extensions of the relations 
come apart, which would be enough to show that they are distinct relations.   
This model can be used to explain Hospers’ notions of ‘conventional’, ‘semi-
conventional’, and ‘natural’ symbols. Conventional symbols will be ones that denote an 
object, idea, or theme x (such as divinity) by depicting a different object y (such as a halo). 
Semi-conventional symbols will be ones that denote x and depict y, but where there is a 
connection between x and y i.e. the appearance of y might partially explain the 
corresponding denotation of a certain theme. For example, the doctrine of humanity’s 
suffering might have non-conventional connections with the depiction of Christ in pain. And 
lastly, a natural symbol needn’t denote anything at all if we don’t want to be conventionalists 
about depiction. Here, the symbol will merely depict an object via a non-conventional 
relation such as resemblance. 8  The lesson here is that we needn’t be committed to a 
conventionalist theory of depiction in order to help ourselves to denotative symbols in works 
of art. 
As well as having contents (whether these be denotations or depicted objects), visual 
symbols can be used with illocutionary forces, just like linguistic symbols: we can do things 
with words, and pictorial symbols are also tools to do things with. For instance, some road 
sign symbols warn drivers about potential hazards, and the Crucifix symbol glorifies Christ, 
and in churches invites people to pray. So, just like with language and artwork meaning 
more generally, a visual symbol’s meaning is composed of its content and force.  
Meaning – comprised of content and force – in linguistic situations is normally 
informed by the context of utterance. For example, we need to consult the context of 
utterance in which a speaker says, “I’ll take that one”, to fully parse the sentence’s content 
and force (what does the demonstrative ‘that’ refer to, who is the speaker, and is this an 
order or request?). Similarly for artwork meaning, it’s generally accepted that a work’s 
content and force is informed by its context. Grounding interpretation in the perceptual 
properties of a work alone, or the artist’s intentions alone, is too limited to make sense of 
                                                 
7 See Lopes (1996: 57) for more on this thought. 
8 For more on this see Hyman (2006: 161-162). 
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how we engage with art. Indeed, it’s been argued that the formal qualities of a work are 
connected to historical facts (Walton, 1970; Davies, 2006b: 60), and concentrating on artist 
intentions alone has absurd consequences for meaning more generally. 9  So, when 
determining artwork meaning, the context needs to be consulted in some way. What kind of 
context that might be, forms the focus of the next section.  
 
3. Originalism and Constructivism   
 
According to a dominant view in aesthetics, Originalism, the meaning of an artwork is fixed 
by factors that held at the time of the work’s creation (Davies, 1996: 20).10 More precisely, 
the facts that determine the meaning of an artwork are exhausted by the (relevant) facts about 
the work’s original context, i.e. the context in which it was created. This means that once a 
work is created, its meaning is informed by that context only. For example, the meaning of 
Guernica is restricted to the period in which Picasso created the work, i.e. as a response to 
the bombing of Guernica.  
Forming the backdrop of the ‘Intentionalist Debate’ – which asks what determines 
artwork meaning and how ought we interpret art – recall that Originalism manifests in at 
least three positions, each of which assign factors in the original context different 
importance. For instance, according to Actual Intentionalism, what determines an artwork’s 
meaning is the artist’s actual intentions that are supported by the work and recognised 
through the conventions that held in the work’s original context (Carroll, 2000: Davies, 
1996: 21). Alternatively, Hypothetical Intentionalism holds that an artwork’s meaning is 
determined by a suitable audience’s ascribing to the artist certain intentions, drawing on 
evidence based on the linguistic and artistic conventions that held in the work’s original 
context. And Conventionalism holds that knowledge about the conventions of language and 
art that were in effect when the work was produced is sufficient to secure the meaning of the 
artwork (Davies, ibid). Conventionalism has been interpreted as a brand of ‘Anti-
                                                 
9 Allowing artist intentions to entirely determine the meaning of an artwork results in a failure to recognise the 
distinction between what the artist intends and the meaning the work conveys. Guernica could not be about a 
child’s tea party by Picasso willing it so. For more on this see Carroll (1992). 
10 Originalism has received different names in the literature. Davies (1996) calls it ‘Original Context Theory’, 
and Levinson (1990) calls it ‘Traditional Historicism’. Originalists include Davies (1996; 2006a; 2006b), 
Stecker (2003), and Levinson (1990).  
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intentionalism’, because it holds that while factors about the work’s origin are relevant, the 
artist’s intentions have no relevance at all to artwork meaning, and interpreters should 
entirely dispense with the artist’s intentions giving the work complete autonomy from the 
beliefs of its creator.  
These three alternative positions about artwork meaning have in common a core claim: 
“the meaning of a work is determined by circumstances obtaining at its creation” (Davies, 
1996: 22). 
A plausible metaphysical view about the nature of art tends to come hand in hand with 
Originalism; namely, that an artwork is a historically informed object. An artwork – literary 
or visual – is partly composed of a text, or a bundle of colours, lines, and shapes on a canvas 
(its visual forms). But artworks are more than this. They are created by people with identities 
within historical parameters, and the artworks consequently have such parameters built into 
their identity and meanings. As Davies writes: “…the art that is produced is historically 
indexed, because its identity and content depend on relations tying it to the setting in which 
it was created” (2006b: 127). In other words, there is more to a poem than its text, and there 
is more to a painting than the way its visual forms are put together on a canvas or wooden 
panel.  
Both the text of a literary work, and the colours and shapes in a painting, can be 
understood as ‘types’ (Stecker, 2003: 69): their abstract form can be detached from the 
artwork, and can manifest in different artworks with different meanings. This is evidenced 
by the fact that two visually or lexically identical artworks would actually be different 
artworks and have their own distinct meanings if they were created by different people, 
within different genres, or within different cultural and historical environments (Davies, 
1996: 22). For instance, Allen Jones’s group of three sculptures – Hatstand, Table, and Chair 
(1969) – consist of three minimally dressed women transformed into pieces of furniture, and 
are taken to objectify women. However, if a female feminist artist had created the very same 
sculptures in the 21st century, it’s plausible that we’d have a very different artwork, one that 
did not itself objectify women, but rather exposed and protested against the objectification 
of women. So, the same constructed sculptural forms – the same type of composition – would 
manifest in two different artworks. In particular, the works would have different contents 
and illocutionary forces depending on their historical origins. This demonstrates the 
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importance of a work’s origin to its meaning and identity, indeed, to its being an artwork at 
all. Call this claim about the nature of artworks the Origin Principle.11 
This view about the nature of art has implications for how we should practice art 
interpretation. Given that an artwork is a historically informed object, if we want to enquire 
into the meaning of an artwork, we should interpret the artwork as a particular historically 
informed object. That is, when enquiring into the meaning of a painting qua artwork, the 
object of interpretation we’re concerned with is not the painting’s visual forms alone, but 
the painting as a whole with its historical identity, i.e. the artwork. Alternatively, 
interpretation of a bundle of visual forms on a canvas, or a text, is far less constrained than 
interpretation of the artworks in which they manifest. As Davies remarks about texts as 
opposed poems, a text can be used for many things (2006b: 110), and playful approaches to 
the text are fine, since interpretation as a practice: 
 
…need not confine itself to providing consistent, integrated accounts of artists’ works…as 
opposed to the texts associated with those works, which may be taken up by the interpreter 
and used for their own purposes (Davies, 2006b: 124).  
 
But if we’re concerned with the meaning of an artwork, then it’s plausible to insist that our 
object of interpretation be that artwork. Call this claim the Interpretation Principle. 
These two principles, the first about the nature of art, the second about the practice of 
interpretation, typically form motivation for the Originalist position. Given that artworks are 
historically informed objects, and given that in discovering an artwork’s meaning the object 
of interpretation should therefore be this historically informed object, Originalists insist that 
interpreters must confine themselves to the practices of language and visual form, and 
events, within which the artist worked. If we attempt to interpret an artwork using 
conventions, theories, or events that couldn’t have been used by artists of the time, argues 
the Originalist, then we are not actually interpreting that artwork (Davies, 1996: 22). Rather, 
we’re just interpreting a bundle of visual forms on a canvas, or a text, which are not tethered 
to the work’s original historical parameters; much like how a sentence in language can relate 
in different ways to different contexts. 
                                                 
11 Davies refers to this claim as ‘ontological contextualism’: “an artwork’s identity and contents are generated 
in part by relations it holds to aspects of the socio-historical setting in which it was created” (2006b: 81). For 
further arguments in favour of this position, see Davies (2006b: pp. 50-87). 
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The meaning of an artwork is thus fixed by factors that held at the time of the work’s 
creation, and cannot change or develop over time. As Jerrold Levinson writes: “…an 
artwork’s basic content can only be a function of what precedes or is coeval with it[s 
creation], and thus that such content does not suffer continual revision after creation” (1990: 
201).12  Call this the ORIGINALIST CLAIM – this is the claim that I’ll be arguing against. It 
should be noted that Originalists accept that some of an artwork’s properties can and do 
change across time, such as their age, how they’re interpreted, or level of damage. However, 
they argue that such changeable properties are not “crucial to the work’s identity”, and that 
those properties that are crucial to the work’s identity, such as its meaning, do not alter over 
time (Davies, 2006b: 95-96). 
But it seems that artworks often react to subsequent events over time and in a way that 
is relevant to their identities: “We have a tendency, admittedly, to regard an artwork as an 
organic thing, with a life and a development, which evolves progressively with its 
surrounding environment” (Levinson, 1990: 180). Originalists claim that such sentiments 
are mistaken, and reflect “the myth of the living artwork” (Levinson, ibid).  
But the rival (and more controversial) view, Constructivism, holds that such 
sentiments are not mistaken: the content and force of a work, i.e. its meaning, can indeed 
change over time. 13  The view holds that artworks are ‘historically constructed’: “…an 
artwork is historically constructed if changes that occur in a work’s historical or cultural 
context change its meaning (Stecker, 2003: 140).14 Constructivists hold, then, that rather 
than remaining fixed across time, the identity of an artwork can evolve through its alteration 
in meaning. Constructivism is therefore Anti-Originalist, denying the Originalist claim: it is 
not the case that the facts that determine the meaning of an artwork are exhausted by the 
(relevant) facts about the work’s original context. 
Some versions of Constructivism hold that interpretations are what change the 
meaning of the artwork: each interpretation changes the meaning of its object (Davies, 
2006b: 125, Stecker, 2003: 141).15 I won’t adhere to this version, but rather a version that 
                                                 
12 For Levinson, the ‘basic content’ of an artwork refers to a work’s aesthetic qualities (gracefulness), artistic 
properties (originality, revolutionariness), representational properties, and its meaning properties (1990: 184). 
It’s the last of these that this chapter, and indeed the whole thesis, is concerned with. 
13  Constructivism has received different names in the literature. Davies (1996) calls it ‘Modern Context 
Theory’, Stecker (2003) calls it ‘Historical Constructivism’, and Levinson (1990) calls it ‘Revisionist 
Historicism’. For variations on the theory in general see Stecker (2003). For proponents of the theory in its 
various forms see Margolis (1991), McFee (1980; 1992), Shusterman (1992), and Krausz (1992).  
14 Stecker, as an Originalist, denies that artworks are like this.  
15 Krausz (1992) and Margolis (1991) hold this version, but see Levinson (1996: 197) for problems with it. 
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sees interpretation as discovery of the changing artwork meaning, which changes as a result 
of “historically shifting variables” which “impinge on and change the meaning of the work” 
(Stecker, 2003: 141). This change in meaning can be understood in two ways: (i) artworks 
can accumulate or alter in meaning: new meanings can be added to the original meaning of 
the work, or (ii) artworks can entirely change in meaning, where the work ceases to possess 
its original meaning altogether, and then means something else. 16 My arguments in this 
chapter support option (i), and I remain neutral about whether option (ii) is possible. So, 
given certain conditions, a work can change in meaning over time, where this is understood 
as an accumulation or alteration of meaning. Call this Constructivism’s ALTER CLAIM – this 
is the claim that I’ll be arguing for.  
Constructivism gained purchase after the dawn of, and so generally combines with, 
‘The New Criticism’; the movement in aesthetic theory which released the artwork from its 
maker, dismissing facts about the work’s origin. The New Criticism is a type of Anti-
intentionalism, because it holds that artist’s intentions have no relevance at all to artwork 
meaning, and interpreters should give the work complete autonomy from the beliefs of its 
creator.  
The New Criticism school is also Anti-Originalist, and not only denies the Originalist 
claim but also makes the additional move of entirely rejecting a work’s original context as 
informing its meaning; historic facts such as facts about the society in which the work was 
created are irrelevant to work meaning. New Critics focus instead on the text or formal 
elements of works, releasing these elements from the artist’s intentions and the work’s 
original context. This consequently reduces the artwork to its bundle of colours and shapes 
on a canvas, or its text, rather than an object that contains fixed historical parameters. 
Divorcing an artwork’s meaning from its original context and the intentions of its creator 
supposedly explains how works apparently gain new meanings after their author or artist has 
died (Beardsley, 1992: 26).  
But the New Critic approach is problematic, for it confuses an artwork with its mere 
form; its bundle of colours and shapes on a canvas, or its text. As we saw, an artwork’s 
historical origin is part of its identity and meaning, as per the Origin Principle, and treating 
a painting qua artwork instead as a mere collection of pigment and shapes on a canvas is no 
                                                 
16 Stecker describes this differently: “Such changes can be either accretions in meaning, that is, simply add to 
the current meaning of a work, or they can be alterations in meaning, that is, bring it about that a work ceases 
to mean one thing and begins meaning something else” (2003: 140). I use the term ‘alter’ to refer to a mere 
accretion in meaning, for this counts as a small alteration but not an entire shift in meaning.  
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longer dealing with the artwork. Consequently, the critic is no longer interpreting the 
artwork, but is instead interpreting the work’s visual forms alone. The object of 
interpretation shifts from the artwork, to its associated visual forms or text. Of course, there 
are many practices of interpretation, some involving artworks, and some involving just the 
works’ associated visual forms or texts. And it might be the case that a New Criticism 
interpretation method is the most worthwhile one as regards aesthetic appreciation. But if 
we’re concerned with determining an artwork’s meaning as opposed to the potential 
meanings of its visual forms or text alone, we need to be careful that the artwork is our object 
of interpretation; we must abide by the Interpretation Principle.  
An artwork’s identity is informed by its original historical setting, and interpretation 
of the artwork should therefore respect this. So if we want to be Constructivist about artwork 
meaning, where one and the same artwork can be reactive to new events and so change in 
meaning, we should abide by the Origin Principle and Interpretation Principle, and reject 
the New Critic approach to art and interpretation. The following sections attempt to show 
that artworks can change in meaning: both their content and force can alter, given certain 
conditions. That is, I argue for a Constructivism that does justice to the nature of art and 
interpretation, and leaves behind the problematic New Critic approach. We can be 
Constructivist – and so Anti-Originalist – without being New Critics.  
 
4. Against the ORIGINALIST CLAIM  
 
Using the Isenheim Altarpiece as a case study, this section argues for Constructivism’s 
ALTER CLAIM and against the ORIGINALIST CLAIM: artworks can change in meaning. I first 
explore the altarpiece’s meaning in relation to its original context. I then argue that the 
altarpiece gained a new meaning when it was displayed in Munich in 1919. I do this by 
showing that the visual symbols specifically in the altarpiece, when displayed in Munich, 
accumulated in meaning, and that the altarpiece overall therefore accumulated in meaning.   
4.1. Saint Anthony’s Fire 
 
There is abundant evidence for the hypothesis that the altarpiece’s meaning is to do with the 
Saint Anthony’s Fire disease and the 16th century hospital patients at the monastery. 
Evidence is found in the altarpiece’s imagery and the specific symbolic parts of the painting, 
and in the original context in which it was created, including the fact that similar altarpieces 
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sharing the same medicinal function were created around the same time.17 I’ll note a handful 
of such evidence.  
First, the wings in the piece’s closed state depict the saints Sebastian and Anthony. By 
the 16th century, St Sebastian was a long-standing symbol for warding off the plague. St 
Anthony, because of the order, by this time symbolised the miraculous cure of the Saint 
Anthony’s Fire disease (Hayum, 503). Moreover, he is shown in the painting holding a tau-
shaped cross, treated by many late 15th century prints as a symbol of healing. In the hospital 
context, these symbolic elements of the painting comprised deep content about healing. 
Second, the predella of the piece (the bottom landscape panel, see Figure. 10), which 
depicts the Lamentation of Christ, has a visible panel split just below Christ’s knees. 
Amputation procedures were common at the hospital, and the monks displayed amputated 
limbs around the monastery. Here in the altarpiece’s predella Christ himself appears 
represented as an amputee (509), comprising deep content about the identification of Christ 
with the hospital’s patients and their disease. 
 
 
 
Third, the right-hand wing in the piece’s open state 
depicts the Temptation of St Anthony (Figure. 11). The 
depicted demon-figure to the bottom left is interpreted as 
a graphic symbol of the diseased state of Saint Anthony’s 
Fire. Gruesome and helpless, the demon’s head lolls 
back whilst his withered arm clenches in agony. The 
cartello opposite the figure reads, “where were you good 
Jesus…why were you not there to heal my wounds?” 
which has been interpreted as a verbal accompaniment to 
the visual embodiment of the disease (507).  
                                                 
17 For example, Roger van der Weyden’s Beaune Altarpiece (Hayum, 503). 
Figure. 10 
Figure. 11 
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Again, these shallow visual elements with their symbolic connotations comprise deep 
content about the nature of the patients’ disease. As the art historian Andrée Hayum writes:  
 
All the symptoms of Grünewald’s demon have been variously associated with Saint 
Anthony’s Fire and, given the professed goals of the monastery, we can assume that the 
artist meant to show him as suffering from this disease (507). 
 
Both the general and specific contents in the altarpiece, given by its symbols, are put forth 
with illocutionary forces. For instance, the general content about the Crucifixion is put forth 
with forces familiar to Crucifixions in this period: the Crucifix symbol was taken to assert 
that Christ died for our sins, and was an invitation to pray and believe. The altarpiece’s 
specific content about Saint Anthony’s Fire is also put forth with certain forces: the work 
functions as a plead for a cure of the disease, a protection against the disease, a relieving of 
the patients’ pain, and the promise of a disease-free afterlife (Williamson, 2004: 40). The 
shallow and deep contents coupled with their illocutionary forces thus expressed, in the 
hospital, shallow and deep messages about Saint Anthony’s Fire, healing, and salvation. As 
Hayum writes: 
 
Thus the viewers at Isenheim, through their common experience of local texts and 
illustrations, could attach this reassuring level of meaning to the crucifixion on the 
altarpiece (510). 
 
That Grünewald chose to transcribe a presumably predetermined program into visual 
language that touches the experiences of these patients only brings out more 
dramatically…his extraordinary capacity to be affected by this context and his evident 
need to communicate with this special group of viewers (516). 
 
Originalists would be happy with this arrived-at meaning. Given that we know little about 
Grünewald, we can only use the information we have: the piece itself with its visual symbols, 
and the context in which it was created, or commissioned for. 
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4.2. The German Spirit  
 
However, several centuries later in 1919, the altarpiece was exhibited in Munich. There, it 
apparently came to symbolise the ‘German spirit’, and was interpreted as representing the 
pain suffered by the German soldiers at the Front. There, “The self-image of a martyred 
people [was] thus equated with the ‘tragic tale’ of the Isenheim Altar” (Stieglitz, 1989: 99). 
How can we explain this apparent alteration in meaning? Recall that artwork meaning 
is composed of content and force. In language, the content and force of a sentence is 
frequently informed by the context of utterance. For instance, some linguistic expressions 
such as the demonstrative ‘that’ are context-sensitive: their content varies with the context 
of utterance. Moreover, the illocutionary acts that we perform with our words are also 
affected by the context of utterance. For instance, whether ‘Be quiet!’ counts as an act of 
giving an order depends on certain contextual conditions, such as the authority of the 
speaker.  
Visual symbols are also context-sensitive, and thus liable to shift in meaning across 
contexts. So if the altarpiece’s symbols can change in meaning across contexts of utterance, 
then it looks like the piece as a whole can develop in meaning too. I’ll now argue that the 
meaning of the altarpiece altered when placed in a certain context of utterance, i.e. the 
exhibition in Munich. I do this in two steps: (1) I outline how the Munich exhibition 
constituted a context of utterance; (2) I show how through its symbols the meaning of the 
altarpiece related in a new way to this context of utterance.  
 
(1) The Munich exhibition  
 
A context of utterance is generally understood as:  
 
…the set of circumstances in which a sentence is spoken or written; it will typically 
include the identity of the speaker, the identity of the addressee (if any), the place and 
time of the utterance, and perhaps other things (Elborne, 2011: 112).  
 
What we say and do with our words is sensitive to such extra-linguistic parameters. The 
context provides crucial elements of meaning to our sentences, and as the context changes, 
the meanings of our sentences can change.   
Artwork meaning has been frequently understood by drawing on analogies with 
language. For instance, interpretation theorists such as Actual Intentionalists and 
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Hypothetical Intentionalists draw a distinction between what the artist intends their work to 
mean, which they call ‘utterer meaning’, and what the work actually ends up conveying, 
which they call ‘utterance meaning’. This analogy with language can be extended to the 
contexts in which artworks express their meanings. In general, contexts of utterance in the 
artworld can be understood as the set of circumstances in which an artwork is displayed, 
which will typically include the identity of the artist, the identity of the audience, the place 
and time of the display, and perhaps other things.  
Contexts of utterance in the artworld can be divided into two types: an artwork’s 
originating context of utterance, and its subsequent contexts of utterance. The former 
comprises the original context in which the artwork was created and shown. It contains as 
parameters the identity of the artist, the broad identity of the original audience, and the place 
and time (i.e. political or moral environment) in which the work was created and displayed. 
For instance, the originating context of utterance of the Isenheim Altarpiece consists of the 
time period in which it was displayed to the patients in St Anthony’s Hospital. 
But artworks continue to be displayed in different exhibitions in time periods and 
locations subsequent to their originating contexts of utterance. These subsequent public 
showings of a work can be construed as a work’s subsequent contexts of utterance. This 
type of context can be further divided, into two sub-types: homage contexts of utterance, 
and contemporary contexts of utterance.  
Presumably according to Originalism, any subsequent context of utterance or 
displaying of a work – against which we analyse the work’s meaning – should approximate 
its originating context of utterance: it must pay homage to it. So, even in exhibitions in the 
21st century, we should still analyse the Isenheim Altarpiece against its original contextual 
parameters, i.e. in a homage context of utterance. Indeed, curators tend to recreate and 
reflect on the originating context of utterance in subsequent showings of famous works, by 
giving information about the work’s originating circumstances. For example, when 
Guernica has been exhibited in shows decades after the Spanish Civil War, its curation tends 
to give information about the war and how the painting was a response to the Guernica 
bombing. 
While subsequent contexts of utterance in the artworld do frequently curatorially draw 
entirely on the parameters of a work’s originating context, this does not mean that this is the 
only way of generating subsequent contexts of utterance in the artworld. Other sets of 
circumstances, which occur after the originating context, can be established as 
contemporary contexts of utterance, perhaps facilitated by the curator. These contexts 
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include as parameters the artist’s identity, the contemporary audience’s identity, and the 
place and time (i.e. the contemporary political or moral environment) of the work’s current 
curated display. Here, artworks can be displayed in exhibitions with narratives different to 
those in the originating context of utterance of the work: narratives that, for instance, draw 
on current affairs rather than past affairs. Crucially, we can and do analyse artworks, such 
as the Isenheim Altarpiece, not only against their originating or homage contexts of 
utterance, but also against their contemporary contexts of utterance generated by current 
events.18 
I’ll now show that the exhibition of the altarpiece at the Alte Pinakothek in Munich, 
within its wider WWI context, facilitated a contemporary context of utterance. This was 
achieved because the following parameters were publicly in place: (i) Grünewald’s identity, 
(ii) the contemporary audience’s identity, and (iii) the place and time of the work’s current 
curated display i.e. its contemporary political or moral environment. I’ll explain these in 
turn. 
The first parameter constitutes Grünewald’s (supposed) identity. By the end of WWI, 
Wilhelm Worringer’s art book Formbrolene der Gotik (1911) was promoting and 
perpetuating “spiritual racism” in Germany: the belief that the Aryan race was special 
(Stieglitz, 87-89). The art book was part of a wider right-wing discourse on German cultural 
regeneration after the end of WWI, expressing chauvinistic and xenophobic messages 
(Stieglitz, 99). Because little was known about Grünewald, writers of this book constructed 
an image of the artist as being “ultra-German” (91), representing the ‘German spirit’ in the 
face of adversity.    
The second parameter constitutes the contemporary audience’s identity, which in this 
case was Germany as a society, and specifically the German soldiers who had fought in the 
trenches. This particular audience was exposed to public discourse surrounding the Isenheim 
Altarpiece, in the form of writing, education, and print distribution. The exhibition of the 
altarpiece triggered polemical articles which filled the newspapers, resulting in Munich 
becoming a place of ‘pilgrimage’ for the public (Stieglitz, 93). Moreover, the Alte 
Pinakothek had been giving courses on art before and after the war, and enabled wounded 
soldiers, many limbless, to visit the galleries (ibid). This discourse about the altarpiece and 
its effects on post-war Germany also influenced how it was photographed. For example, 
                                                 
18 For instance, the art exhibition Age of Terror: Art since 9/11 (2017) at the Imperial War Museum did this by 
curating artworks as a reaction to terrorism, even though some of the works hadn’t been created with this 
purpose in mind. 
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great importance was placed on photographing Christ’s hands and feet in the altarpiece. This 
further conveyed the graphic severing of the limbs: “a dismemberment uncannily close to 
the realities of the people viewing the altar” (95). Formed into prints, these photographs were 
distributed in the media, enabling the altarpiece to reach many German people outside of 
Munich. 
Moreover, at the time of the altarpiece’s display in Munich, this particular audience 
shared surrounding general knowledge about the German soldiers’ psychological and 
physical experience of the war and trench warfare, which was conceptualised at the time as 
Fronterlebnis: the traumatic experience of the Front (93). The graphic and intense naturalism 
of the painted body of Christ in pain in the altarpiece, with its emphasis on the skin’s surface 
– wounds, lacerations, puss, sores, the crown of thorns digging into his head, the nails cutting 
through bulging tendons – “was like a mirror to the wounds inflicted in the trenches” (94). 
Grünewald’s representation of Christ became uncanny to this new, contemporary audience. 
Furthermore, because of the print and article distribution, the altarpiece’s predella now 
seemed to signify the severing of limbs in the trenches. All of this “definitively changed the 
way people saw and wrote about the altar” (93). The altarpiece thus became a “sanctuary” 
for a war-torn country, and “bore witness to the to the suffering of Germany’s people” (93), 
and was considered a “cathartic experience” for the soldiers (95). 
The third parameter, consisting of the altarpiece’s contemporary political or moral 
environment, was a particularly dark Germany. The country had just lost the war, and as 
well as the emotional effects of accepting responsibility for the war, the country faced 
starvation and drastically reduced military and territorial power. This difficult time for the 
people of Germany between 1911 and 1919, and the growing spiritual racism amongst 
certain political parties, formed an anxious and distressed backdrop to the exhibition of the 
altarpiece in Munich.  
These three parameters constituted a contemporary context of utterance, into which 
the altarpiece was displayed. I’ll now argue how, within this contemporary context, the 
altarpiece expressed the same general messages as it did in its originating context of 
utterance (the monastic hospital) – about general pain and Christ – but its specific messages 
had accumulated, affecting the altarpiece’s overall content and force. 
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(2) A new meaning  
 
Much like context-sensitive linguistic expressions, the referents or denotations of at least 
conventional and semi-conventional visual symbols can change across contexts of utterance. 
Moreover, much like the illocutionary force of our words is sensitive to the context of 
utterance, so too can the force with which a visual symbol is used also change. This might 
be due to a new stipulated convention in a society, or because of a particular use of the 
symbol in a certain context. As Hospers writes, “what precisely is symbolised in each case 
can be determined only by the context” (1946: 36).  
It is uncontroversial that the meanings of symbols change across time, place, and 
culture. Some symbols lose their original meaning entirely; for instance, mistletoe used to 
be a symbol of ritual castration but now just signals a convention to kiss beneath it. But some 
symbols manage to retain their original meaning but accumulate across time; holding a 
collection of meanings at one time, becoming an ‘aggregate’ symbol. For instance, the 
swastika is an ancient symbol which is still taken to mean good fortune in the East, but 
because of the Nazi’s use of the symbol, refers to or denotes in much of the Western world 
‘Aryan race superiority’. And the hand symbol that signals ‘ok’ or ‘fine’ in some countries, 
is also offensive in most of Europe, indicating that the person it’s directed to is a ‘zero’, and 
in South American nations it symbolises the anus (Armstrong & Wagner, 2003). And the 
inverted cross symbol is simultaneously a pro-Christian, anti-Christian, and anti-
authoritarian symbol, symbolising the crucifixion of St Peter on an upside down cross, but 
also used by rock music, and horror films, such as The Omen (1976). 
In particular, the illocutionary force of a symbol can change. The first known 
representation of the Crucifixion – a piece of 2nd century Roman graffiti depicting a man 
worshipping a crucified donkey – was a satire. The Crucifix symbol was here denoting the 
death of Jesus, but was put forth in the form of an insult towards growing Christianity 
(Viladesau, 1995: 46-47). Now, the Crucifix symbol is generally taken to glorify Christ and 
celebrate Christian faith, though has since been used by artists with different illocutionary 
forces such as protest.19 As Nelson Goodman writes of symbols: 
 
                                                 
19 For instance, the artist Chris Burden crucified himself to a Volkswagen in 1974, and Robert Cenedella in 
1997 painted a crucified Father Christmas, protesting against the commercialisation of Christmas.  
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…what we read from and learn through a symbol varies with what we bring to it. Not 
only do we discover the world through our symbols but we understand and reappraise 
our symbols progressively in the light of our growing experience (1968: 260). 
 
The above observations about visual symbols and their meanings help explain how the 
symbols in the Isenheim Altarpiece developed in both content and force. I’ll focus on two 
such symbols.  
First, recall the image of the Lamented Christ in the altarpiece’s predella, with a visible 
panel split just below his knees (a semi-conventional symbol).20 In the 16th century hospital, 
this symbol in the predella denoted the loss of limbs in the amputation procedures on 
diseased patients. Christ himself appears represented as a diseased amputee, perhaps 
comprising an assertion that Christ bears the patients’ pain, echoing the theological 
identification of Christ with the diseased patients. But in the new, contemporary context of 
utterance in Munich, people who visited the altarpiece or read about it, encountered the piece 
against the backdrop of the political events of the time, and knowledge about the soldiers’ 
experience at the Front. Because of this, this Christ symbol in the predella came to stand for 
the loss of the German soldiers’ limbs in trench warfare.21 There, Christ was identified with 
the wounded soldier: “like a mirror to the wounds inflicted in the trenches” (Hayum, 95). 
The symbol was now asserting a connection specifically between Christ and the horrific 
effects of WWI trench warfare, something it couldn’t have done in the 16th century.22 
Second, consider the Crucifix symbol in the main panel of the altarpiece, depicting an 
emaciated Jesus on the cross (also a semi-conventional symbol). 23  In the 16th century 
hospital, this symbol stood for Christ bearing the patients’ pain, but in the Munich 
exhibition, the symbol came to stand for Christ bearing the pain of Germany and its soldiers. 
There, the symbol was a promise of a better society, it glorified the ‘German spirit’ and 
                                                 
20 This is because it requires prior knowledge about the conventional use of Jesus to represent the suffering of 
humanity, but it’s not entirely conventional for the relation between it and its object is not arbitrary: there is a 
natural relation or resemblance between the painted symbol’s denotation and its depicted object, Christ.  
21 To continue our non-commitment to certain depiction theories, we can say that while denotations of visual 
symbols can shift, their depicta can remain the same. In our case, the visual Christ symbol in the predella when 
displayed in Munich still depicted Christ’s dead body, but what it denoted had now altered. 
22 This blocks a standard Originalist response, namely, that a work’s apparent new meaning was actually there 
all along in the work, and subsequent events just enabled it to be revealed to us (see Levinson (1990: 181, 187, 
203) and Davies (2006b: 97)). The Isenheim Altarpiece in the 16th century could not have originally been about 
WWI all along. 
23 This may be a case where the depiction and denotation relations coincide in their extensions: the Crucifix 
symbol on one level depicts the death of Jesus Christ, but it might also constitute a conventional symbol for 
his death, thereby also denoting this significant event. 
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functioned as a protection against the post-war starvation and poverty of Germany. 
Moreover, the symbol appeared to gain new types of illocutionary force altogether: perhaps 
it was then being used to criticise the Allies’ role in the Treaty of Versailles, an illocutionary 
force that was not evident in the altarpiece in the 16th century.  
It’s plausible that in the Munich exhibition at least these two symbols in the altarpiece 
retained each of their meanings, both original and new, thus becoming ‘aggregate symbols’ 
with a collection of meanings. That is, each symbol accumulated in meaning across time, 
rather than the new meaning entirely replacing the original one. Given that visual symbols 
in general can do this, there’s no reason why those specifically in the altarpiece didn’t do so.  
My argument that artworks can accumulate in meaning across time, and so alter in 
meaning, can thus be stated: 
 
(1) Visual symbols can accumulate in meaning across time  
(2) An artwork’s meaning is partly informed by the meaning of its visual symbols 
(C) Artworks can accumulate in meaning across time. 
 
The Isenheim Altarpiece is an instance of the above argument. The altarpiece’s symbols 
related in new ways to the parameters provided by the contemporary context of utterance. 
Given that the altarpiece is comprised of such symbols, and given that these symbols 
manifested in new shallow and deep messages in Munich, it seems reasonable to claim that 
the work as a whole thus altered in meaning in the Munich exhibition.  
The Originalist will likely be uncomfortable with the notion that symbols as part of a 
painting can change in meaning. Given that they think artworks as a whole cannot change in 
meaning, they will equally push back that a work’s symbolic parts cannot change either.  
However, my argument has specifically concerned such symbolic parts of an artwork. 
As I’ve shown, symbols in general have an adaptive behaviour, displaying an ability to 
change in meaning. They can do this when placed in contexts of utterances: when symbols 
are placed in new contexts of utterances, they can gain new denotations. This much is 
uncontroversial.  I then showed that the Munich exhibition of the altarpiece constituted a 
contemporary context of utterance. The symbols as they appear in the altarpiece were then 
able to gain new denotations. This is evidenced by the public’s informed interpretation of 
these particular symbols, and by the general behaviour of symbols when placed in a public 
context.  
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The burden of proof is thus on the Originalist to argue that a work’s symbolic parts are 
not sensitive to new contexts. But this looks like a large burden: given that symbols in 
general are sensitive in this way, and given that the Originalist will concede that a work’s 
particular symbols are sensitive to the work’s original context (indeed, they’d need to be to 
gain meanings in the first place), the Originalist will be hard pressed to deny that these same 
symbols in the altarpiece are not sensitive to new contexts as well. 
In sum, the altarpiece was commissioned specifically with the Order’s patients in 
mind. When placed in a new context of utterance – the Munich exhibition during post-war 
Germany – the work’s general messages about pain and redemption remained largely the 
same. And the painting still depicted the dead body of Jesus, as well as other biblical people 
and objects. But, the specific messages (or contents), and the forces with which they were 
expressed, had accumulated. Now not just about Saint Anthony’s Fire, the altarpiece 
expressed deep messages about trench warfare, about Christ bearing the suffering of the 
German soldiers and post-WWI Germany, and about the healing of WWI psychological and 
physical trauma. This poses a serious problem for Originalism, for it falsifies their 
ORIGINALIST CLAIM: artwork meaning can alter over time, and so the Constructivist’s ALTER 
CLAIM is true.  
 
5. Originalist response: significance shift, not meaning shift  
 
Some Originalists have anticipated the kind of counterexample I’ve given. For instance, 
according to Stecker, we might think that Hamlet means something different to us now than 
it did for its original audience, maybe because we use different concepts to those of the 
Elizabethans (2003: 124). However, Stecker explains away this supposed change in meaning 
as a mere case of change in significance, and meaning is distinct from significance: 
 
…it is inevitable that Hamlet has a different significance for each of us today than for 
Shakespeare’s contemporaries, but from this it does not follow that its meaning has 
changed (Stecker, 125, my emphasis). 
 
So, while an artwork’s meaning does not change throughout time, its “significance can alter 
markedly” (Davies, 2006b: 124). 
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How should we understand this distinction between meaning and significance? 
According to Originalists, ‘significance’ is understood as the idiosyncratic and precarious 
content something has for someone; and with art, a “way a work is taken” by a certain 
audience (Stecker, 60). The significance of an artwork, as opposed to its meaning, can be 
defined as a kind of function: 
 
…that takes as arguments any given artwork with its determinate art-content and any 
object or situation outside the cultural and temporal context that determines that content, 
and gives as a value the salient similarities, echoes, or parallelisms discernable between 
the given work and the external matter with which it is brought into comparative relation 
(Levinson, 1990: 190). 
 
So, the significance of an artwork is a relation between its already existing meaning, and the 
viewer. For example, when looking at van Gogh’s painting The Yellow House (1888), it 
might remind you of your grandmother’s house. The painting can have this significance for 
you, but it doesn’t follow that the painting is about your grandmother’s house: it doesn’t 
refer to or say anything about your grandmother’s house. 
Artwork meaning on the other hand is determinate, objective, and public. It is not a 
way a work is merely taken subjectively by a viewer, but is secured by the work’s publicly 
manifest “semantic, symbolic, or other properties”, and objective, public features of the 
context in which the artwork is created (Davies, 2006b: 125). For example, The Yellow 
House is about the house, or represents the house, that van Gogh worked and lived in at the 
time when his mental health was deteriorating, and where he severed his ear. The meanings 
expressed by the painting will thus relate to these facts, and not to the whimsical thought of 
your grandmother.  
Originalists see interpreting artwork meaning not as “the pursuit…of shadowy, private 
ephemera, but of meanings successfully carried though to, and revealed in, the public action” 
(Davies, 1996: 25). They see the artwork as a public object with a meaning that is 
determinable, and not one that is private, idiosyncratic or subjective. Artwork meaning is 
not equivalent to the significances it elicits.  
Originalists can apply this distinction to try explain away the Isenheim Altarpiece case. 
When the altarpiece was exhibited in Munich, it developed a new significance, not a new 
meaning. Given their experiences at the Front, the soldiers read into the altarpiece references 
to the horrors of trench warfare. But it does not follow that the work expressed this new 
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German WWI-related meaning; the work is about Saint Anthony’s Fire, and not about WWI 
German trench warfare, or the ‘German spirit’. Rather, the exhibition at Munich prompted 
an idiosyncratic way of regarding or taking the work: the soldiers’ reactions to the altarpiece 
– when they considered the relation between its meanings and them – were just different to 
the reactions of the 16th century patients. 
So the Isenheim Altarpiece isn’t really a counterexample to the Originalist’s 
ORIGINALIST CLAIM. Originalism can supposedly accommodate it by claiming that what 
shifted was the altarpiece’s significance, and significance is not the same as meaning. Any 
counterexamples like the one I’ve offered can be explained by those works’ significance 
shifting, but their meanings remaining fixed by their original context. Call this the 
Originalist’s SIGNIFICANCE REBUTTAL. 
 
6. Against the Originalist’s SIGNIFICANCE REBUTTAL  
 
Recall that the distinction between significance and meaning roughly reduces to the 
distinction between a subjective way of taking something, and an objective, public, and 
determinable expressed content.  
But, my argument deals with symbolic meaning as opposed to mere significance: the 
Isenheim Altarpiece altered in meaning because its symbols altered in meaning. And 
symbols, when shown in a context of utterance, express objective, public, and determinable 
content, i.e. meaning. While there is a link between meaning in general and significance, 
symbolic meaning cannot be reduced to subjective whimsical reactions. Symbols are 
independent of “subjective fancy” either because of their recognised underlying convention, 
or because of their natural relations to their referents or denotations, both of which are 
objective and public amongst a considerable body of people in a society (Hospers, 49). In 
other words, it’s not a matter of idiosyncratic whim that public symbols refer to or denote 
the objects they do, and that they have certain illocutionary forces, i.e. it’s not a matter of 
significance. As Hospers notes:  
 
…there are subjective overtones of meaning, but we generally refer to these 
differently: we say “the word ‘snake’ means (symbolises, represents)…a biological 
species, but to me it expresses (not symbolises) everything that is horrible” (1946: 49, 
my emphasis). 
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According to their own lights, Originalists should treat the Isenheim Altarpiece case as a 
change in artwork meaning and not a change in mere significance, for I am treating meaning 
and significance just as they do. Originalists argue that the pursuit of artwork meaning is 
“not of shadowy, private ephemera, but of meanings successfully carried though to, and 
revealed in, the public action” (Davies, 1996: 25, my emphasis). Moreover, Originalists hold 
that artwork meaning is possessed “in virtue of [the work’s] semantic, symbolic, or other 
properties” (Davies, 2006b: 125, my emphasis), and is not something private, subjective, or 
idiosyncratic (Davies, 1996: 25).  
The case of the altarpiece in Munich is certainly not an example of a painting eliciting 
just “shadowy, private ephemera”: it was not just taken in a private and idiosyncratic way 
by its viewers. Rather, the work’s messages about Germany and trench warfare were 
determinate and objective because they were expressed by the altarpiece’s symbols in a 
contemporary context of utterance. This is thus an example of an artwork expressing 
meanings which were “successfully carried though to, and revealed in, the public action”. 
There in Munich, the meanings of the altarpiece’s symbols were not reduced to whimsical 
reactions but remained conventional, semi-conventional, or natural. There, the altarpiece 
“bore witness to the suffering of Germany’s people” (Stieglitz, 93), which was something 
public, shared, and objective i.e. it was a case of meaning.  
The piece as a whole, then, was able to acquire a new meaning at the Munich 
exhibition, and not merely a new significance. The Originalist’s claim that the altarpiece just 
changed in significance therefore does not capture the public and objective nature of my case 
study. The Originalist’s SIGNIFICANCE REBUTTAL fails.  
 
7. A faithful Constructivism  
  
Recall the Origin Principle and the Interpretation Principle: an artwork’s identity and 
meaning is informed by its original historical parameters, and when interpreting artwork 
meaning we should analyse this historically informed object.  
My argument in this chapter has involved interpreting an artwork – the Isenheim 
Altarpiece – using events that couldn’t have been known by Grünewald and the artwork’s 
16th century audience, i.e. WWI and its effects on Germany. Moreover, I draw on analogies 
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with language, specifically, context-sensitive terms. Since these change in meaning across 
contexts, I argue, so too do visual symbols.  
But visual symbols and linguistic expressions are considered as types, tokened in 
certain situations or utterances to express meanings. Consequently, the Originalist might 
object that I’m treating the altarpiece not as a historically informed object (i.e. as an artwork) 
but as a mere collection of its formal elements, or symbols, on wooden panels. Given that 
artworks are not reducible to their material parts, i.e. their visual or textual forms, the 
Originalist could object that I am not interpreting the Isenheim Altarpiece qua artwork at all, 
but merely its material parts as applied to a new context. Consequently, I have not shown 
that the Isenheim Altarpiece changed in meaning when it was displayed in Munich. Rather, 
I’ve merely shown that its visual forms gained a new meaning, which is not what is disputed 
between Originalists and Constructivists. The dispute is rather over whether one and the 
same artwork can develop in meaning. So it looks like I’m not abiding by the Origin 
Principle or Interpretation Principle: I’ve fallen afoul of the problematic New Critic 
approach that typically comes hand in hand with a Constructivist position; an approach that 
we wanted to dispense with. 
However, the Constructivist need not be forced down this thorny path: we can be 
Constructivist and still abide by the Origin Principle and Interpretation Principle. Recall 
that visual symbols can accumulate in meaning. Rather than a new meaning entirely 
replacing the original one, both meanings can coexist for a single symbol. In the Isenheim 
Altarpiece we saw at least two of its symbols gather a new meaning when shown in a 
contemporary context of utterance, accruing on top of the original Saint Anthony’s Fire-
related meaning. When a visual symbol gathers new meanings throughout time, a chain of 
meanings, or a ‘history of meaning’ is established for the symbol. Given that an artwork’s 
meaning is partly informed by the meanings of its visual symbols, so too, then, can artworks 
possess a history of meaning.  
So how can the very same artwork alter in meaning, and thus have an evolving 
identity? The key is in the accumulation picture of Constructivism, where artworks can have 
growing histories. I’ve argued that artworks have a history of meaning. And because the new 
meanings through time accumulate on top of the work’s original meaning, this history of 
meaning begins, and is ‘rooted’, in a work’s original context of utterance: the work’s original 
meaning forms a ROOT. All the different ways a work is displayed in contexts subsequent to 
its originating context can contribute to this history of meaning, which is anchored to the 
original meaning, the ROOT. For instance, consider Figure. 13 which shows a chain of 
 165 
 
 
contexts of utterance taking place at locations L={l1,…lm} and times T={t1,…tn} for the 
Isenheim Altarpiece, where ‘a’ refers to one of the altarpiece’s symbols, namely, its Christ 
symbol in the predella, and ‘*’ is affixed to the ROOT meaning: 
 
lm, tn                                                                       Subsequent  
(contemporary)  
a denotes: 
+ C (lm, tn) 
+ WWI trench warfare, and the soldiers/people 
*Saint Anthony’s Fire and the hospital patients 
l2 = Munich, t2 = 20
th century                               Subsequent  
(contemporary) 
a denotes:  
 
+ WWI trench warfare, and the soldiers/people 
*Saint Anthony’s Fire and the hospital patients 
l1 = Monastery of St. Anthony, t1 = 16
th century Original  a denotes:  
 
 
*Saint Anthony’s Fire and the hospital patients 
Location and time  Context type Symbol a in the Isenheim Altarpiece 
  Figure. 13 
 
where the location-time pair lm, tn refers to any context of utterance at a time subsequent 
to t2, and where C is a function from a location-time pair to the salient and artistically 
relevant parameters of that context of utterance. For instance, the Isenheim Altarpiece could 
today be exhibited amongst the rubble in Aleppo after the ancient city was extensively 
damaged by the intense bombardment by the Syrian government in 2016. Just like the 
exhibition in Munich, if a public contemporary context of utterance were established via 
wider contextual parameters, perhaps including curation, then the altarpiece’s symbols, and 
thus the piece as a whole, could alter in meaning by denoting the catastrophic 2016 
bombings.  
Given that the ROOT of an artwork is what makes that artwork the same artwork across 
time (given the Origin Principle), the Isenheim Altarpiece remains the same work as it 
persists through time, even though its meaning changes, because it remains fixed to this 
ROOT. New meanings can be added on top of this meaning, altering its identity, whilst it 
remains the very same work across time. This makes sense of statements like:  
 
[Uttered in 1518] “The Isenheim Altarpiece is about Saint Anthony’s Fire” 
[Uttered in 1918] “The Isenheim Altarpiece is about Saint Anthony’s Fire and post-war 
Germany” 
[Uttered in 2018] “The Isenheim Altarpiece is about Saint Anthony’s Fire and post-war 
Germany and the 2016 Aleppo bombings”.24 
                                                 
24 Given certain conditions, of course. 
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Here, the object of interpretation remains the very same artwork across contexts as it accrues 
in meaning. Only if the Isenheim Altarpiece continues to be about Saint Anthony’s Fire in 
the 16th century through time will it remain that artwork. 
But is it even possible for the Isenheim Altarpiece to cease being about Saint 
Anthony’s Fire? Unless this ROOT is kept ‘alive,’ perhaps by historians and curators referring 
to and referencing the original context and original meaning, this ROOT could be lost if every 
living person forgot the Isenheim Altarpiece’s original meaning. Would this entail that the 
work would actually lose its original meaning and cease to be that artwork? Or would the 
altarpiece still be about Saint Anthony’s Fire even if no one knew? 
This presents a choice-point, and one that I won’t take here, but I will sketch it out for 
interest. If the altarpiece’s original meaning was ‘lost’ in the epistemic sense of the word, 
then there are two possibilities: (i) either the work would still possess this original meaning 
nonetheless, and so remain the very same artwork, or (ii) it would actually lose its original 
meaning and so cease to be that artwork. The less radical option (i) would make use of the 
notion that aboutness facts can still hold of something even if that something no longer exists 
(a poem about my grandfather is still about my grandfather even though he died years ago). 
Similarly, an artwork cannot be metaphysically ‘uprooted’ just because we don’t know what 
it originally meant. The more radical option (ii) would rely on the notion that the epistemic 
qualities of something can determine its metaphysical qualities: given that artworks are 
objects of communication, an artwork’s meaning depends somewhat on people actually 
knowing and understanding this meaning. As I said, this forms a choice-point but one I won’t 
take here.  
It should be noted that my Constructivism invokes a particular kind of ontology of art, 
one which is normally used to explain the persistence through change of the identity of living 
creatures like trees and people. Even though living things change over time, they retain their 
identity: “An oak tree can be one and the same as a past acorn with which it shares few 
properties. A given person can, at different times, be young and blond and old and bald” 
(Davies, 2006b: 95).25 An upshot of my view is that artworks should be treated like this as 
well.26  
                                                 
25 Davies argues that artworks are not like this, because their meanings don’t alter across time (2006b: 95-97). 
Given that I’ve argued that artwork meaning can alter across time, then, suggests that this kind of ontology is 
indeed appropriate for artworks, as well as for living things.  
26  See Newman et al (2014) for recent studies that show that “in terms of judgments about identity 
continuity…there are important ways in which judgments about ART appear to be more similar to judgments 
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Originalists accuse Constructivists of succumbing to the ‘the myth of the living 
artwork’. But this metaphor can be used to the Constructivist’s advantage. Just like 
vegetation grows from its root, and develops and matures over time, artworks grow from 
their originating context of utterance. What makes the Isenheim Altarpiece the same artwork 
in the 16th century and in the 20th century (and subsequent centuries), rather than a collection 
of colours and shapes on wooden panels, then, is the piece’s own particular chain of 
meaning; its own history of accumulating content, anchored to its ROOT which began in a 
16th century monastery.  
My argument in this chapter therefore remains faithful to the Origin Principle and 
Interpretation Principle, and does not reduce an artwork to its visual formal elements. To 
argue that an artwork can develop in meaning does not entail that the artwork itself is lost, 
as long as we acknowledge an artwork’s own unique history of meaning and ROOT as its 
identifying character. The myth of the living artwork, then, is no myth: artworks are organic 
and reactive objects. Of course, I haven’t devoted anywhere near enough time to the potential 
mileage of this particular ontology of art that my argument incurs; exactly what specific 
ontology should be invoked here requires further investigation.27 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
I have argued that the ORIGINALIST CLAIM – that artwork meaning is fixed to its original 
context and cannot change – is false. Given that this is the defining claim of Originalism, 
Originalism is therefore false. Using the Isenheim Altarpiece as a case study, I tried to show 
that the Originalist’s SIGNIFICANCE REBUTTAL – that what is shifting in the altarpiece is not 
its meaning but its significance – fails. If a contemporary context of utterance is established, 
a work’s representative content, in this case its symbols, can gain new meanings. When this 
happens, the work as a whole then expresses new meanings in this new context. The 
Constructivist’s ALTER CLAIM is true. Given that artworks can change in meaning over time, 
then, the curator is thus not ruled out as playing a central role in generating, and developing, 
artwork meaning.  
                                                 
about PERSONS (in their reliance on sameness of substance) than judgments about other kinds of artifacts” 
(2014: 658). 
27 For instance, whether artworks persist through time by ‘enduring’ or ‘perduring’. For more on this see 
Hawley (2015). 
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Given that Originalism forms the assumed backdrop for the Intentionalist Debate in 
aesthetics, this chapter is thus a call that we take more seriously a Constructivist view, but 
one that remains faithful to the Origin Principle and Interpretation Principle. An artwork 
does receive its identity and meaning in the context in which it is created, but that same 
artwork can mature, or alter, in meaning through time. This explains how old and revered 
artworks like the Isenheim Altarpiece can maintain relevance and power over time, and 
continue to speak to us in new and dynamic ways.  
My Constructivist position is therefore Anti-Originalist – it is not the case that the facts 
that determine the meaning of an artwork are exhausted by the (relevant) facts about the 
work’s original context – but it still gives an artwork’s original context theoretical 
importance in determining work meaning. Consequently, my position rules out most if not 
all of the main players in the Intentionalist Debate: Actual Intentionalism, Hypothetical 
Intentionalism, and Conventionalism, are all ruled out, for these are all Originalist positions. 
But, my position also rules out the existing Anti-Originalist Anti-intentionalist approach – 
that of the New Critic – because my approach still gives a work’s original context theoretical 
importance in determining artwork meaning.  
This thus carves out new space in the debate: we should acknowledge an Anti-
Originalist two-dimensional theory of artwork meaning that captures the importance of a 
work’s original context, but also allows a work to accumulate in meaning by being 
influenced by non-original contexts. Traditionally, to be Anti-Originalist was to be a New 
Critic. But it’s possible that there are also at least Anti-Originalist variants of Actual 
Intentionalism and Hypothetical Intentionalism, which draw on non-original contexts, 
including the role of the curator. These two expanded intentionalist positions would ideally 
capture the importance of the original context to artwork meaning, but also capture the 
flexibility of artwork meaning in new, non-original contexts. This is of course only a starting 
point, but I think one that merits further investigation. 
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Conclusion 
 
1. Artworks as shifting speech acts 
 
This thesis has made two main arguments. First, it argues that artworks are speech acts: 
given certain conditions, artworks possess illocutionary force and propositional content. 
This explains how artworks can ‘speak’ to us without using words – the puzzle with which 
we began this thesis.  
As we saw in Chapter 1, artworks can perform illocutionary acts due to their use of 
established and conventional methods of depiction and expression within their formal 
elements, and due to uptake being secured in the viewer. This makes sense of the claims that 
Picasso’s Guernica is a “generic plea against the barbarity and terror of war”, and “a bold 
visual protest” forming a “powerful anti-war statement,” since according to my adapted 
speech act theory, the artwork performs the illocutionary acts of pleading, protesting, and 
stating. And as we saw in Chapter 3, artworks possess propositional content. I offered a 
theory of how artworks express shallow and deep propositions, where a work communicates 
to its viewer types of basic or more complex ‘cognitive actions’. On this view, Guernica can 
‘say’ true things about the nature of war because the painting expresses propositions about 
war, which bear truth-values.  
Second, this thesis argues that what artworks say and do is sensitive to the curated 
context in which they sit. As we saw in Chapter 2, artworks can tell shallow or deep lies, but 
only under special conditions. Titian’s Rape of Europa can only lie about the nature of rape 
if it is knowingly curated in a special way, and if Titian or the curator believes that what the 
painting says is false. As I explained, lies in art are thus more difficult to come by than 
perhaps first thought. And we saw in Chapter 4 that one way that artworks can express deeper 
meanings is by using the mechanism (or function) of a metaphoric relation, a mechanism 
which is dependent on the context in which the artwork is displayed. What a work is a 
metaphor for is informed by contextual parameters surrounding the work, such as the work’s 
curation and the work’s history. And lastly, we saw in Chapter 5 that artworks can 
accumulate or alter in meaning over time, by responding to new events. For example, 
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Matthias Grünewald’s Isenheim Altarpiece possessed a different force and content in a 
desolate post-war Germany in the early 20th century than it did in the Monastery of St 
Anthony in the 16th century. This particular Constructivist view invokes a specific ontology 
of artworks, treating them as objects with the disposition to have growing histories, 
beginning with their original meaning, or ‘ROOT.’  
I have intentionally developed all of these arguments and accounts with a neutral 
backdrop of what depiction consists of (resemblance-based, conventional, or psychological), 
whilst noting that my proposition theory of art specifically may invoke a broadly 
psychological account of depiction; though I don’t intend this thesis to be an argument for 
such an approach to depiction. 
So artworks not only speak to us, but also are sensitive to their surroundings and new 
events that unfold around them. Old works can gain new import and gravitas, helping us 
make sense of contemporary trials and tribulations, while maintaining their own origins and 
histories with depth of meaning.  
The key figure facilitating this reactivity to contemporary situations, I argued, is the 
curator. Drawing on the curator’s growing visibility and power in the artworld, I argued that 
the curator is a central force in creating artworld situations which specifically (i) facilitate 
the performance of illocutionary acts by artworks, (ii) control whether artworks can lie and, 
if so, at what different levels, (iii) generate target domains that compose artistic metaphors, 
and (iv) help establish new contexts of utterance in which a work’s visual symbols can gain 
new denotations, thereby developing the artwork’s contents and illocutionary forces. 
Together, these arguments comprise my overall Anti-Originalist thesis that artwork 
meaning is active, and flexible. Artwork meaning is active because artworks can possess 
illocutionary force: they can do things. And artwork meaning is flexible because it’s 
sensitive to the curative and wider social context in which the work is displayed, and so the 
work can develop in meaning over time. This is an Anti-Originalist thesis because it denies 
the Originalist claim: it’s not the case that the facts that determine the meaning of an artwork 
are exhausted by the (relevant) facts about the work’s original context. The (relevant) facts 
about the work’s original context do indeed play a role in determining the overall meaning 
of an artwork, but the flexible nature of artwork meaning is influenced by factors outside the 
work’s original context, specifically, the curative and wider contemporary social context. 
So, (relevant) facts from non-original contexts can influence the meaning of an artwork as 
well. This forms a two-dimensional picture of artwork meaning that captures the importance 
 173 
 
 
of a work’s original context, but also allows a work to accumulate in meaning by being 
influenced by events subsequent to the work’s original setting.  
 
2. Upshots and future work in the philosophy of art 
 
If the central arguments of the thesis outlined above are correct, then the thesis has broad 
consequences for the philosophy of art. I will conclude by sketching these out, and I will 
gesture to what I take to be promising directions for future research in these topics. 
 
2.1. The Intentionalist Debate and the ‘-isms’ 
 
Recall that the Intentionalist Debate can be divided into two camps: Originalist and Anti-
Originalist. Traditionally, Actual Intentionalism, Hypothetical Intentionalism, and 
Conventionalism (an Anti-intentionalist position) fall within the Originalist camp. And the 
New Criticism method of interpretation (also an Anti-intentionalist position) falls within the 
Anti-Originalist camp.  
While the thesis is not directly about the Intentionalist Debate, through the lens of this 
debate the thesis can be seen as dividing into two halves. First, what I say in each chapter 
has some upshots for the existing positions in the debate. Second, my thesis creates space 
for novel Anti-Originalist positions. I’ll take each of these halves in turn. 
First, let us consider some general upshots. Chapter 1, which argues that artworks can 
perform illocutionary acts, is neutral on the Intentionalist Debate. The specific role that 
intention plays in a work’s performance of illocutionary acts was left open. But I argued for 
a derivative picture, and one that uses a ‘distant speaker’, considering three treatments of the 
role of intention by drawing on Actual Intentionalist, Hypothetical Intentionalist, and 
broadly Anti-intentionalist (both Originalist and Anti-Originalist) pictures of artwork 
meaning, noting some consequences along the way.  
However, given my argument in Chapter 2 that artworks can in fact lie (though with 
difficulty) this is problematic for Anti-intentionalist positions, both Originalist and Anti-
Originalist. For if reference to the intentions and beliefs behind a work is excluded in 
theorising about artwork meaning, then artworks, under this Anti-intentionalist framework, 
consequently cannot lie, for lying involves having beliefs, which artworks cannot possess 
themselves. Furthermore, Anti-intentionalists cannot avail themselves of this troublesome 
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result by admitting reference to the curator’s intentions, rather than the artist’s, in 
determining whether an artwork lies. For to do so might risk collapsing into a type of 
intentionalism. 
Chapter 3, which argues that artworks have propositional content, suggests a 
proposition theory of art with a Soamesian twist, whereby artworks communicate to their 
viewers types of ‘cognitive actions.’ This chapter as it stands is neutral on the Intentionalist 
Debate, though I sketched how it would fit within at least Actual Intentionalist and 
Hypothetical Intentionalist pictures of meaning. However, given that the Soamesian 
proposition theory of art offered invokes the notion of a cognitive act performed by an agent 
(or agents), suggests that it might be incompatible with Anti-intentionalist theories of 
artwork meaning, both Originalist and Anti-Originalist. More needs to be done though to 
investigate this possible incompatibility.  
Chapter 4, which argues that artworks can express deep meanings via their use of 
ARTISTIC METAPHOR, is incompatible with all of the Originalist positions: Actual 
Intentionalism, Hypothetical Intentionalism, and Conventionalism. This is because my 
account of ARTISTIC METAPHOR is an Anti-Originalist position: it allows curation to provide 
new target domains, and so leaves open the possibility that the curator draw on facts from 
contemporary, non-original contexts that depart from the context in which the work was 
created. Allowing this possibility thereby permits non-original contexts and new events to 
potentially affect the meaning of the artwork in question, and in this case, affect what 
metaphors might be expressed by the work. Moreover, ARTISTIC METAPHOR is also 
incompatible with the New Critic’s Anti-Originalist position, because my account also 
allows the work’s history, i.e. facts about the historical setting in which it was created, to 
provide target domains, thereby allowing the work’s original context to affect the overall 
meaning of the artwork. 
And Chapter 5, which argues against Originalism and for a particular Constructivist 
position, thereby rules out all of the Originalist positions: Actual Intentionalism, 
Hypothetical Intentionalism, and Conventionalism. But it also rules out the existing Anti-
Originalist Anti-intentionalist approach – that of the New Critic – because my particular 
Constructivist approach still gives a work’s original context theoretical importance in 
determining artwork meaning.  
The second consequence my thesis has for the Intentionalist Debate is that it creates 
space for novel Anti-Originalist positions. Specifically, the above results of each chapter 
begin to carve out new possible positions in the Intentionalist Debate: Anti-Originalist two-
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dimensional positions that capture the importance of a work’s original context, but also allow 
a work to accumulate in meaning by being influenced by non-original curated contexts. I’ll 
now outline how Chapters 1, 2, 4 and 5 reveal these novel positions.  
Chapter 1 can be seen as raising a problem for both Actual Intentionalism and 
Hypothetical Intentionalism, in that both positions look too restrictive on whom the ‘distant 
speaker’ in art is. According to a Hypothetical Intentionalist treatment of illocutionary 
performance in art, the person about whose intentions we are to hypothesise is the artist, and 
the artist only. And according to Actual Intentionalists, the person whose intentions are 
determiners of meaning are the artist’s and the artist’s only. But it looks like artworks can 
perform illocutionary acts derivatively on the intentions or beliefs of people other than the 
artist, perhaps the curator, which could be a single person or a collective entity. In relation 
to speech act performance, then, we should therefore acknowledge an expanded type of at 
least Actual Intentionalism or Hypothetical Intentionalism, but one that does not concern 
just the artist. We can bring in the curator too. On this kind of picture, the artwork might 
perform illocutionary acts derivatively on the artist’s or curator’s actual intentions, or 
derivatively on an ideal audience’s hypotheses about the artist’s or curator’s intentions. 
Similarly in Chapter 2, whether an artwork lies was argued to partly depend on the 
artist’s or curator’s beliefs about what the artwork says. We should again therefore recognise 
an expanded type of Actual Intentionalism or Hypothetical Intentionalism, that does not 
include just the artist’s beliefs and intentions when theorising about whether a work lies. We 
can bring in the curator too. On this kind of picture, the artwork might lie derivatively on the 
artist’s or curator’s actual beliefs, or derivatively on an ideal audience’s hypotheses about 
the artist’s or curator’s beliefs. 
In Chapter 4, the source and target domain fusion process within my ARTISTIC 
METAPHOR account was suggested to fit within a partial Hypothetical Intentionalist 
framework. This involves the audience detecting a metaphorical fusion by either 
hypothesising what the artist might have intended, via the work’s history, or hypothesising 
what the curator might have intended, given the show’s curatorial narrative and concepts. I 
suggested a partial Hypothetical Intentionalist approach because an Actual Intentionalist 
approach is incompatible with my metaphor account: target domains not envisaged by the 
artist may be provided, so my account treats the artist’s actual intentions as redundant. It is 
not necessary that the artist intend their work to be metaphorical for the work to be 
metaphorical, nor does what a metaphor convey depend on what the artist actually intended. 
So, a partial Hypothetical Intentionalist approach was suggested instead, whereby target 
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domains can be provided as a result of our hypotheses about what the artist or curator may 
have intended for the artwork. 
And lastly in Chapter 5, the Constructivist position argued for is Anti-Originalist but 
it still gives an artwork’s original context theoretical importance in determining work 
meaning. This therefore requires an Anti-Originalist two-dimensional theory of artwork 
meaning that captures the importance of a work’s original context, but also allows a work to 
accumulate in meaning by being influenced by non-original contexts. 
Tradition would have you believe that the only Anti-Originalist position is that of the 
New Critic. But like most things in the artworld, tradition must give way to progressive 
modernity. My thesis exposes some novel Anti-Originalist positions that haven’t yet been 
noticed. In sum, we should acknowledge Anti-Originalist variants of Actual Intentionalism 
and Hypothetical Intentionalism that draw on non-original contexts, including the role of the 
curator. These two new expanded intentionalist positions would ideally capture the 
importance of the original context to artwork meaning, but also capture the flexibility of 
artwork meaning in new, non-original contexts. I will briefly sketch out what these positions 
might look like. 
Under an expanded Actual Intentionalism, the artist’s successfully realised actual 
intentions or the curator’s successfully realised actual intentions in later contexts, determine 
artwork meaning. This position would accommodate the performance of illocutionary acts 
(including the act of lying) by artworks because it’s still a broadly intentionalist position. It 
would also fit neatly with my accumulation version of Constructivism because it assigns 
roles to both the original context via the artist’s actual intentions, and to non-original 
contexts via the curator’s actual intentions. However, as explained above, it likely would not 
fit neatly with my ARTISTIC METAPHOR account of metaphor in art.  
Under an expanded Hypothetical Intentionalism, artwork meaning is determined by a 
suitable audience’s hypotheses about what the artist meant by the work or hypotheses about 
what the curator meant in using the work in later contexts. This position also would 
accommodate the performance of illocutionary acts (including lying) by artworks because 
it’s still a broadly intentionalist position. It would also fit neatly with the accumulation 
version of Constructivism, because it assigns roles to both the original context via 
hypotheses about the artist’s intentions, and to non-original contexts via hypotheses about 
the curator’s intentions.  
Moreover, in contrast to an augmented Actual Intentionalism, an augmented 
Hypothetical Intentionalism looks compatible with my ARTISTIC METAPHOR account of 
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metaphor in art, for it does not treat as necessary what the artist or curator actually had in 
mind when determining any metaphors in the artwork. Rather, metaphors in art can be 
generated by target domains being offered by the work’s history or curation in new contexts. 
The former involves an ideal audience hypothesising about the artist and the context in which 
she created the work, and the latter involves the audience hypothesising about what the 
curator had in mind for the work. The actual intentions of neither the artist nor curator 
determine meaning, only suitably ascribed intentions do. 
The central two arguments of this thesis have been that artworks are active and flexible 
in meaning, and the thesis is by no means a comprehensive argument for an expanded Actual 
Intentionalism or expanded Hypothetical Intentionalism. Nor does it comprise a solid 
knockdown objection to all of the existing positions in the Intentionalist Debate. However, 
the results from the thesis do cast doubt on some of the existing positions in the Intentionalist 
Debate, and suggest schemas for the augmented intentionalist positions. I have offered a 
rough picture of what these two positions would look like. If the arguments of this thesis are 
correct, then the philosophy of art needs to remedy its neglect of the curator in theorising 
about artwork meaning. This is only a starting point, but I think one that forms a promising 
direction for future research into the meaning of art. 
 
2.2. Upshots for art and morality  
 
 
This thesis has been about how artworks say and do things. But the ability of expression and 
action comes with duties of responsibility. It is now documented that some speech acts can 
harm individuals and social groups.1 Indeed, the UN considers hate speech to be a type of 
verbal assault – the words used can constitute direct attacks on people – as well as inciting 
hatred and violence towards certain groups.2 Given, as I’ve argued, that artworks are speech 
acts, questions are raised about the types of social harm that some artworks might therefore 
constitute or cause. There’s a possibility that some artworks can harm individuals and social 
groups in the way that hate speech does. We should therefore consider the possibility that 
artworks might harm not only by saying immoral things, but also by constituting problematic 
                                                 
1 For example, see Langton (1993; 2016) and Waldron (2012). 
2 For an example of this, see ‘Tackle tabloid ‘hate speech’, UN commissioner urges UK’ BBC News (2015). 
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actions such as subordination.3 And given, as I’ve argued, that artworks can lie, the question 
of how art can harm through deception is also raised.  
Furthermore, by rejecting the long-standing dogma of treating the artist as the focal 
point in theorising about artwork meaning, this thesis raises questions about the moral 
responsibility of curators, as well as that of artists. If what I have said about the role of the 
curator in determining artwork meaning is true, then this will have profound significance for 
issues relating to the ethics of both art-making and exhibition-making. For instance, the 
‘Aryan’ artworks in the ‘Great German Exhibition’ (1937) told lies or at least falsehoods 
about Aryan race superiority, which likely perpetuated racial inequality. But were the artists 
responsible for this dangerous art, and its societal harm? Or did the responsibility entirely 
lie with Ziegler (and broadly the Nazi Party for which he was working), the curator(s)? If 
the curator indeed plays a role in the ways I’ve outlined in this thesis, then we need to be 
careful how we evaluate artists who have been co-opted by malignant ideologies. 
Answers to these questions will help us better understand whether and in what ways 
we should censor artworks, an issue becoming increasingly relevant with the resurgence of 
populist and totalitarian politics and the problems of giving hate speech a platform. This 
thesis lays the foundation for these areas, and carves new directions, the moral dimensions 
of which are yet to be explored.  
Theorising about artwork meaning has been predominantly an Originalist affair. My 
hope is that this thesis helps move future research into the meaning of art in an Anti-
Originalist direction, a direction that highlights the role of the curator and exposes the real 
power that art possesses, in its dynamic content and force. 
 
                                                 
3 This would therefore provide support for proponents of the view that visual pornography constitutes the 
illocutionary act of subordination. For example, see Bianchi (2008), Langton (1993), and Saul (2006). 
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